

JOURNAL OF UKRAINIAN STUDIES

Summer-Winter 1995

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SPECIAL ISSUE
Ukrainian Studies Association of Australia
Second Conference
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Preface

In 1985 the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* published a special issue that brought together Australian contributions to Ukrainian literary and linguistic scholarship.¹ Ukrainian studies as a university-taught discipline was at that time very new in Australia. Continuing Ukrainian programmes had been introduced at Monash University in Melbourne in 1983 and at Macquarie University in Sydney in 1984. Both were institutionally located within academic units teaching Slavic languages and literatures, both offered full undergraduate courses and supervised higher-degree candidates, and both were financed by regular contributions to the universities of funds collected by the Ukrainian community.

With slight variations, this pattern has persisted into the 1990s. Ukrainian studies at Monash University continues to be financed by the Ukrainian Studies Support Fund of the Association of Ukrainians in Victoria. At Macquarie University the Ukrainian Studies Foundation in Australia, in addition to funding the core programme, sponsored a succession of visiting scholars from North America. In more recent times the Foundation has evolved into a more generalized granting body supporting a range of research, publication, and other initiatives. Within the entire region the sole example of a Ukrainian course wholly funded from the public purse is to be found in Dunedin, New Zealand, where in 1988 the University of Otago introduced Ukrainian for higher-year students in the Department of Russian and Slavonic Studies.

Ukrainian studies research in Australia has concentrated on literary and cultural studies, dealing especially with the modern and contemporary period, and on synchronic linguistics, especially morphology.² These have also been the disciplines of the four doctoral dissertations on Ukrainian topics at Australian

1 *Monash University Scholars in Ukrainian Studies*, special issue, *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 10, no. 1 (summer 1985).

2 A bibliography of publications in Ukrainian studies by scholars associated with Monash University was published in *Ukrainian Settlement in Australia: Second Conference, Melbourne, 5–7 April 1985*, ed. Marko Pavlyshyn (Melbourne: Department of Slavic Languages, Monash University, 1986), 138–40. It has been updated in the newsletter *Monash Ukrainian Studies* 1 (1989), no. 1: 8–11; 2 (1990), no. 2: 9–10; 4 (1992), no. 1–2: 79; and 5–6 (1994): 5–6. Since 1990, lists of publications by members of the Ukrainian Studies Association of Australia have appeared in the association's *Biuletyn/Newsletter*.

universities.³ In addition, both the Monash and the Macquarie Ukrainian studies establishments have co-operated with the Shevchenko Scientific Society in organizing five conferences on the history of Ukrainian settlement in Australia and have published their proceedings.⁴ Three major reference works on the Ukrainian community in Australia have recently been completed.⁵

As was the case in other Western countries, scholars in Ukrainian studies in Australia began establishing links with their colleagues in Ukraine in the late 1980s. Macquarie, Monash, Newcastle, and James Cook Universities now have co-operation agreements or understandings with universities in Ukraine. While the volume of academic traffic between Australia and Ukraine does not approximate that between Ukraine and North America, there have been student exchanges, and a number of fruitful extended research visits to Monash University by young scholars from the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.⁶

In 1990 the Ukrainian Studies Association of Australia was founded in order to foster links with the Ukrainian studies community worldwide. In the following year the association became a member of the International Association of

3 Olesia Rosalion, "Ukrainian Homonymy" (Ph.D. diss., Monash University, 1985); Linda Sydor Petkovic, "Inflectional Patterns of the Ukrainian Verb" (Ph.D. diss., Monash University, 1993); Halyna Koscharsky, "Lina Kostenko: An Essay in the Poetics of Expressiveness" (Ph.D. diss., Macquarie University, 1994); Anna Berehulak, "Colonial, Anti-Colonial and Post-Colonial Positions in the Ukrainian Historical Novel: 1934–1989" (Ph.D. diss., Monash University, to be defended in 1996).

4 See *Ukrainian Settlement in Australia: Second Conference; Istoriia ukrainskoho poselennia v Avstralii: Dopovidi z druhoi konferentsii, Melborn, 5-7 kvitnia 1985* (Melbourne: Department of Slavic Languages, Monash University, 1986); *Ukrainian Settlement in Australia: Fourth Conference, Sydney, 22–24 April, 1988*, ed. Ihor Gordijew and Halyna Koscharsky (Sydney: School of Modern Languages, Macquarie University, 1989); *Istoriia ukrainskoho poselennia v Avstralii: Dopovidi z pershoi i chetvertoi konferentsii (Sidnei, 1983, 1988)*, ed. Halyna Koscharsky (Sydney: School of Modern Languages, Macquarie University, 1990); and *Ukrainian Settlement in Australia: Fifth Conference, Melbourne, 16–18 February 1990* (Melbourne: Monash University, Slavic Section, 1993).

5 *Almanakh ukrainskoho zhyttia v Avstralii* (Sydney: Vilna dumka and the Ukrainian Studies Foundation in Australia, 1994); *Entsyklopediia ukrainskoi diaspori*, vol. 4, ed. Vasyl Markus, Marko Pavlyshyn, and Volodymyr Troshchynsky (Kyiv: Naukove tovarystvo im. Shevchenka and Natsionalna akademiia nauk Ukrainy, 1995), which contains entries on Ukrainians in Australia and New Zealand; and *Ukraintsi v Avstralii*, vol. 2, ed. Serhii Iekelchik (Melbourne: Soiuz ukrainskykh orhanizatsii Avstralii, forthcoming in 1996), which updates vol. 1 (1966).

6 The publications resulting from these visits include *Stus iak tekst*, ed. Marko Pavlyshyn (Melbourne: Monash University, Slavic Section, 1992), a symposium whose contributors were literary scholars from Kyiv (Tamara Hundorova and Serhii Sarzhewsky) and Melbourne (Anna Berehulak, Marko Pavlyshyn, and Peter Sawczak); Serhii Iekelchik [Serhy Yekelchik], *Probudzhennia natsii: Do kontseptsii istorii ukrainskoho natsionalnoho rukhu druhoi polovyny XIX st.* (Melbourne: Monash University, Slavic Section, 1994); and Tamara Hundorova, *Ivan Franko—ne kameniar* (Melbourne: Monash University, Slavic Section, forthcoming in 1996).

Ukrainian Studies (MAU). It has been represented at the two MAU congresses that have been held thus far. The association also holds international conferences on its own territory. The first of these took place soon after the Ukrainian declaration of independence, and the proceedings were published at Monash University.⁷ The second conference, on which the present collection is based, was held in May 1995.

Of the sixteen papers, eleven are by scholars from Australia. Their subject matter reflects the predominantly literary and linguistic focus of Ukrainian studies in Australia. Four papers are by scholars from Ukraine, and one is by a scholar from the United Kingdom. The collection also contains the edited record of a round table on Polish-Ukrainian relations that was held as one of the sessions of the conference. The round table, an initiative of the Australian Institute of Polish Affairs, was co-sponsored by the institute and the Ukrainian Studies Association of Australia.

The major sponsors of the conference were the vice-chancellor of Monash University, Professor M. I. Logan, and the Ukrainian Studies Foundation in Australia. The foundation has also generously subsidized the publication of the present proceedings.

The editors express their thanks to Ms Natalia Romanowski-Vyshnevyy and Ms Olya Pavlyshyn for their invaluable technical assistance.

Marko Pavlyshyn
J. E. M. Clarke

⁷ *Ukraine in the 1990s: Proceedings of the First Conference of the Ukrainian Studies Association of Australia, Monash University, 24–26 January 1992*, ed. Marko Pavlyshyn and J. E. M. Clarke (Melbourne: Monash University, Slavic Section, 1992). This was followed on 19–21 June 1992 by a similarly topical conference held in Sydney by the Ukrainian Studies Centre at Macquarie University. Its proceedings were published as *Ukraine Today—Perspectives for the Future*, ed. Halyna Koscharyk (Commack, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 1995).

Ukraine and Russia: The Burden of Historical Tradition and Contemporary Realities

Iaroslav Isaievych

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence (or, in many cases, re-emergence) of the “new” independent states has been viewed by Russian public opinion from a perspective very different from that which is typical for the non-Russian republics.¹

For most Russians and sympathizers of the “Russian idea,” the independence of Russia’s former “younger brethren” looks like something accidental, caused by “Gorbachev’s mistakes,” “Yeltsin’s selfishness,” or even by the conspiracy of anti-Russian and “anti-Slavic” imperialist forces. In the past, most Russian public opinion did not consider the peoples incorporated long ago into the Russian Empire and “inherited” by the Soviet Union to be substantial subjects of the historical process. They were parts of the Russian state—at best, of its sphere of influence. Such a perception could not vanish as suddenly as the possibility of maintaining the Moscow-centred conglomerate of nations. Therefore the image that many Russians have of their relations with their neighbours must be, for the time being, anachronistic. As such, it can be used, and is being used, as an argument for implementing the “historical rights” of Russians, which can be realized in the form, if not of a “restructured” Soviet Union, then of a kind of Monroe doctrine extended across the region.²

1 The only exception is Belarus, where Soviet-implemented stereotypes appear, at least for the time being, to be too deep-rooted. On the other hand, it seems that in Ukraine even the majority of those who are in favour of closer contacts with Russia do not question the distinctiveness of the Ukrainian historical tradition. They do not regard it as non-existent, but only as “closely interwoven” with the Russian tradition.

2 Zenon E. Kohut, “History as Battleground: Russian-Ukrainian Relations and Historical Consciousness in Contemporary Ukraine,” in *The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 124.

By contrast, for the non-Russian nations independence is a result of their entire history. Even the term "newly independent states" seems misleading for those states that consider themselves heirs of national states that existed long ago.

Such is the case with Ukraine. The parliamentary declaration adopted on 24 August 1991 stressed that independence is the continuation of a thousand-year-old tradition of Ukrainian statehood. Such a state-oriented interpretation of Ukrainian history seems biased not only to the majority of Russians, but also to many Western historians, including those who are essentially sympathetic to the idea of Ukraine's revival. For example, Mark von Hagen deplores the fact that in contemporary Ukraine the leading principle of historiography is "an overly nationalistic rewriting of the past that posits a sovereign, national state as a teleological outcome of history." The quite natural reaction of Ukrainian scholars has been to point out that a teleological approach is typical for patriotic textbooks of national history in any country.³ The use of history for promoting political, ethnic, religious, and other ideas is not peculiar to Ukraine: it is a general rule, not an exception. The fact remains, however, that in a totalitarian society history is used (or rather, misused) in a particularly vulgar and undisguised way. For example, in the Soviet Union the study of the so-called *Short Course of the History of the Communist Party* was mandatory for all loyal citizens. When the concept of a Soviet people was introduced into public life and education, historians had to find foundations for it in the remote past. Thus the "history of the Soviet Union" was reduced to the history of Russia and the Soviet system ruled from Moscow. Each of over a hundred ethnic nations that allegedly constituted the Soviet people theoretically had the right to its own cultural development, but its history was allowed to be studied only in the framework of a Russocentric Soviet history. The non-existence of an independent political science in the USSR made the promotion of political ideas with the help of politically biased interpretations of history especially popular.⁴

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a national history that included the history of resistance to the expansion of Russia became the ideological basis of public education in all the former Soviet republics, with the obvious exception of Russia. In Russia the main trend has been to combine Russian nationalism with an imperial ideology that has been advertised as supranational or internationalist, but on a practical level has served revanchist ideals.

Many political scientists, both in Russia and elsewhere, agree that the restoration of a multinational state ruled from Moscow is incompatible both with

3 See the discussion "Does Ukraine Have a History," *Slavic Review* 54, no. 3 (fall 1995), 658-719.

4 For a detailed account, see Ivan M. Myhul, "Politics and History in the Soviet Ukraine: A Study of Soviet Ukrainian Historiography, 1956-1970" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1971).

the interests of world security and with the development of democracy in Russia itself. Thus nostalgia for the imperial past reflects historically implanted stereotypes rather than Russia's current national interests. More often than not, pro-Russian imperial interpretations of history have been accompanied by anti-Western, Slavophile, or Eurasian sentiments. On the other hand, the anti-imperial stereotypes popular in Russia's neighbouring states have, in most cases, been pro-European and pro-Western. It is true, however, that the initial fascination with an American and pan-European orientation has become weaker as a result of the policies of Western countries, which have often been perceived as essentially pro-Russian. In Ukraine and particularly in Belarus, anti-Western and pro-Russian trends have been more attractive for those who remain under the influence of pan-Slavist traditions. As a rule, those political forces that are openly pro-Russian have accepted a pan-Slavist interpretation of history.

As far as Ukrainian-Russian political relations are concerned, historical arguments are nowadays most often centred around those problems that were also central to Soviet propaganda and were defined in an official, symbolic text entitled "Theses on the Three-Hundredth Anniversary of the Reunion of the Ukraine with Russia (1654–1954): Approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union."⁵ This was a kind of summary of Ukrainian history written from a highly teleological point of view. In it the entire history of Ukraine before 1654 was interpreted as a preparation for the "reunion ... of the freedom-loving Ukrainian people ... with the Russian people in a single Russian state." Its history after that date was presented in terms of transition from the "friendship of the two great, kindred Slavonic peoples" to the "unbreakable friendship of the peoples of the USSR." Although the "Theses" were to be accepted without question by all Marxist historians, only in Ukraine were they treated, until recently, as an unquestionable dogma that was more important even than the pronouncements of Marx and Lenin.⁶

Among the historical problems that have been important for the pro-Soviet part of public opinion in Russia and Ukraine until now, the following are central: (1) the problem of the historical role of the medieval Kyivan state—namely, whether it was Ukrainian, Russian, or "the common heritage of the three fraternal East Slavic peoples"; (2) the problem of the Pereiaslav agreement: whether it was a voluntary act of "the reunification of Ukraine with Russia," or a political treaty that was subsequently misinterpreted and violated by the Russian authorities; and

5 I am using an official Soviet translation of the original Russian text into English (Moscow, 1954). For a reprint, see John Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1982), 270–88.

6 The Ukrainian scholar Mykhailo Braichevsky was severely persecuted when he tried to show that even from a strictly Marxist point of view, the conception of the "reunion" was nationalist rather than internationalist.

(3) the problem of the Soviet Union, its internal policy and wars: whether the "Soviet multinational state" was an instrument of Russian domination over non-Russian nations, or whether the Russians' rights were violated in the same way as the rights of other peoples.

The first problem has often been perceived as being the most important. That is because the myth of origin has been crucial for the shaping of any common identity. Significantly, both in Russia and in Ukraine there exist theories promoted by some self-proclaimed historians who trace the origins of all Slavic nations or only of their own nation back to very distant times, often to the Neolithic or the Bronze Age. Books written from such points of view are popular among some sections of the patriotic public. In Ukraine there are even religious sects based on forged proto-Slavic or proto-Ukrainian pre-Christian mythology. Although such trends have been gaining momentum, they remain marginal and have not affected academic scholarship.

It is well known that in tsarist Russia the state that was named Kyivan Rus' by later historians was considered the first stage of the Russian Empire. Academician Mykhailo Hrushevsky rejected this "traditional scheme of East European history" and proposed another conception, according to which the Kyiv region was the metropolis of the state, like Italy in the Roman Empire, while Russian ethnic territory could be compared with the colonies of the Roman Empire. After the Bolshevik revolution, Hrushevsky's theory was accepted by such prominent Russian historians as academicians Mikhail Pokrovsky and Aleksandr Presniakov. Pokrovsky was hostile to imperial schemes because he believed in world revolution, and from this perspective he rejected the nationalism of the tsars. On the other hand, Presniakov became loyal to the Soviet Union because for him this was the only way to save the rule of Moscow over countries that had been annexed by the tsarist state. In the 1920s Soviet authorities tried not to provoke anti-Russian feelings among the nations allegedly liberated from national oppression; therefore they condemned imperial Russification policies. In the 1930s, however, the situation changed. In fact, Stalin himself decided that Russian patriotism would be a better foundation for the cohesion of his empire than an ideology of proletarian internationalism. An imperial Russian interpretation of history, only cosmetically ornamented with Marxist rhetoric, became official until the dissolution of the Soviet multinational state. Any questioning of the Russian patriotic heritage was persecuted no less cruelly than was any questioning of Marxist dogmas.

According to the official Soviet view, "the common cradle" of the Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians was Kyivan Rus', which was inhabited by an "ancient Rus' nationality" (*drevnerusskaia narodnost* in Russian, *davnoruska narodnist* in Ukrainian). This scheme was a concession to the Ukrainians; in it they were accepted as a separate nationality, although their emergence was dated

no earlier than the fourteenth century. Russians had the right to call Kyivan Rus' a Russian state, but use of the adjective "Ukrainian" was forbidden when referring to that period.

It was assumed that the Ukrainians had appeared only as a result of a split in the "monolithic ancient Rus' nationality." The allegedly monolithic character of this culture was argued on the grounds that the liturgical language and forms of religious art were identical, or almost identical, in all the regions of Kyivan Rus'. This is true, but the Church Slavonic liturgy and Byzantine traditions in theology, church organization, architecture, painting, and music were common not only there, but to all the other Orthodox Slavs and even to the Romanians. Integrative processes in some spheres of culture played an important role, but this is not sufficient evidence for the existence of a common nationality for all the Orthodox Slavs. By the same token, the acceptance of the Latin language and Gothic architecture throughout medieval western and central Europe did not lead to ethnic integration there.

There is much evidence that each of the three East Slavic peoples emerged not as a result of the dissolution of the "ancient Rus' nationality," but rather as a result of the consolidation of several mutually related tribal unions. As far as the Ukrainians are concerned, their forerunners were such early Slavic ethnic groups as the Polonians, Siverianians, Dulibians, Ulychians, Tivertsians, Derevlians, and probably also the White Croats. Many historians even now underestimate the degree to which some distinctive features of the Belarusian, Russian, and Ukrainian cultures originated during the Kyivan Rus' period—and some even earlier.⁷ Those cultural elements that can be recognized as specifically Belarusian, Russian, or Ukrainian remained diversified mostly at the level of popular culture and the vernacular, whereas cultural integration within Kyivan Rus' and the entire Orthodox Slavic world proceeded mostly on the level of social elites.

The heritage of Kyivan Rus' has been erroneously qualified as Russian by those historians who still remain under the influence of the so-called traditional scheme of Russian history. This point of view seems to be supported by traditional ethnic terminology. All three East Slavic peoples called their languages by the same or similar words: *ruskyi*, *ruskii*, and the like. But the traditional ethnonym, *rusyn*, used in Kyivan Rus' (being the singular form of the collective *Rus'*) remained in use as an ethnonym only in Ukraine and Belarus.⁸

7 For a discussion of the problem of the role of the Kyivan heritage in Ukrainian cultural history, see Jaroslaw Pelenski, "The Contest for the 'Kievan Inheritance,'" in *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj et al (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992), 3–19; and my "Die mittelalterlichen Wurzeln der ukrainischen Kultur," in *Ukraine: Gegenwart und Geschichte eines neuen Staates*, ed. Guido Hausmann and Andreas Kappeler (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), 31–48.

8 The evolution of the meanings of *rusyn* is reflected in the Rus' chronicles and other sources.

This word was not used to refer to ethnic Russians, and is certain that the ethnonymic form *rusyn* was not generally accepted in Russia. Eventually the Russians took the adjectival form *ruskii* as their ethnonym.⁹ Outside Russia the Russians were called mostly by derivatives of the name Moscow—*Muscovites*, *Moskwa*, *moskali*, and so on—and were clearly differentiated from the *rusyny* and *Rus'*,¹⁰ which were used by the Ukrainians and Belarusians when referring to themselves.

In practice, only Soviet Ukrainian historians differentiated between *ruskyi* (which was, in Ukrainian, a synonym for “common East Slavic”) and *ruskii* or *rosiiskyi* (“Russian”). In Russian both concepts are rendered by *ruskii* (“Russian”), while *drevneruskii* is understood as “old Russian.” Thus, all culture that theoretically was declared the common heritage of the Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians has been perceived as Russian. Even now many Russians believe that Kyiv is a Russian city and that Russian history began on Ukrainian territory.

The Russians' appropriation of the medieval Kyivan heritage was clearly demonstrated during the celebration of the millennium of “Russian” Christianity. Although in 988 it was a Kyivan prince who adopted Christianity, in 1988 almost all the jubilee events were concentrated in Moscow.¹¹ It should be noted that under the tsarist regime the 900th anniversary of the Christianization of Rus' was celebrated in Kyiv: for the tsarist authorities Ukrainians did not exist, and consequently Kyiv was as Russian as Moscow. For the Soviet state and the Russian Orthodox hierarchy, however, it seemed politically incorrect to focus the 1988 festivities in the capital of Soviet Ukraine.

The current controversy over the character of the Kyivan state and over the origin of the Ukrainians and Russians has been generated by those who want to use the traditions of Kyivan Rus' as an ideological basis for the so-called Slavic Union, i.e., a form of political reintegration of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.

A similar controversy has continued on the question of the Pereiaslav agreement of 1654. On the occasion of its 340th anniversary, conferences were held in Moscow and Donetsk to promote the idea that “the legacy of Pereiaslav”

Initially it was only an ethnonym; later, however, it was also used to define political identity. The politico-territorial usage of *rusyn/rusin* (Latin *Ruthenus*) was typical even for sources from the Polish-ruled Rus' Palatinate in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, that is, from a period when the traditions of the Rus' principality of Halych were still alive. Later, when the Ukrainian and Belarusian territories became fully incorporated into other states, the use of *rusyn* reverted to its purely ethnic meaning. The word *rusnak* (known from the sixteenth century to recent times) has always had only an ethnic meaning.

9 The Russians later called the Ukrainians *cherkasy*, and both the Ukrainians and Belarusians *livva*.

10 The English term is “Ruthenians,” from Latin *Rutheni*.

11 Kohut, “Russian-Ukrainian Relations”; Ihor Kutash, “Soviet Union Celebrates 1,000 Years of Christianity,” *Christian History* 7 (1988), no. 2: 12–13.

should serve as the basis of the policy of solidarity of all three East Slavic nations. Not all Ukrainians understand that under present conditions Slavophile slogans can be of some use for the Slavic nations in conflict with non-Slav states (e.g., the Slovaks with the Hungarians, the Russians with the Islamic and Caucasian world). But they are of no use to the Ukrainians.

Until the end of the seventeenth century, the character of Russian culture was determined by its being part of Orthodox culture in its post-Byzantine variant. By contrast, the Ukrainian and Belarusian cultures began to attain distinctive characters much earlier under the influence of both the Eastern and Western Christian worlds. Outer expressions of this were the comparatively swifter "Westernization" of Kyivan Orthodoxy and, later, the appearance of the Eastern-rite Uniate Catholic church. As a result, in some important cultural areas Ukraine and Belarus remained in the post-Byzantine Orthodox tradition alongside Russia, the Southern Slavic nations, Romania, and Greece, while other aspects of Ukrainian and Belarusian culture were determined by contacts with the Roman Catholic and later also the Protestant communities. The situation was further complicated by influences from Islamic Oriental cultures and, in the case of Russia, by contacts with the indigenous populations of northern Europe and Asia.

The direction of late medieval and early modern cultural links was determined not only by cultural traditions, but also by the no less important political situation in eastern Europe. Early modern Russian culture developed under the protection of the independent state known as Muscovy. Although its cultural relations with the East and West never ceased, the ideologically motivated policy of the Muscovite state was that of cultural isolationism. The Westernization of Ukrainian Orthodoxy was viewed in Russia with suspicion as long as the cultural orientation of the tsars' state was determined almost exclusively by conservative circles. Later on, when pro-modernization trends in Russia took a firmer hold, the attitude towards Ukrainian and Belarusian innovations became more sympathetic. The Russians' direct contacts with Catholics and Protestants were instrumental in promoting the gradual processes of cultural secularization. In religious affairs the innovations were much more palatable when introduced not directly, but through the intermediacy of Ukrainians and Belarusians who had already modified foreign cultural models and adapted them to some degree to Orthodox traditions.

Most pro-Western Russian historians have evaluated the Ukrainian and Belarusian impact on Russian culture of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries very positively. At the same time, other Russian scholars, especially those with Eurasian or neo-Slavophile connections, have qualified the Ukrainian and Belarusian influences as disastrous for the identity of "Holy Russia." For example, a prominent Russian historian, Fr. Georges (Georgii) Florovsky, wrote that Metropolitan Petro Mohyla's reform of Orthodoxy was "even more

dangerous than the [Church] Union with Roman Catholicism." He condemned Metropolitan Stefan Iavorsky, St. Dimitrii (Tuptalo) of Rostov, and other clerics educated in Ukraine not only for their acceptance of Roman Catholic theological ideas and the Latin language, but also for their affinity to the European baroque. Florovsky deplored the fact that, in the words of Prince N. S. Trubetskoi, the culture of post-Petrine Russia was "the organic and direct continuation not of Muscovite tradition, but of Kyivan Ukrainian culture."¹²

If Russian historiography has been divided on this point, Ukrainian and Belarusian historians have been nearly unanimous in their enthusiasm for the role played by Ukrainians and Belarusians in the so-called "Europeanization of Russia." In most cases they have underestimated the extent to which the Ukrainian influence on Russian culture made subsequent Russification easier. The Ukrainian and Belarusian cultures were most vulnerable to Russification when their cultural development had lost momentum, owing mostly to unfavourable political conditions.¹³ Imperial discrimination against the Ukrainian and Belarusian cultures was devastating not only in its direct effects, but also because it provoked cultural isolationism and populist provincialization in the cultural life of the submerged nations. As far as Russian culture is concerned, the abyss between the popular and elite cultural variants contributed to the superficiality of its "Westernization" process. Perhaps this abyss also facilitated the emergence of the Bolshevik ideology and practice that materialized in the Soviet Union. Already in the early part of this century, Nikolai Berdiaev clearly defined the Soviet Union as a definite stage in the development of the Russian empire. Much later, in *Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?*, Andrei Amalrik stressed that Marxism delayed the dissolution of imperial Russia, but could not avert the inevitability of the collapse of the self-proclaimed "Third Rome." Nevertheless, nowadays idealization of the tsarist empire and its Soviet version is popular not only in Russian public opinion. It is also shared by many Russian historians. For example, Mikhail Dmitriev, the chairman of the Centre for Ukrainian and Belarusian Studies at Moscow State University, quite recently questioned the existence of "deliberate policies of Russifying Ukrainians and assimilating them." According to him, "although this question is ordinarily answered in the affirmative, [this] can hardly be convincing until new documents from the archives of the CC CPSU and other executive organs of the USSR are published. But even now, by viewing all these processes from within the society in which they were taking place, it is possible to say that the matter never came

12 Cited in Frank E. Sysyn, "Peter Mohyla and the Kiev Academy in Recent Western Works: Divergent Views on Seventeenth-Century Ukrainian Culture," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 8 (1984): 167.

13 See Zenon E. Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate, 1760s–1830s* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1989).

down to the oppression or discrimination of one nation by the other. Such concepts as well as, for example, the concept of 'imperial nation' applied to the Russians in the USSR, quite inadequately convey ... the real essence of the on-going socio-cultural processes."¹⁴

As far as the Second World War is concerned, the Russian and pro-Soviet interpretation has influenced not only war veterans throughout Eastern Europe, but also public opinion in the West. Memories of the policies of Hitlerite Germany in the occupied territories have contributed to the strengthening of pan-Slavist and even pro-Communist stereotypes; the latter appear very stable, at least for the generations who experienced the horrors of the war and the German occupation.

In this paper, it has been possible to mention only some of the historical problems that have influenced contemporary relations between Ukraine and Russia. Some other problems have been discussed by other authors.¹⁵ Much still remains to be investigated, and only a very general comparison of Ukrainian and Russian historiography can be made at this stage. The ideological consolidation of contemporary Ukraine is also taking place on the basis of remembrance of former injustices and of traditions of the struggle for survival. This process (with the exception of some marginal extremist interpretations) is being developed within a defensive context, since Ukraine has not had and cannot have any expansionist plans. At the same time, it seems that contemporary Ukrainian historians underestimate the importance of in-depth study of the historical background of Ukrainian-Russian relations, while Russian historians do not realize the importance of Ukrainian studies for the history of Russia. Although the Russian media devote much attention to alleged Ukrainian extremism, Russian scholars still do not realize the importance of Ukrainian subjects for Russian studies. Even for those of them who declare Ukrainian history to be a part of Russian history, things Ukrainian, perhaps on a subconscious level, are felt to be alien.¹⁶

Various developments have contributed to the fact that contemporary Russian historical consciousness is being nourished much more than ever before by nostalgic memories and historical stereotypes than by political realities. Edward Keenan is perhaps correct when he observes that previously the expansion of the

14 Mikhail Dmitriev, "Ukraine and Russia" (review article on Potichnyj et al., *Ukraine and Russia*), *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 35 (1993), no. 1-2: 131-47, here 146-7.

15 Kohut, "Russian-Ukrainian Relations"; Serhii M. Plokhyy, "Historical Debates and Territorial Claims: Cossack Mythology in the Russian-Ukrainian Border Dispute," in *The Legacy of History*, 147-70; and my "Early Modern Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine: Culture and Cultural Relations," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 17 (1992), nos. 1-2: 17-28.

16 By contrast, Polish historians have taken the initiative in organizing Polish-Ukrainian scholarly forums. Studies on Ukraine published in Poland exceed in quantity anything published in any other country except Ukraine, and many of them are of a very high quality.

Muscovite and Russian state, as a rule, was not driven by political myths. These were adapted *ex post facto*, often from Western sources.¹⁷ According to him, the situation has changed only recently. Among other things, a reaction to Soviet propaganda (which had formally rejected some nationalistic stereotypes), as well as the end of the Soviet Union (which is perceived by many Russians as nothing less than the humiliation of their great nation) contribute to the popularity of the imperial tradition.¹⁸ Such popularity prevails among much broader strata of public opinion than was the case in tsarist Russia, where the democratic and anti-tsarist sentiment limited the glorification of expansionism. Among Russian politicians today there are both sincere believers in the quasi-imperial historical mythology and those who use it in order to increase their popularity. Even the second approach is dangerous, because it creates a climate for political adventurism.

Political realities determine the need for coexistence and co-operation between neighbouring states. Bearing this in mind, historians must seek better mutual understanding. Textbooks of national history should focus mainly on the territories of the given contemporary state and should not implant in their readers the conviction that the territory of any other nation is its legitimate area.¹⁹ Mutual respect for the historical traditions of all nations is the *conditio sine qua non* of better understanding.²⁰ It is to be hoped that pragmatism will eventually prevail over the mythologization of realities. When this happens, historians of the East Slavic peoples will be able to carry out their research with less regard for non-scholarly considerations.

17 Edward L. Keenan, "On Certain Mythical Beliefs and Russian Behaviors," in *The Legacy of History*, 19–38.

18 Ibid., pp. 37–38.

19 There exists a Polish-Ukrainian joint commission for the mutual revision of textbooks of history and geography. But there have been no plans to establish a similar Russian-Ukrainian commission.

20 See Omeljan Pritsak "The Problem of a Ukrainian-Russian Dialogue," in *Ukraine and Russia*, ix–xiv; and N. V. Riasanovsky, "Conclusion," in idem, 327–30.

Creating a Sacred Place: The Ukrainophiles and Shevchenko's Tomb in Kaniv (1861–ca. 1900)

*Serhy Yekelchyk**

Formulating a definition of nation or nationalism is notoriously difficult. In this paper national identity should be understood as a certain shared semiotic network, and nationalism as the determination of a people to preserve and maintain the fundamental relations or structure of such a network. My aim is to demonstrate that the tomb of the greatest Ukrainian poet, Taras Shevchenko (1814–61), served as an important symbol in the national semiotic network in Ukraine and thus was instrumental in the consolidation of national consciousness and national cohesion there in the last third of the nineteenth century. As the resting place of “the father of the nation,” the tomb was especially well suited to assume a privileged place in the national semiotic network. First, it actualized the myth of the nation as a deep horizontal comradeship of brothers and sisters with a common “father.” Second, because the notion of the individual’s mortality, in contrast to the eternal life of the nation, is one of the most fundamental elements in the psychological base of national identity, Shevchenko’s tomb became an artificially and deliberately created “national sacred place.” This paper deals with the process of inventing the symbols and rituals connected with the poet’s tomb—that is, the process of the ideological “signification” of Shevchenko’s burial place by Ukrainian patriots in the Russian Empire from the 1860s to 1900.

Mausoleums and cemeteries, like the special cultural spaces that Foucault calls heterotopias, have a special relationship to “reality.” They are “mirror utopias,” real sites transfigured so that they attain an unreal relationship to time

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and space through cultural construction.¹ This cultural construction is, in fact, nothing but commemoration. In social memory, commemorative ceremonies serve as events that bring the “original narrative” of the community into focus. These rituals attempt to establish a continuity of collective memory for a given community. (When speaking of rituals, we are referring to a “rule-governed activity of symbolic character which draws the attention of the participants to objects of thought and feeling which they hold to be of special significance.”²) By such acts the community, as a temporally continuous entity, is able to transcend the ever-changing uniqueness of its individual members by ensuring the preservation of collective memory (or, in other terms, a shared semiotic system). Commemorative ceremonies perform a narrative of the past in the form of ritual. This narrative represents historical events as they have been transfigured into permanent structures and located in the metaphysical present of such historical constants as struggle, sacrifice, and victory. An individual is usually transfigured into a hero or a prophet.

The point of reference of monuments and memorials is a symbol. It is less the living memory of an individual than social discourse in which “history” is constructed and memory as a semiotic system is mediated. Because this memory is in constant flux, however, so too is the meaning of monuments or memorials. The discourse of history that is contained in these sites, which Pierre Nora calls *lieux de mémoire*, and the memory embedded in the social network of individuals involve a complicated web of interaction between past and present social and cultural practices. Acts of commemoration (memorials and ceremonies) are not so much unproblematic reflections of “real” collective memory as they are socially constructed discourses. Understood in this way, the relationship between collective memory and its symbolic patterns, *lieux de mémoire*, and historical “reality” is transformed by the cultural and social discourse of the past and of the present. As representations, acts of commemoration reflect both collective memory as it was enacted in representation practices in the past, and the social and cultural discourse that takes place in the present about the past.³

Communities are formed by the value choices of individual identities (or, we might say, semiotic systems), in which collective memory serves as the most important identity-forming element. In the case of the entity that is described as “the nation,” the “original narrative” brought into focus by the representation of *lieux de mémoire*—commemorative ceremonies—is the embodiment of the life-

1 Michel Foucault, “Of Other Spaces,” *Diacritics* 16 (1986): 24–5.

2 Steven Lukes, “Political Ritual and Social Integration,” *Sociology* 9 (1975): 291, as quoted in Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 44.

3 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: *Les Lieux de Mémoire*,” *Representations*, no. 26 (1989): 8–9.

history. Such "history" serves as the key element in the preservation of a community's coherence.

Considering their importance for national identity, the national "sacred sites" of Ukraine have not generated the historiography they deserve. In an earlier article I tried to show that the rituals and symbolic practices of Ukrainian patriots in the Russian Empire clearly reflected the dual character of the modern Ukrainian national myth. The traditions invented by Ukrainophiles⁴ of the 1860–1900 period represented the symbolic cohesion of two paradigms in the Ukrainian national myth—the Cossack paradigm (incorporating the argument of historical legitimacy) and the peasant paradigm (which was closer to modern democratic populism).⁵ The combination of these two strands in the Ukrainian national myth was first described by Marko Pavlyshyn in his article on Kotliarevsky's *Eneida*.⁶

By the nineteenth century, the Kyivan Caves Lavra, a monastery founded in the eleventh century, was already an official "all-Russian" Orthodox holy site that attracted hundreds of thousands of pilgrims each year. The old St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv and other churches had already been "signified" by the official Russian Orthodox Church, which was known for its loyalty to the empire and its Russificatory efforts. But such potential national *lieux de mémoire* as the so-called Askoldova Mohyla (Tumulus of Askold) in Kyiv⁷ or, even more, the ruins of the Golden Gate, a symbol of Kyiv's glory and power dating from the twelfth century, were ignored by the Ukrainophiles.

One could suppose that the peasant-populist component of the national myth made it impossible to create a national holy place in a city (Ukraine's cities being Russified) rather than in the countryside. Besides, an important peculiarity of the Ukrainian quest for a national sacred place was its essential separation from the official Russian Orthodox Church, because that church, though common for both the Ukrainians and Russians, served as an instrument of Russification.

It should be stressed, however, that the Cossack component of the Ukrainian national myth had already provided the Ukrainophiles with a historical place imbued with rich national(ist) memories: the island of Khortytsia—the site of the

4 This term was originally used as a contemptuous label for Ukrainian patriots in the Russian press of the 1860s and 1870s, but was then adopted by the Ukrainians themselves. In the course of time, however, the term came to be applied only to the supporters of the culturalist (non-political) trend in the Ukrainian national movement.

5 Serhy Yekelchuk, "The Body and National Myth: Motifs from the Ukrainian National Revival in the Nineteenth Century," *Australian Slavonic and East European Studies* 7 (1993), no. 2: 31–59.

6 Marko Pavlyshyn, "The Rhetoric and Politics of Kotliarevsky's *Eneida*," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 10 (1985), no. 1: 9–24, here 20–1.

7 A relic of pre-Christian Rus' attributed in the Primary Chronicle to the ninth century and depicted already in 1835 as a symbol of the "old times" and loyalty to ancient local rulers in Aleksei Verstovsky's *Askoldova mogila*, a popular opera that is still performed in Kyiv.

former Cossack Sich—and the nearby Dnieper Rapids. This place undoubtedly had, and still has, an important place in the semiotic system of Ukrainianness, but two pragmatic factors prevented this site from becoming the major national sacred place in the second half of the nineteenth century. First, before the huge dam of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station was built in the 1920s, it was almost impossible to reach the island and the rapids by water (precisely because of the rapids), and the land route to them was also inconvenient. Second, this historical site was insufficiently concrete, having no single and impressive monument or building. A convenient point of application of patriotic loyalties, so to speak, was absent. After all, Khortytsia and the rapids were places with some resonance for nationalist intellectuals, but they had never been places of pilgrimage for the peasants. The tradition of pilgrimage to an all-national Ukrainian holy place had yet to be created.

Shevchenko's tomb became the sacred place that symbolized the cohesion of both components of the national myth. It combined the populist charisma of the poet of a peasant nation with a powerful historical image of the Cossack past that Shevchenko had elaborated in his own poetry—the *mohyla*, or Cossack burial mound. This combination established the potential of Shevchenko's tomb as a central item in the semiotic system of Ukrainianness.

When Shevchenko died in St. Petersburg on 26 February (10 March N.S.) 1861, it was clear to his friends and the members of the St. Petersburg Ukrainian Hromada that his grave might become a place of pilgrimage at least for nationally conscious intellectuals. According to his famous poetic last will ("Zapovit," 1845), Shevchenko himself wanted to be interred in a *mohyla* on the banks of the Dnieper:

Як умру, то поховайте
Мене на могилі,
Серед степу широкого,
На Вкраїні милій,
Щоб лани широкополі,
І Дніпро, і кручі
Було видно, було чути,
Як реве ревучий.⁸

[When I die, then make my grave / High on an ancient mound, / In my own beloved Ukraine, / In steppeland without bound: / Whence one may see wide-skirted wheatland, / Dnipro's steep-cliffed shore, / There whence one may hear the blustering / River wildly roar.]⁹

8 Taras Shevchenko, *Povne zibrannia tvoriv* (henceforth *PZT*), vol. 1 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1989), 268.

9 "Testament," in Taras Shevchenko, *Song Out of Darkness: Selected Poems*, trans. Vera Rich (London: Mitre Press, 1961), 85.

In his speech during Shevchenko's funeral in St. Petersburg, on behalf of all Ukrainians Panteleimon Kulish promised to fulfil the poet's last will: "You wanted, Taras, to be buried above the Dnieper-Slavuta, for you loved and painted and glorified it. We trust in God that we will fulfil even this wish of yours. You will lie, Taras, in your native Ukraine, on the bank of the famous Dnieper, for you have united its name with yours forever."¹⁰

Initially there were several proposals regarding the place in Ukraine where Shevchenko should be buried. The main source of information about them is an article published in 1861 in the monthly *Osnova*. According to it, immediately after the poet's death the circle of Ukrainian activists in Kyiv sent a telegram to St. Petersburg proposing that Shevchenko's body be brought to Ukraine at their expense and buried in Kyiv. One young landowner from Chernihiv gubernia offered to bury Shevchenko on his estate and to raise "a high *mohyla* in accordance with the old custom."¹¹ In a letter (9 March 1861) to Mariia Gogol (Hohol), Nikolai Gogol's mother, Panteleimon Kulish informed her that "the Kyivans are asking [for permission] to transport his [Shevchenko's] mortal remains to Ukraine [and] promising to meet all the expenses, and more than a thousand silver roubles have been collected here for this very purpose."¹²

Meanwhile, on the evening of 26 February 1861, the day of Shevchenko's death, Ukrainian activists in St. Petersburg gathered in Mykhailo Lazarevsky's apartment to arrange the poet's funeral and discuss how to implement immediate commemorative measures. They approved a number of plans, including some that were obviously unfeasible at the time (establishing schools named after Shevchenko, university scholarships and awards in his memory, and so on). Of the nine resolutions they adopted, the first two and the last one are of special interest to us: Shevchenko's body would be brought to Ukraine; a monument to him would be built; and some of his closest friends would visit his tomb in Ukraine each year.¹³

The last resolution indicates that the activists had no inkling of what the future role of the poet's tomb would be and that they even suspected that, without special commemorative efforts, the tomb might be neglected by their contemporaries. There was some point to their concern, since a symbol has no meaning by itself. Meaning is created, grasped, activated, and communicated by

10 P. O. Kulish, "Slovo nad hrobom Shevchenka," *Osnova*, 1861, no. 4: 5–6. (All translations in this article are mine unless otherwise noted.) "Slavuta" (or "Slavutych") is the Old Slavic name for the Dnieper.

11 "Znachenie Shevchenka dlia Ukrainy: Provody tela ego v Ukrainu iz Peterburga," *Osnova*, 1861, no. 6: 13–14.

12 P. O. Kulish, "Pismo k M. I. Gogol 9 marta 1861 g.," *Kievskaiia starina*, 1903, no. 2: 115 (second pagination).

13 "Znachenie Shevchenka dlia Ukrainy," 14.

individuals. Symbols acquire meaning only as individuals create, connect, and use them to encode and communicate their experiences; and the range of potential meanings may be largely the result of prescription through socialization—speech, rituals, dictionaries, and so on. What is true of socialization with established symbols is also true of the creation of symbols. Symbols acquire meaning as devices to represent patterns of experience. Thus, Shevchenko's followers gave rich meaning to his death (and tomb) in accordance with the meaning they sought to give to their own lives. In this way the poet's tomb became one of the central symbols in the semiotic network of the modern Ukrainian national identity.

The passage through Ukraine of the coffin with the poet's remains was in itself of great importance for the consolidation of Ukrainian national consciousness, which ran parallel to the establishment of Shevchenko's personality cult. In most towns and in many villages the hearse was met with processions and requiem services. In Kyiv students unharnessed the horses and pulled the vehicle themselves.¹⁴

According to Shevchenko's first biographer, Mykola Chaly, the place where the poet would be buried had been the topic of protracted correspondence between the Ukrainian activists in Kyiv and St. Petersburg. The Kyivans insisted on burying Shevchenko in a "Christian cemetery" in Kyiv (and not on a hill on the Dnieper's bank outside the city). Two prestigious Kyivan cemeteries, both located in the Dnieper Hills, were proposed: at the Vydubychi Monastery or at the church at the Askoldova Mohyla site. Finally the Kyivans fixed their attention on a less prestigious cemetery. It was located on a much higher hill in Kyiv—Shchekavytsia, where the poet's tomb would certainly be more noticeable both in the literal and the metaphorical sense. Without informing the St. Petersburg Hromada, the poet's so-called brother (in fact, a distant relative), Varfolomii Shevchenko, arranged for a grave to be dug and for a large cross to be prepared at the Shchekavytsia cemetery.¹⁵

It appears that when Shevchenko's body arrived in Kyiv, a consensus on where to bury the poet had not yet been reached. Differences between the Kyivans and the St. Petersburg Hromada members who had come for the funeral immediately resurfaced, and Shevchenko's body was left in the nearest church for a night. It appears that the St. Petersburg contingent was intellectually stronger and more authoritative. Shevchenko had spent his last years in their city, and their point of view finally prevailed. A decisive role in this regard was played by the artist Hryhorii Chestakhivsky, a person with a clear understanding

14 The entire journey is documented in detail in a recently published collection of materials, *Ostannim shliakhom Kobzaria*, ed. M. L. Novytsky (Kyiv: Ukrainskyi litopys, 1994).

15 M. K. Chaly, *Zhizn i proizvedeniia Tarasa Shevchenka (Svod materialov dlia ego biografii)* (Kyiv, 1882), 189–91.

of some of the symbolic and mythological consequences that the location of Shevchenko's tomb might have in the future. He emphatically claimed that he had been with the poet during the last moments of his life (this later proved to be untrue) and insisted that when he had asked Shevchenko where he should be buried, the bard had allegedly responded, "in Kaniv." In the opinion of the St. Petersburg Hromada members, Shevchenko meant the so-called Chernecha Hill near Kaniv, where he had once intended to build himself a house.¹⁶

On 8 May the poet's body was transported by steamer to Chernecha Hill, which was conveniently located by the Dnieper a couple of hours downstream from Kyiv. Again, a grave had already been dug at a cemetery near the local church, and again Chestakhivsky protested, insisting, in the name of the St. Petersburg Hromada, that Shevchenko be buried on a different hill far from the church and the local cemetery. As usual, he prevailed,¹⁷ and the bard was finally buried on Chernecha Hill near Kaniv, high above the Dnieper's right bank.

Because professional grave diggers had demanded a disproportionately large fee (100 roubles), the intellectuals from Kyiv and St. Petersburg, together with the poet's relatives, dug Shevchenko's grave themselves. For over two months after the funeral, when all of the late poet's friends and relatives had already departed from Kaniv, with the help of local peasant volunteers Chestakhivsky built up over the grave a wide and long earthen mound approximately three metres high. It was covered with stones, and a tall wooden cross was erected at the head of the tomb. The process of raising Shevchenko's tomb was photographed several times. Given the rarity of photography in provincial Ukraine in 1861, this is an indirect confirmation of Chestakhivsky's attention to symbolic aspects of the construction. Some characteristic populist photographs of the tomb have survived (such as "Peasants Raising Shevchenko's Tomb").¹⁸

The tomb was finished. Now came the task of imbuing it with meaning as a national symbol and to communicate this meaning—in other words, to give the tomb the meaning of a national sacred place. This work was begun by Chestakhivsky. On 20 June 1861 he wrote in a letter about the funeral: "I walked among the people, told them what kind of man Taras had been, [and] beseeched them not to call him a lord, but to call [him] father Taras.... That is why the people gathered around me in a throng: they wanted to hear a speech, and I did not stint this commodity. Everywhere Taras had been taken for a colonel or a general. 'My good people! God [only] knows why you show such disdain for the simple serf Taras!'—roared [my words] like thunder in the ears of the common

16 Ibid.

17 "Pisma Chestakhovskago, pisannyia v 1861-m godu o pokhoronakh poeta Shevchenka," *Kievskaiia starina*, 1898, no. 2: 175–82.

18 See V. K. Kostenko, *Stezhky do Kobzaria* (Kyiv: Radianska shkola, 1964), 7.

people.... He was a father to all the children of Ukraine and loved all of them equally."¹⁹

As we see, even local peasants at first did not know who had been buried near Kaniv. According to Chestakhivsky, the first visitors to the poet's tomb were Belarusians floating timber down the Dnieper. Obviously they visited the place simply out of curiosity. Then steamship passengers appeared (Kaniv quay was just five hundred metres away from the poet's tomb), among them officers, officials, students, and ladies. Some of them were certainly acquainted with Shevchenko's poetry, but the tomb was still more a tourist attraction than a place of pilgrimage. Only gradually did small groups of priests and peasants from neighbouring villages begin to arrive, mainly on Sundays and holidays.²⁰ They were probably the first visitors who came especially to see the tomb of the Ukrainian national poet. Unfortunately, we know nothing of their motivations or of their perceptions (a visitors' book was kept there only from 1897).

From 12 May to the first days of August 1861, Chestakhivsky lived in a small village near the tomb and regularly talked to local peasants. Later, during an official inquiry, he denied that these talks had any political or nationalist content. He admitted, however, that he had read and explained works by Shevchenko, Kvitka-Osnovianenko, and other Ukrainian writers to the peasants and had disseminated among them literature printed for that purpose in Ukrainian in St. Petersburg.²¹

The inquiry's materials shed more light on Chestakhivsky's propagandist activities and his myth-creating efforts. Extracting his real words from the various rumours collected by the officials for the inquiry's record is not easy, but it is a fascinating exercise in deconstructing a system of symbols and non-rational ideas generated through single-minded propaganda.

1. "In a suburb of Kaniv there lives a certain Hryts, a peasant musician who, they say, returned to life after being dead for sixteen years." "He is considered to be a grandson of Gonta or Zalizniak."²² Chestakhivsky, to whom these rumours applied, had indeed been born a peasant, but in 1861 he was a middle-rank government official in St. Petersburg. He was an artist, not a musician. The idea that he had come back to life after being dead for sixteen years is probably based on what he told the peasants about the spiritual resurrection he had experienced with the awakening of his Ukrainian national consciousness. The theme

19 "Pisma Chestakhovskago," 180-1.

20 Ibid., 233.

21 "Epizod na mogile Tarasa Shevchenka (Zapiska khudozhnika Chestakhovskago," *Kievskaiia starina*, 1896, no. 2: 234.

22 D. D. Kopytsia, ed., *T. H. Shevchenko v dokumentakh i materialakh* (Kyiv: Derzhpolityvdav URSR, 1950), 274 and 283. Ivan Gonta and Maksym Zalizniak were leaders of the Koliivshchyna peasant uprising in Right-Bank Ukraine in 1768.

of death and resurrection is characteristic for all such stories. The notion that Chestakhivsky was a grandson of Gonta or Zalizniak is obviously the consequence of peasants understanding another metaphor quite literally.

2. "[They] said that Shevchenko is not dead but alive and that he is always thinking of [his] dear Little Russia and that in time he will give the signal for Little Russians to act; that there are knives in his tomb, and that soon Taras's night will come, when landlords and Poles will be slaughtered." "There is a rumour that Chestakhivsky was successful in persuading the common people that it was not Shevchenko's body, but knives that had been buried in the tomb. These knives had been sent there for the purpose of conducting a slaughter and thereby obtaining full freedom for the common people." "There is an investigation concerning the consecrated knives [allegedly] hidden in Shevchenko's tomb above his mortal remains for the purpose of a general extermination of landlords, priests, and all people in fine coats with tall collars, and also concerning the countless Cossacks scattered throughout Ukraine from Khortytsia [Island] to the Taman [Peninsula], in all of the Zaporizhzhia [the territory beyond the rapids] along the Dnieper, and in other areas, who are to gather in Kaniv to accomplish what was preached by 'father Taras' (Shevchenko)."²³

Here we see a whimsical conjuncture of motifs from Shevchenko's long poem "Haidamaky" (the character Taras Triasylo from the section of the poem titled "Taras's Night" had been understood as Shevchenko himself, and the theme of consecrated knives had been taken seriously) and Chestakhivsky's comments on the poem and his attempts to explain the ethnic and historical unity of the Ukrainian lands. (The inquiry established that Chestakhivsky had explained Shevchenko's works to the peasants, and "Taras's Night" is named as the most popular booklet he disseminated among them.) The themes of the "father" who is dead and yet alive and of the human body transformed into weapons have numerous parallels in the mythology of various peoples. In this case, however, their presence is not the result of conscious borrowing, but of the fundamental similarity of some structures of myth-creation and symbolic thinking.

3. "Shevchenko's body was buried with such solemnity and enthusiasm for him was aroused so skilfully and zealously, that people gathered in crowds at his tomb; people making their pilgrimage to Kyiv come here along the way as to a *sacred place*: [they] revere Shevchenko as their people's prophet, and his every word as sacred for his people." "Some of the peasants who were there are sure that they received their freedom as a result of Taras Shevchenko's activities, and that soon they will receive even greater freedom, and others prostrated themselves before Shevchenko's mortal remains, explaining that he is a

23 Ibid., 277, 272, and 279.

venerable saint and that if he were not, his body would not have been brought from [St.] Petersburg."²⁴

The new cult described above was created by the Ukrainophiles, who deliberately (and in some sense sincerely) propagated the "immortality" of "father Taras." However, it is clear that the popular base of this new cult had been prepared by the centuries-old tradition of worshipping local saints and of pilgrimage to local sacred places. As a matter of fact, the semiotic network of religiosity has very much the same structure as the semiotic network of national identity, and symbol-making in both systems has the same rules.

Shevchenko's tomb was destined to be not only a kind of local sacred place, but an all-national symbol of cohesion. Roughly speaking, what was begun in 1861 in Kaniv was the process of making local peasants into Ukrainians. It was precisely the prospect of the mobilization of the peasants for the Ukrainian national cause (and, more broadly, for the cause of social liberation) that frightened local Polish landlords. They even asked the authorities to dig up the tomb (the most radical way of deconstructing a myth!) to show the peasants that there were no knives in it.²⁵ The threat of popular upheaval was taken seriously even by the authorities: a squadron of the 37th Don Cossack Regiment was stationed in Kaniv, Chestakhivsky was forced to leave Ukraine and return to St. Petersburg, and several peasants were arrested.²⁶

With the consent of the Kyiv Hromada, Varfolomii Shevchenko formally assumed responsibility for tending the tomb. To facilitate the granting of official permission, he called himself Taras Shevchenko's brother. After that his responsibility was registered legally. In April 1863 he asked for permission to make minor repairs to the tomb. This was granted, but not before the chief of the local police certified that the tomb was truly in need of repair and assured the governor-general of Kyiv that he would personally see to it that "no manifestation would be permitted."²⁷

The repairs carried out in 1863 were insignificant: the stones that covered the tomb were readjusted, and the cross was moved to the top of the burial mound. Nothing else was done until the early 1880s. After the repairs were finished, Varfolomii Shevchenko asked the owner of the land where Shevchenko was buried, the Kaniv town community, to sell him half a *desiatin* (thirteen and a half acres) so that he could plant a garden. His request was not approved. Only in December 1869, after protracted correspondence with the Ministry of the Interior and the governor-general, was he permitted to rent 1,200 sq. *sazhni* (5,465 sq.

24 Ibid., 283 and 291. Emphasis added.

25 Ibid., 284.

26 Ibid., 278 and 289–90.

27 Ibid., 294.

m.) around the tomb with the proviso that he would plant a garden and build a fence around the tomb.²⁸ The fence was not installed until 1883, however, because of a lack of funds.

When the prominent Ukrainian writer Ivan Nechui-Levytsky visited the tomb in December 1880, it was overgrown with grass and small bushes: "The ground at the foot of the cross has been trampled hard. On the cross, as high as one can reach, are carved the names of tourists who have visited the grave. But the weather and inexorable time have erased the inscriptions and worn the paint from the cross."²⁹ Another visitor, the Russian author Nikolai Leskov, wrote in August 1882, "I visit Kaniv almost every year.... The tomb is constantly visited. And it is crumbling precisely because it has not been forgotten.... The common people, whom Shevchenko understood and loved so much, are attracted to this place by an irrepressible need 'to grieve with their father.'"³⁰

Finally, the natural deterioration of the unmaintained tomb reached its culmination. In the autumn of 1882 its wooden cross collapsed. The prominent Ukrainian activist, writer, and playwright Mykhailo Starytsky visited the site in October 1882. After this trip he wrote an anxious and wrathful poem, "On [the Occasion of] Shevchenko's Anniversary":

За Каневом, на горах, аж на чолі,
Де унизу Дніпро щось гомонить,—
Могила єсть; її дощі поволі
Розмили вкрай, дубовий хрест лежить;

І щовесни з гори рвуть хвилі глину,
Обвалюють у воду береги,
Щоб вирвати в недбальців домовину
Й на дні сховать останки дороги ...³¹

[Outside Kaniv, in the hills, at the very top, / Where the Dnieper can be heard murmuring below, / There is a tomb; the rains gradually / Have washed it away; the oaken cross has fallen; // And each spring the waves tear away clay from the hill, / They bring the river bank tumbling into the water / So that they might seize the coffin from the uncaring ones / And cherish the precious remains at the [river's] bottom.]

28 P. L. Shestopal, *Mohyla T. H. Shevchenka* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo Akademii nauk URSR, 1954), 22-4.

29 Ivan Nechui-Levytsky, "Shevchenkova mohyla," in his *Zibrannia tvoriv*, vol. 4 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1966), 8.

30 Quoted as cited in Kostenko, *Stezhky do Kobzaria*, 10.

31 Mykhailo Starytsky, "Na rokovyny Shevchenku," in his *Tvory*, vol. 1 (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1989), 88.

As a true populist, Starytsky concluded that only the common people loved Shevchenko sincerely. He reported that "even at night [they] trudge to the hill where the martyr's remains [are buried]." ³²

Ukrainian activists initiated a campaign to raise funds for renovating the tomb. In the summer of 1882 the governor-general approved the project. The earth-moving works commenced immediately; a warden's house was built; and a cast-iron cross and fence for the tomb were ordered from the Termen plant in Kyiv. However, the tomb was not finished that year, for the governor-general refused permission for the cross to leave the plant because of a quatrain by Shevchenko that had been inscribed on it:

Свою Україну любіть,
Любіть її ... во врем'я люте,
В остатню, тяжкую мінуту
За неї Господа моліть. ³³

[Love your dear Ukraine, adore her, / Love her ... in fierce times of evil, / In the last dread hour of struggle, / Fervently beseech God for her.] ³⁴

Only on 7 July 1889, after the inscription had been deleted, was official approval issued. When the renovation works were finished, members of the Kyiv Hromada organized a requiem. To prevent "Little Russian manifestations" during the service, the local authorities again asked the governor-general to station a squadron of Don Cossacks in Kaniv. ³⁵

From 1883 to 1933 a resident of Kaniv, Ivan Iadlovsky, was warden of Shevchenko's tomb. He planted fruit trees around it and bushes and maples on the slopes of Taras's (Chernecha) Hill to prevent spring washouts and landslides. More importantly, he fitted out a room in the warden's house, which came to be called "Taras's front room" (*Tarasova svitytisia*). The room contained a large copy of Ilia Repin's portrait of the poet, and Shevchenko's *Kobzar* was always on the table. Most importantly, Iadlovsky collected and retold various stories about the poet's life and death, ³⁶ thus maintaining the (spiritual) symbolic status of the place.

After the renewal of the tomb in 1884, pilgrimages to it as manifestations of national identification became very frequent. An 1886 description by Ivan Bilyk (Panas Myrny's brother) captures the tomb's appearance and its popularity: "Shevchenko's tomb is an unusual mound the size of the ancient barrows of the prehistoric period. A huge kurgan—that is what *Shevchenko's tomb* is—on

32 Ibid.

33 Shevchenko, "V kazemati (XII. Chy my shche ziidemosia znovu?)," in *PZT*, 2 (1991): 13.

34 "Shall we Ever Meet Again," in *Song Out of Darkness*, 88.

35 Shestopal, *Mohyla T. H. Shevchenka*, 30.

36 Kostenko, *Stezhky do Kobzaria*, 12–13.

which, already from a distance, a tall cross reminds all travellers on the Dnieper of the resting place of the famous "Kobzar" of Ukraine. This tomb has become a favourite visiting place not only for passers-by, but also for local residents—for city dwellers, peasants, and pilgrims. Judging by the number of paths leading to that tomb, one may really say that "the people's path to it will not be overgrown."³⁷

After Varfolomii Shevchenko's death, guardianship of the tomb officially passed to the editorial board of the journal *Kievskaiia starina* (representing, in fact, the Kyiv Hromada, which could not be registered legally).

In the 1880s and 1890s the tomb was regularly visited by Ukrainian intellectuals. Two celebrated writers left detailed descriptions of the place: Ivan Nechui-Levytsky (in 1880) and Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky (in 1890). Both accounts can be analysed against the pattern of nationalist and populist discourse.

Nechui-Levytsky's essay on Shevchenko's tomb was published in 1891 in the literary miscellany *Luna*. The essay, which is quite characteristic of its author, presents a long and detailed description of the road to the tomb and the site itself. It offers a sort of artistic substantiation of the cult of Shevchenko's tomb: "We stood atop Shevchenko[']s tomb] and bowed our heads. The proximity of a great man's remains has a great, inexpressible impact on the human heart. Great people speak to the living through the earth from their coffins."³⁸ The essay's tone is one of grief—not of grand, sublime sorrow, but rather of depression and despair: "It is not quiet reverie or a poetic dream of the historical past, of antiquity, that spreads its wings over Shevchenko's tomb. No! Something heavy lies upon one's heart and chokes it, like the stones that cover his tomb.... Sorrow has flooded this country like an invisible river of grief."³⁹

This metaphor was quite common among the populist writers of the time, being preoccupied as they were with the life of the common people (mainly peasants) and with social inequality and oppression. However, in the paragraph between the two passages quoted above we find a definition of Shevchenko as "a true son of miserable Ukraine." This allows us to assume another connotative meaning of "the river of grief"—that of the national oppression of Ukrainians in the Russian Empire.

Much the same may be said of Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky's essay of the same title written for the Galician Ukrainian youth magazine *Dzvinok* (1890). Surprisingly for an author with the reputation of being an aesthete and an impressionist, it bears all the traditional clichés of the propagandist populist-patriotic

37 I. Bilyk, "Trevoga nad svezhei mogiloi T. G. Shevchenka," *Kievskaiia starina*, 1886), no. 4: 709. Emphasis in the original. "The people's path to it will not be overgrown" is a quotation from Pushkin's poem "A Monument."

38 Nechui-Levytsky, "Shevchenkova mohyla," 8.

39 Ibid.

style: "did Slavuta" (grandfather Slavuta), "bili khatky" (white little cottages), "kucheriavi sadochky" (ornate little gardens), "mezhy vysokymy verbamy dziurchyt strumochok" (among the tall willows purls a brook), "zolote sonechko" (golden little sun), and so on.⁴⁰ These clichés were, in fact, commonly recognized signs from the national semiotic system. Like Nechui-Levytsky, Kotsiubynsky creates in his essay an atmosphere of woe: "Sorrow falls on one's heart like a heavy stone, tears stream from the eyes, when one recollects who is buried here."⁴¹ Again, as in Nechui-Levytsky, the majestic pictures of the Dnieper and its hills create in conjunction with this grief a mythological picture of sublime nature (read: the nation) seized with a deep sorrow (read: oppression).

At the end of the 1880s Shevchenko's tomb was visited by the young Lesia Ukrainka. She decorated the poet's portrait in the warden's house with a cloth that she had embroidered with a Ukrainian traditional design⁴² and words by the poet, "Dumy moi, dumy moi, lykho meni z vamy" (O my thoughts, my thoughts, you bring misfortune upon me) and "Liubite, braty moi, Ukrainu liubite" (Love, my brethren, love Ukraine).⁴³ For decades this cloth and its words were an integral part of a complex symbolic creation—a sign called "Shevchenko's tomb." The inscription made public what had been previously implied: the poet's tomb acquired the symbolic meaning of Ukrainian national identity, and in a certain sense even of Ukraine itself. It is worth mentioning here that in Shevchenko's own poetic world the *mohyla* has the connotative meaning of "our glory." It is a place where "Cossack liberty" rests. In fact, it stands for the Ukrainian past of the nationalist myth. In his poem "Rozryta mohyla" (The Dug-Up Grave), the *mohyla* clearly stands for Ukraine itself.⁴⁴ Thus the poetic myth of Ukraine created by Shevchenko was reinterpreted by his followers, with the poet and his tomb serving as important elements of its structure. This is probably what George Grabowicz means when he writes that Shevchenko "became as much a product as a maker of his own myth."⁴⁵

40 Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky, "Shevchenkova mohyla," in his *Tvory*, vol. 4 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1975), 7–8.

41 Ibid., 8.

42 Kostenko, *Stezhky do Kobzaria*, 33.

43 Kotsiubynsky, "Shevchenkova mohyla," 9. For the first passage from Shevchenko, see *PZT*, 1: 57. The correct text of the second passage is "Liubitesia, braty moi,/ Ukrainu liubite" ("I pray you, brethren, love each other,/ Love your Ukraine"). See "V kazemati (I. Zhadaite, bratiia moia)," in *PZT*, 2: 6; and "To My Fellow-Prisoners," in *The Poetical Works of Taras Shevchenko: The Kobzar*, trans. C. H. Andrusyshen and Watson Kirkconnell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), 318.

44 "Buvaie, v nevoli inodi zhadaui," *PZT*, 2: 209; "Son," *PZT*, 1: 189; "Rozryta mohyla," *PZT*, 1: 169–70.

45 George G. Grabowicz, *The Poet as Mythmaker: A Study of Symbolic Meaning in Taras Ševčenko* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1982), 161.

The visitors' book established in June 1897 reveals that Shevchenko's tomb was visited by the composer Mykola Lysenko on 5 June 1897, 6 August 1898, and later practically each summer; by the playwright Marko Kropyvnytsky on 12 June 1898; and by the writer Olha Kobylanska on 16 August 1899.⁴⁶ The last visitor is especially important, since she lived in Bukovyna, which was then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Her visit indicates that the poet's tomb was beginning to be recognized by Ukrainian patriots in Galicia and Bukovyna as an all-national symbol and as the pre-eminent site for manifesting one's national identity and loyalty to nationalist ideals. At the turn of the twentieth century the tomb was visited by several Ukrainian members of the Austro-Hungarian parliament (among them Oleksander Barvinsky and Prof. Stepan Smal-Stotsky), the prominent Galician painter Ivan Trush, and the famous Galician modernist writer Vasyl Stefanyk.⁴⁷

The principal creators of the national sacred place, though, were the Ukrainophiles in the Russian Empire. According to his son's memoirs, Mykola Lysenko, who was also a prominent Ukrainian activist, visited the tomb each year. His pilgrimages had all the features of invented ritual. The composer's family was usually accompanied by the Starytskys, the Kosachs, other Ukrainian intellectuals and men and women of letters, Lysenko's students, and members of the choir founded by him. This large group of patriotic intelligentsia would travel to Kaniv by rented steamer, singing songs based on Shevchenko's poems. Then they would silently climb Taras's (Chernecha) Hill and stand in contemplation before the tomb.⁴⁸ In 1909, more than a hundred people participated in such a pilgrimage organized by Lysenko.⁴⁹

The visitors' books show that from 1897 through 1916 Shevchenko's tomb was visited by some 150,000 people.⁵⁰ These books are an extraordinary source for the study of the actual process of the crystallization and manifestation of popular national consciousness. The Soviet Ukrainian scholar Vasyl Kostenko, who studied these books, noted several features common to the majority of the entries. Some of them are of importance to us. First, most of the visitors address Shevchenko as if he were still alive, sometimes asking him questions and responding in his name. Second, in a very large proportion of the entries

46 Shestopal, *Mohyla T. H. Shevchenka*, 33.

47 F. Matushevsky, "Posetiteli mogily T. G. Shevchenko," *Kievskaiia starina*, 1903, no. 2: 292-3; Kostenko, *Stezhky do Kobzaria*, 22 and 24.

48 Ostap Lysenko, *M. V. Lysenko: Spohady syna* (Kyiv: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo obrazotvorchoho mystetstva i literatury URSR, 1959), 52-3.

49 Shestopal, *Mohyla T. H. Shevchenka*, 48.

50 V. K. Kostenko, "Do istorii mohyly Shevchenka (Knyha vrazhen za 1904-1916 rr.)," in *Zbirnyk prats somoi naukovoii shevchenkivskoi konferentsii* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo Akademii nauk URSR, 1959), 186.

Shevchenko is addressed as "father" (*batko*), frequently as "Father," and even as "our Father." Third, while many entries were most probably written by people with only elementary educations (Kostenko claims that the majority of visitors were peasants and workers), there were regular visits by intellectuals from Kyiv and, every year, by Ukrainian graduates of Kyiv and St. Petersburg universities immediately after their graduation ceremonies.⁵¹

We may generalize that at the beginning of the twentieth century Shevchenko's tomb had already become a recognized all-national sacred place and a symbol of "Ukrainianness." It attracted the common people (most probably, literate peasants and petty officials) as the memorial place for the one "father" of their nation, and the young nationalist intelligentsia as a sacred place where they could swear loyalty to the nationalist cause. At least this was probably the visitors' own common, conventional understanding of the aim of their pilgrimage. We might say that a pilgrimage to Shevchenko's tomb was the most effective way of *establishing and maintaining (or actualizing) the central role of this symbol* in each individual's perception of the national semiotic system and of its place in his or her hierarchy of values.

In 1903 a representative of the newer generation of politically active Ukrainians, Fedir Matushevsky, summarized his impressions of reading the first visitors' book. He was extremely critical of the commonest, short entry in the book: "Buv na mohyli ridnoho batka svoho Tarasa shchryi ukrainets" ([Present] at the tomb of my native father Taras was a true Ukrainian) or its Russian variant, "Posetil mogilu batka Ukrainy poklonnik istinnyi ukrainets" (The tomb of the father of Ukraine was visited by a true admirer [of Shevchenko] and a Ukrainian), followed by the individual's name.⁵² To Matushevsky these inscriptions seemed to be merely trite stock phrases. But in fact they were clichés of great historical importance, declaring the individual's national identity in a situation where the Ukrainian nationality was not recognized officially, was not included as such in imperial census questionnaires, and was considered to be only a "Little Russian" variant of the "Russian people." The visitors' book thus became the place where people could declare that they are Ukrainian (in many cases, probably for the first time).

Not satisfied with the set of practices of celebrating Shevchenko established by the older generation of Ukrainophiles, Matushevsky wanted to attach "a deep educational character" to the pilgrimage to the poet's tomb. He proposed that a monument to Shevchenko be erected and a museum and bookstore be established there.⁵³

51 Ibid., 186–9.

52 Matushevsky, "Posetiteli," 279. In the second phrase all words but "father" (*batko*) are in Russian.

53 Ibid., 270, 293–4.

Created and "signified" as a national symbol by Ukrainophiles of the 1860s through 1880s, Shevchenko's tomb became the place where a new Ukrainian political nationalism in the Russian Empire was born. In the summer of 1891 four students—Ivan Lypa, Mykola Baizdrenko, Mykhailo Bazkevych, and Vitalii Borovyk—visited Taras's Hill. As Lypa recollected many years later, it was "here that we decided to found a secret Ukrainian political society, and in honour of the poet and the place where this idea emerged we called it the Brotherhood of Tarasites [Braterstvo tarasivtsiv]."⁵⁴

The Brotherhood of Tarasites became the first Ukrainian organization in the Russian Empire that openly advocated Ukraine's political independence. It was, in fact, the embryo of several of the first Ukrainian political parties in Russian-ruled Ukraine, which emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century.⁵⁵ With the brotherhood's founding, Shevchenko's tomb began to be apprehended as (and thus *became*) a symbol of *political* nationalism.

This political symbolization is precisely why the tsarist administration directly and indirectly opposed erecting a monument to Shevchenko in Kyiv,⁵⁶ and why his tomb was surrounded by the police to prevent "Ukrainian manifestations" there in 1911 and 1914, on the fiftieth and hundredth anniversaries of Shevchenko's death and birth respectively. (A photograph of armed police officers sitting near the tomb in 1914 has been reproduced in many publications.⁵⁷)

The subsequent fate of Shevchenko's tomb is well known. After the 1917 revolution its cross was removed, and a temporary monument was erected in 1923. In 1939 majestic monuments to Shevchenko were unveiled in Kyiv and at the tomb. From the 1960s to the 1980s the former was a favourite meeting place for Ukrainian dissidents. The latter (and the adjacent Shevchenko Museum-Preserve) served merely as a tourist attraction and declined in significance as a national sacred place. At a time when attempts to propagate nationalist ideas were severely repressed, Shevchenko's tomb lost much of its "Ukrainian" symbolic meaning. In the semiotic system of "Soviet socialist society" the role of this symbol was rather different, auxiliary, and less important.

It is not by accident, therefore, that Ukrainian radical nationalists have recently demanded that the "original appearance" of that "almost sacred object" be restored.⁵⁸ (Obviously they mean the "original" appearance it had in 1917,

54 Ivan Lypa, "Bratstvo tarasivtsiv: Spomyny," *Literaturno-naukovy visnyk*, 1925, no. 7–8: 263.

55 See Iu. P. Lavrov, "Zarodzhennia ukrainskoho natsionalnoho rukhu v studentskomu seredovyschi," in *Narys z istorii ukrainskoho natsionalnoho rukhu* (Kyiv: Instytut istorii Ukrainy NANU, 1994), 90–111.

56 See T. H. Shevchenko v dokumentakh i materialakh, 316–40.

57 For example, in Shestopal, *Mohyla T. H. Shevchenka*, 51.

58 See, for example, Viktor Vechersky, "Komu postavleno pam'iatnyk na Chernenii hori v Kanevi?" *Pam'iatky Ukrainy*, 1993, no. 1–6: 122–3.

not in 1861 or 1863). In other words, today the “original narrative” (created by the Ukrainophiles of the 1860s through 1890s) of Shevchenko’s tomb as a special cultural place functioning to synthesize a people’s identity—that is, as a major symbol in the semiotic system of Ukrainianness—needs reactualization, for its loss threatens the very structure of the national semiotic network.

Gogolian Myth and the Colonial Ethos

Anna Berehulak

The "colonial" archaic of Gogol is an image that has been perpetuated and popularized and has served to reinforce the colonial image of the Ukrainian ethos. If myth is defined as a narrative that purports to portray the origins of a culture, society, or institution,¹ Gogol's stories, read as narratives of origin, create a colonial myth of Ukraine. This is achieved in the following ways. The village and its inhabitants as portrayed in the stories "Starosvetskie pomeschiki" (Old World Landowners, from the *Mirgorod* [Myrhorod] cycle) and "Sorochinskaia iarmarka" (The Fair at Sorochyntsi, from *Vechera na khutore bliz Dikanki* [Evenings on a Farm near Dykanka], hereafter *Dikanka*) are part of the Ukrainian ethos created by Gogol, and they colour the subsequent reception of the values of the Ukrainian ethos in general. The images of the Ukrainian ethos in *Dikanka* and *Mirgorod* can be seen as archaic in the negative sense of the word—"primitive" and "backward." The portrayal of the Old World landowners in a state of perpetual complacency and bliss and indulging in Rabelaisian eating and drinking, and the depiction of the decay of their world after their deaths, emphasizes a wholly physical state of existence in a static world of gross consumption and growth via the belly. Similarly, the cacophonous world of Sorochyntsi suggests a chaotic, carnivalesque existence, full of grotesque transformations and associations, in an amoral universe. It is, paradoxically, the reception of Gogol as a realist that causes these myths to be posited as "realistic" depictions of the Ukrainian ethos and spirit.² Given the former political context of Ukraine within the Russian Empire, these images are easily translated into stereotypes of Ukraine's provinciality, backwardness, and negatively archaic status. This archaic ethos becomes a comic and exotic "other" excluded from an

1 For a general definition of myth, see Mircea Eliade, "The Structure and Function of Myths," in *Myths, Rites, Symbols: A Mircea Eliade Reader*, vol. 1, ed. Wendell C. Beane and William G. Doty (New York: Harper, 1975), 6.

2 For example, by Tatiana Morozova in her "Gogol as Interpreted in the West," *Soviet Literature*, 1984, no. 4: 185-90.

identity of prestige and reinforcing the cultural and political authority of the "centre."

Soviet critics were to assimilate the use of myth and "non-realistic" literary forms into their definition of "realism" and, thus, to reinforce their own ideological bias towards the "truth" value of Gogol's works. Tatiana Morozova, for example, interpreted Gogol's "realism" as able to accommodate elements of fantasy. She attacked the "Western" notion that realism involves a

description of everyday events, a description which slavishly copies the reality of everyday life. Such mundane "realism" completely rules out fantasy, the symbol, and the grotesque, i.e., anything which is outside the formula "life as it is presented in the forms of life itself." Soviet literary critics have quite a different concept of the essence of realism; they see in it a constantly developing method of the cognition of the world by means of art, whose expressive devices include such diverse aesthetic forms as hyperbole, the paradox, the grotesque, etc. Soviet researchers believe that it is not only the concept of "realism" that helps us to get a deeper understanding of Gogol, but also Gogol's originality that helps us to broaden and elaborate the concept of realism.³

While Morozova argued that the aesthetic of realism is not limited to "life shown through life," she implicitly emphasizes the truth value of the "realism" created by the artistic devices she listed. Thus, Gogol's myth of Ukrainian identity as provincial, when read and received as "truth" guaranteed by "realism," was opted for a colonizing agenda.

Hitherto, Western receptions of Gogol have been uncritical of the constructed nature of this myth. For example, Leonard Kent dismisses the idea of Gogol as a realist, and evaluates the two volumes of *Dikanka* thus: "*Evenings* consist of imaginative, escapist, fantastic, romantic stories which combine eloquent passages of descriptive narrative, realistic elements, coarseness, earthy humour, and gruesomeness."⁴ He sees the stories as "permeate[d]" by "Ukrainian folklore and its tradition."⁵ Kent also points out that the history of Gogol's reception by Russian critics has been a progression of "extreme points of view": in the nineteenth century, Vissarion Belinsky saw Gogol as "a realist, a naturalist," and "an apostle of progress"; the Symbolist Dmitrii Merezhkovsky viewed Gogol as a "creat[or of] fantasies," who "projected ... his own ... neuroses" into his works; and, in the view of the Soviets, Gogol became "an apostle of Enlightenment," returning to the same position as the "liberal" Belinsky.⁶ Like

3 Ibid., 186.

4 Leonard J. Kent, introduction to *The Collected Tales and Plays of Nikolai Gogol*, ed. and trans. Leonard J. Kent (New York: Octagon, 1978), xvii–xviii.

5 Ibid., xvii.

6 Ibid., xii–xiv.

Kent, the critic Edmund Little rejects the view that *Dead Souls* is the "cornerstone of Russian Realism," and describes Gogol as a "fantast."⁷

Nina Perlina's comments, insightful as they are in her analysis of the relationship between the carnivalesque myth and Gogol's works, reveal the colonizing effect of Gogol's myth upon the perception of the Ukrainian literary tradition.⁸ Perlina argues that *Dikanka* and *Mirgorod* are "mock-mythology": "By no means do the *Dikanka* stories represent heroic myths; their poetics is instead an example of mock heroics in Russian literature, and the tokens of mock mythology are everywhere. In *Dikanka*, a bicker between husband and wife substitutes for a military battle, and a Cossack's wife is shown as a stronger fighter than her husband ("Christmas Eve").... The narrative fabric of *Dikanka* is made not of History and heroic legends, but of lugubrious cock-and-bull stories."⁹ Perlina does not consider the evaluative dimension of these images for the Ukrainian ethos. Her inability to distinguish between the "mock mythology" and parodic nature of Gogol's works and their potential to create a myth of the Ukrainian ethos is evident especially in her comparison of Kotliarevsky and Gogol: "In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Russian and Ukrainian writers exhibited a strong aesthetic interest in the carnival and parodic re-interpretations of the classics.... One has only to consider the poetic lines of Kotljarevskyj chosen for the epigraphs to the Dikan'ka tales to realize how much Gogol' owed to the tradition of travesty and carnival parody."¹⁰

The comparison of Kotliarevsky's parody of Virgil's *Aeneid*—*Eneida* (1798)—and the *Dikanka* tales is significant, because there are great differences between Kotliarevsky's and Gogol's treatment of the Ukrainian ethos through travesty and carnival parody. As Marko Pavlyshyn has shown, the argumentation of *Eneida*, the first literary text published in modern vernacular Ukrainian, works to affirm the positive values of the Cossack ethos. At the end of the eighteenth century the lost Cossack past and the era of Ukrainian political autonomy are familiar again and identifiable to the Ukrainian readership by being encapsulated in the form of a travesty of a classical text. Pavlyshyn writes that

Eneida addresses itself to a reader who, in the transition from landowner to public servant, is in the process of becoming part of an empire-wide service elite; insofar

7 Edmund Little, "Nikolay Gogol (1809–1852): The Town of NN," in his *Fantasts: Studies in J. R. R. Tolkien, Lewis Carroll, Mervyn Peake, Nikolay Gogol and Kenneth Grahame* (Amersham: Avebury Publishing, 1984), 74–92.

8 Nina Perlina, "Travels in the Land of Cockaigne, Sluggards' Land, and Dikan'ka: Mythological Roots of Gogol's Carnival Poetics," in *The Supernatural in Slavic and Baltic Literature: Essays in Honor of Victor Terras*, ed. Amy Mandelker and Roberta Reeder (Columbus, Ohio: Slavica, 1988), 57–71.

9 Ibid., 61–2.

10 Ibid., 60.

as he is sensitive to his cossack heritage, he conceives of it as the source of his social privilege. *Eneida*'s persuasive strategy is to reform the reader's residual and historically irrelevant sense of identity with a defunct military caste into a sense of identity with a living nation. This nation is given a *present* through an idealized image of the ethnographic substance of peasant and cossack life; it receives a *past* through a rearrangement of various strands of Ukrainian history.¹¹

This ethos is exploited by Gogol, who uses fragments of *Eneida* for some of the epigraphs in "Sorochinskaia iarmarka." But his use of this travesty is a colonizing act, for, while drawing upon *Eneida*'s text for "local colour" and its carnivalesque dimension, Gogol's own myth places negative value upon Ukraine's autonomy, and the effect of his use of the familiar genre of parody is to "lower" the image of the village, not raise it. As Pavlyshyn argues, Kotliarevsky's innovation lies in his introduction of a non-literary language into a literary work; the latter signals its relationship to world literature by virtue of the classical text it parodies and through the only genre in which the vernacular was traditionally used, that of burlesque.¹² *Eneida* can thus be seen as a text that asserts non-colonial positions in Ukrainian culture. Gogol's treatment of the text, however, reinforces the wane and decrepitude of the Ukrainian ethos from the golden age of Cossackdom, and its parodic presentation as myth posits an alternative, colonial narrative of origin.

In addition to the "baroqueness" of Gogol's elaborate, grandiose stylistics,¹³ critics have noted Gogol's use of the Ukrainian baroque *vertep* (puppet theatre) and intermedes (comic interludes), identifying his baroque with these "low" cultural forms. This bears little relationship to the baroque ethos described, for example, by the contemporary Ukrainian novelist Valerii Shevchuk. The two-dimensional characterizations in *Mirgorod* and *Dikanka* reduce characters to "puppets" and stereotypes, associating the baroque ethos with the decline and degeneration portrayed in the narratives. Thus, it becomes an ethos not to be identified with as prestigious, on the scale of the imperial cultural hierarchy. In the Ukrainian baroque of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, "high" and "low" forms were often organically unified. For example, secular, comic intermedes were inserted into the high religious, symbolic drama performed at the Kyiv Mohyla Academy. The perpetuation of low baroque forms without an accompanying "high" cultural orientation thus only reinforces the absence of those cultural forms and the loss of the "organic" baroque heritage.

11 Marko Pavlyshyn, "The Rhetoric and Politics of Kotliarevsky's *Eneida*," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 10 (1985), no. 1: 22-3.

12 *Ibid.*, 23-4.

13 See Gavriel Shapiro, "Nikolai Gogol' and the Baroque Heritage," *Slavic Review* 45 (1986), no. 1: 95-104.

The reception of Gogol in various histories of Ukrainian literature has hitherto been uncritical. In the Soviet context in particular, much effort was invested in constructing a genealogy linking Gogol to Ukrainian writers. Oleksandr Biletsky notes that the first academic works that aimed to establish the links between Gogol and Ukrainian literature were published during the early 1950s, alongside general works on the relations between Russian and Ukrainian literature,¹⁴ on the eve of the three hundredth anniversary of the Pereiaslav Treaty and union between Russia and Ukraine. The motive behind these developments may be construed as an intention, based on a colonizing agenda, to emphasize the ties between Ukrainian and Russian literature. The canonization of Gogol was continued by the multiauthored history of Ukrainian literature prepared at the Institute of Literature of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences in the 1960s.¹⁵ The uncritical assimilation of Gogol and his stereotypes of Ukraine has also been noted by Marko Pavlyshyn in the Soviet Ukrainian whimsical novels of the 1970s and 1980s; he singles out Valerii Shevchuk's "novel-ballad" *Dim na hori* (The House on the Hill, 1983) as being anti-Gogolian.¹⁶

Gogol's "colonial" myth-making can be contrasted to the anticolonial, liberating myths of the Ukrainian national ethos, such as those of Taras Shevchenko and the early Pavlo Tychyna. The myth-making roles of Gogol and Shevchenko have been noted by Ukrainian critics in the West. George Grabowicz sees differences between them. While Gogol "effect[s] through [his] mythic treatment of the Ukrainian theme a personal, psychological rite of passage, that is, exorcise[s], by expressing [his] sense of the Ukraine in myth, a deep conflict in [his] psyche," in comparison to Shevchenko he is limited.¹⁷ Shevchenko as a myth-maker, Grabowicz argues, retold the "deep, sacred truth" of the national ethos by evoking the symbols of Ukrainian history as an argument against its repression and in order to raise the awareness of the community so that it could transcend the circumstances of its present. In this sense, Shevchenko's myth is anticolonial and a myth of liberation. Furthermore, it is constructed upon real, historical events, and it places them in a universal context of anticolonial

14 Oleksandr Biletsky, "Literaturoznavstvo i krytyka za 40 rokiv Radianskoi Ukrainy," in his *Zibrannia prats u p'iaty tomakh*, vol. 3 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1965), 68–9.

15 See, for example, *Istoriia ukrainskoi literatury*, ed. Ie. P. Kyrlyuk et al, vol. 4, part 1 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1969), where Gogol is treated as part of the literary canon and his literary influence on the nineteenth-century realists Ivan Nechui-Levytsky and Ivan Franko is emphasized (pp. 148 and 240). Gogol's influence, the *Istoriia* stresses, extends to twentieth-century writers. See vol. 7 (1971): 111, 139 and 146; and vol. 8 (1971): 179 and 182.

16 Marko Pavlyshyn, "National Idioms in Soviet Literature? The Case of the Ukrainian Whimsical Novel," in *Literature and National Cultures*, ed. Brian Edwards ([Geelong]: Deakin University Centre for Studies in Literary Education, 1988), 109–16, here 112–14.

17 George G. Grabowicz, *The Poet as Mythmaker: A Study of Symbolic Meaning in Taras Ševčenko* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1982), 46.

liberation struggle. In contrast, Gogol's myth contains a deep cultural pessimism, despite its outwardly comic and "affectionate" tone. Gogol's attitude towards Ukrainian history as "accursed"¹⁸ is deterministic, showing the decline of the Cossacks and the inevitable "transition of the old Ukraine into a new imperial Russian framework."¹⁹ His attitude is thus different from that of Shevchenko, who wishes to "enlighten" his nation so that it has a critical awareness of its history and colonial circumstance.

Gogol's attribution of a deep-seated "curse" to the Ukrainian ethos has been analysed by Iurii Lavrinenko. Lavrinenko's discussion of *zlopomsta* (evil revenge) as a central Gogolian myth is based on the short story "Strashnaia mest" (A Terrible Vengeance) in *Dikanka*. This tale of an evil sorcerer who is the greatest criminal in his family line carries an epilogue that describes the myth of evil revenge. A murdered Cossack, Ivan, requests that his murderer, his brother Petro, be punished by God. Petro must wait until the greatest criminal in his line of descent is killed. The criminal is then to be thrown into the abyss where Petro lies, and is to be devoured by all of Petro's descendants, who will have risen from their graves. Petro will not be able to gnaw the corpse, however, but only his own bones in frustration, which will continue to grow within the earth, so that his pain may be all the greater. Even God is shocked by such a revenge, which is worse than the crime itself, and commands that Ivan not be admitted into heaven: Ivan must sit on his horse above the abyss and watch the terrible revenge take place.

Such a myth of damnation condemns the engenderers of this vengeance, implying that the ethos that produced such an "evil revenge" is itself fated for decline. Lavrinenko diagnoses the Bolshevik revolution as an expression of the complex of *zlopomsta*: where the Bolsheviks, in their desire for class vengeance, tried to destroy the past and its adherents, they wreaked a revenge that was worse than the crime itself.²⁰ In Lavrinenko's view, this complex of "criminal revenge" is the opposite of the "clarinetism" of Pavlo Tychyna, whose poetry of the 1910s and 1920s provides an antidote to Gogol's myth and *zlopomsta*. Lavrinenko believes that, for Tychyna, the events of 1917 marked a rebirth of culture and national freedom, which he expressed in his poetry collection *Soniashni kliarnety* (Sunny Clarinets, 1918). For Lavrinenko, Tychyna's aesthetics unify sound, light and colour in poetry and express a vision of the world based on spiritual autonomy and harmony. Most significantly, such an artistic strategy allows the transcendence of internal slavery and the psychic

18 George G. Grabowicz, "Three Perspectives on the Cossack Past: Gogol, Ševčenko, Kuliš," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 5 (1981), no. 2: 174.

19 *Ibid.*, 189.

20 Iurii Lavrinenko, "Literatura vitaizmu," in *Rozstriliane vidrozhennia: Antolohiia 1917–1933. Poeziia—proza—drama—esei*, ed. Iurii Lavrinenko (Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1959), 932.

complex of "zlopomsta," and thus promotes liberation from social and national repression. Although Lavrinenko does not identify the connection between the Gogolian myth and the complex of *malorosiistvo* (Little Russianism), we may infer that *malorosiistvo*, as the denial of the prestige and autonomy of Ukrainian identity, can be associated with the provincializing and trivializing mythology of Gogol's *Dikanka* stories. Such complexes, according to Lavrinenko, are dispelled through clarinetism. Although Danylo Husar Struk points out that Lavrinenko's concept of clarinetism as a neo-baroque is neither clearly developed nor defined,²¹ we can agree with Lavrinenko that it is an aesthetic that secures spiritual release from the "psychic serfdom" of *malorosiistvo* and therefore can be seen as constructive of a myth of national healing. In the Ukrainian literary context both Shevchenko's and Tychyna's myths are thus alternatives to Gogol's.

The concept of *zlopomsta* can be seen to be implicitly dealt with in the second part of Valerii Shevchuk's novel *Try lystky za viknom* (Three Leaves outside the Window), titled "Petro utekly" (The Fugitive Petro). It is set in the middle of the eighteenth century and deals with Petro Turchynovsky, the narrator of the story. The principles of avoiding the perpetuation of evil and refusing to take revenge (which are articulated in an earlier narrative) are developed here in a tragic way that signifies the loss of baroque high spirituality in the age of the Enlightenment and spiritual decay, which are paralleled by the encroachments of Russian imperialism in the eighteenth century.

The story of the fugitive Petro demonstrates that taking revenge in the hope of salvation results only in denigration of the self. It can be seen as a complex commentary on the nature of colonialism, since the spiritual decay accompanying the onset of colonization is shown as a consequence not of frustration with the "other," but of demoralization of the self; the causes of downfall are within. This does not mean, however, that Shevchuk espouses a deterministic philosophy. Instead, he transcends and deconstructs the binary opposition between the colonial and the anticolonial. "Petro utekly" tells the story of a murder investigation in which Turchynovsky takes part as the scribe of the government investigator. The identity of the victim is unknown, and there are no witnesses to the crime. The mysterious circumstances are compounded by the curiously oppressive atmosphere of the village of Rudivka where the body was found and the investigation is taking place. The landscape is both threatening and hypnotic, attracting the viewer while disturbing him and suggesting the possibility of death. It is the contiguity between the landscape and the murder victim (the colour of

21 Danylo Husar Struk, "Clarinetism-Neo-Baroque: Pavlo Tychyna's *Soniashni Kliarnety*," ms., 5.

both is a mottled blue, black, and red)²² that suggests a spiritual decay analogous to the decrepitude of the Gogolian world.

The theme of spiritual decay is encountered frequently in the narrative. Turchynovsky is a secular man who yearns for harmony in life, but only experiences alienation and begins to question the extent to which the individual is valued and unique in society. The fact that the murder victim was completely unknown and could vanish without trace from his place of origin profoundly disturbs him. Such alienation in the narrative signals the loss of community that Turchynovsky's society is experiencing. The corruption of society is also reflected in the stories he hears about other young men named Petro who have disappeared from their villages under mysterious circumstances.

The narratives in "Petro utekly" are based on actual eighteenth-century trial documents.²³ These archaic texts impart an authenticity to the stories. The scenarios that Turchynovsky constructs as the possible causes for the murdered Petro's absence from his place of origin and subsequent murder develop the idea of a society in decay and the scapegoating of an innocent person. As these narratives show, the victims are not guilty of the crimes they are charged with, but they nevertheless carry within them a vague feeling of guilt. For Turchynovsky, all these Petros meld into one, with whom he himself identifies (p. 228) and who reflects his own existential fears. The elements of collective guilt in the story unify these scenarios with the actual situation that had transpired, and they confirm Turchynovsky's fears about becoming the fifth "Petro utekly."

The link between the concept of *zlopomsta* and the narrative of "Petro utekly" can be found in the complicity in the crime among the villagers themselves, which may also be interpreted in a colonial context as the misguided "collaboration" of the people in a cause that results in their enslavement rather than liberation. This theme is developed through a story Turchynovsky is given to read by Stefan Savych, the deacon of Rudivka, who is also the story's author. The story, titled "Znaida" (The Foundling) is, in fact, Shevchuk's rendition of the Oedipus myth. It also holds the key to the murder mystery, which Turchynovsky initially was not able to discover. The character of the foundling is interpreted by both Turchynovsky and Savych as analogous to Judas Iscariot.

"Innocent guilt" that nevertheless causes destruction is also a central theme of the frame narrative, the account of the murder investigation of the unknown Petro. The presence of a "collective guilt" in the village, as reflected in the landscape, creates a tension between the victim's innocence and his murder: his innocence is symbolized by the whiteness of his clothing, which contrasts with

22 Valerii Shevchuk, *Try lystky za viknom: Roman-tryptykh* (Kyiv: Radianskyi pysmennyk, 1986), 141. All further page references to this novel appear in parentheses in the text of this article.

23 See Mykola Zhulynsky's commentary on "Petro uteklyi" in his introductory article, "U vichnomu zmahanni za istynu," in *Try lystky za viknom*, 3–14, here 9.

the reddish, dust-covered appearance of the local inhabitants and reinforces the fact that the victim was a stranger (p. 152). The villagers' silence and the victim's contrasting "whiteness" affects the sensibilities of the observer Turchynovsky, who is also aware of a vague sense of guilt that pervades the surroundings. Gradually he comes to suspect the villagers of complicity in the murder. The actual circumstances are revealed only at the end of the story: it transpires that the villagers were led to believe in the presence of the Messiah and the Antichrist and, in the hope of collective salvation, killed the unknown Petro, believing him to be the Antichrist. This myth is revealed by the deacon, who is also the instigator of the myth itself; his story "Znaida" is revealed as the blueprint for the "guilt" of the fugitive Petro. The notion of collective guilt is explored in the narrative, raising the question of an inherent curse that has crucial implications for the question of colonialism and *zlopomsta*. Savych's elaboration of his beliefs shows how a mistaken faith in achieving salvation through the ritual killing of the hostile "other" is fundamentally flawed. A myth of cyclical recurrence and of a Manichaean struggle in the world is the basis of Savych's belief, which leads to the death of the fugitive Petro. His killing, which was intended as an act that would thwart the scenario described in the "Znaida" story, instead compounds the guilt of the villagers themselves, who discover their error when the pseudo-Messiah is caught and hanged without any miracle—which might have proved him to be the Messiah—occurring.

In this case, the idea of revenge as a path to salvation is portrayed as futile, since it results in the death of an innocent—a message that emphasizes the futility of binary oppositions and revenge. The latter could also symbolize the desire for liberation through revenge and destruction of the colonizer. A similar problem can be identified in the complex of *zlopomsta*: the mystery of the murder and the villagers' complicity, which suggests an inherent evil in the land, is resolved and reveals how the attempt to achieve salvation through revenge (as in Lavrinenko's interpretation of *zlopomsta* as revolution) ultimately ends in another crime being committed (as in the revenge of Gogol's Ivan, who is not admitted to heaven because of the terrible vengeance he created for Petro). In this case, Shevchuk does not interpret this complex as an inherent curse, but as a mistaken belief in a myth that, paradoxically, was created through rational thought. Savych is momentarily considered insane by Turchynovsky because of his attempt to order the world rationally through a derivative myth. This attempt is ultimately shown to be his downfall. Shevchuk thus looks for the causes of spiritual degeneration and encroaching colonialism within the "self" instead of blaming the hostile "other," as Savych had done. Savych's "blindness," caused by his faith in his own imagination, can be compared to Oedipus' blindness regarding his own origins (like Oedipus, Savych blinds himself when he discovers his odious crimes). The irony of Oedipus' ignorance that he has committed these crimes and is himself the "pollution" that must be driven from

his land is echoed in Savych's desire to "purify" his land of the Antichrist: in quest of this purity he himself commits a crime—the murder of an innocent man. "Petro Utekly" thus reinforces the philosophy expressed in the first narrative of Shevchuk's novel: that it is essential to restrain oneself from taking revenge. Both Turchynovsky and Savych are shown to be blind to the reality of the world: Turchynovsky only realizes what happened in Rudivka at the end, when his own life is threatened, and Savych only realizes that he has killed the wrong man when Turchynovsky tells him the latest news of the execution of the pseudo-Messiah.

For the decolonization of a particular culture, the myth of an inherent curse which caused the nation's original downfall is scarcely useful: it portrays that nation as stigmatized and tragically determined. It is in this way that Gogol's story of *zlopomsta* in "Strashnaia mest" portrays the Ukrainian ethos as inherently accursed; and it is for this reason that Savych's belief in a similar myth of revenge upon a "Judas"/Oedipus figure is criticised by Shevchuk, for Savych, trapped by the myth, himself echoes the criminal acts that are to be expiated. The result is not expiation, but further pollution. By showing how such a decline is caused, Shevchuk reassesses the history and myths of Ukrainian culture to show how the damaging opposition of colonizer and colonized can be understood and transcended.

Станіслав Пшибишевський і Володимир Винниченко: Еротика модерного*

Тамара Гундорова

Властивий модерному письменству процес диференціації індивідуума на першопочаткові складаючі елементи і виявлення з-посеред них душі, “сього найбільш активного й найціннішого в житті й поступові людини елемента”,¹ українська критика починає від Пшибишевського.

Фальк із “*Homo sapiens*” є властиво модерним характером, з диференційованою психікою і накреслюваною антиномією розуму і чуття, автономізацією суб’єктивної свідомости, “руйнівним для релігії зловживанням розумовими здібностями” (Франц Бадер), з диявольською силою саморуйнування, естетичною вразливістю і містичною потребою любови. Окрім того, Пшибишевський задає новий екзистенціальний модус буття такого індивідуума, виймаючи свого героя з-під тиску часу історичного і сучасного. Польський критик Марта Вика асоціює цей модус буття із зануренням особистости в безчасовому, чистому мисленні, алогічному і спонтанному.² На цій основі Пшибишевський відкриває також і особливу структуру модерного зображення, де твір становить собою рід сценарію, що лише подекуди переривається “німим монологом” (лист до А. Ноймана).

В найглибшому сенсі специфіка ранньомодерністського дискурсу Пшибишевського має метафізичну підоснову. “Диференційований індивідуум” Пшибишевського позначав культурну кризу модерного

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1 Йосип Зоранчук, «Шляхами душі: Диференціація індивідуума», *Шлях*, 1918, ч. 3, стор. 29–30.

2 Marta Wyka, «Przybyszewski—powieściopisarz», у кн.: *Stanisław Przybyszewski: W 50-lecie zgonu pisarza*, ред. Hanna Filipkowska (Вроцлав, 1982), стор. 79.

суб'єкта, і в цьому відношенні він однорідний з феноменом “людини без властивостей” Музіля, Уліссом Джойса, безіменним героєм Кафки і т.п. “Вже починаючи з Homo sapiens’а Пшибишевського, індивідуум лишається тривалого ґрунту під собою, губить свій “абсолют”, своє “бароцентричне ядро”, навкруг якого концентрувались, збирались його усякі добродетельні чи злочинні здібності, і повільним рухом, несвідомо для себе самого, йде до диференціації, до роз’єднування своїх різноманітних сил, які приводили в рух його психіку”,—зауважував Йосип Зоранчук.³ Наслідком цього процесу є непогамована туга за чимсь, що б могло стати новим інтегруючим центром—Любов, Абсолют, Бог, Розум, Закон, Міт.

Модерний індивід епохи “переоцінки цінностей” і психічної диференціації саме в творах Пшибишевського чи не вперше окреслює свою метафізичну сутність. В ситуації “смерти Бога” він приходить до екзистенційного буття, подібно, як пізніше це зроблять герої Винниченка. Буття “тут-і-тепер”, тобто статус модерного, стверджує себе передусім в плані антихристиянства, нового християнства, сатанізму, нігілізму тощо. Адже, як твердить Томас Алтюзер, “смерть Бога або відкинення трансцендентної вічності уможливило воскресіння тепер, часу, тіла”.⁴

Питання декадансу, і загалом індивідуалізму як явища постнатуралістичного, зближує творчість Пшибишевського і Винниченка. Критика загалом досить часто відносить творчість Винниченка до “неонатуралізму” початку ХХ ст. “Метафізиком-натуралістом” називає Пшибишевського Леся Українка у статті “Заметки о новейшей польской литературе” (1901), зауважуючи: “Против этого метафизического натурализма, или декадентизма, или модернизма, которого передовым бойцом является Пшибишевский, началась уже реакция”.⁵

Спільним для обох митців як письменників постнатуралістичного типу є органіцистична ідеологема. Саме на основі природного і необхідного розгортається драма модерного індивідуалізму. Еволюціонізм, за Пшибишевським, надає цілі людському існуванню (“індивідуум як момент охорони і удосконалення виду в історії розвитку людства”), хоча вносить в нього і справжній екзистенціальний трагізм—“в житті індивідуума виявляється велика сила природи, що має на увазі лише рід і не турбується про особу”.⁶

3 Зоранчук, «Шляхами душі», стор. 29.

4 Tomas J. Altizer, «Wieczny powrót a królestwo Boże», *Literatura na świecie* (Варшава), 1993, ч. 1–3 (258–60), стор. 331–32.

5 Леся Українка, *Зібрання творів у 12-ти томах*, т. 8 (Київ, 1977), стор. 121.

6 Stanisław Pшибишевский, «К психологии индивидуума», в його *Полном собрании*

Подібним чином Винниченко стверджує: життя—“многофарбне, многостороннє, складне—воно все ж таки кінець-кінцем зводиться до двох простих формул, які вміщують всі його складності й фарби: підтримання себе в життю і продовження свого роду”.⁷ Герої останнього, визнаючи силу сліпого інстинкту природи, ціль якої в продовженні роду, прагнуть виправити її, протиставляючи їй, подібно до Ніцше, свободу вибору себе в будучині—право мати лише “вибраних” дітей. Притому знаряддям підступної природи герої Винниченка вважають, подібно до Пшибишевського, диявольську природу жінки.

Обох письменників об’єднує така декадентська метафізика, яка впливає з потрактування еротизму як підставової засади світу, як тотальної реальності, що лежить між природним і надприродним, чуттєвим і надчуттєвим. Окрім того, еротизм в модерному мисленні позначає не стільки платонівський алогічний шлях до Абсолюту, скільки конституювання нової, *модерної чуттєвості*, де еротизм виявляє порив модерного суб’єкта до неоформленого, потойбічного, десакралізованого, його сатаністські коливання між протилежними чуттями, між крайностями душі, зафіксованими у творах Гюїсманса, д’Аннунціо, Станіслава Пшибишевського.

Загалом, як твердить Ролян Барт, еротика виступає онтологічною сутністю розгортання і виявлення Нового (Модерного). Все мислення нового часу перейняте такою аперцепцією: “еротика Нового виникла в XVIII ст. і з того часу знаходиться в постійному розвитку”, адже “насолота спроможна виникнути лише за рахунок чогось *абсолютно* нового”.⁸ В цьому зв’язку скандальний еротичний зміст творів Винниченка і Пшибишевського підтримується відкриттям нового, модерністського світовідчуття, що мислиться за своєю суттю антицивілізаційним, символічним, надприродним, інтенсифікованим.

За словами Терези Валас, еротизм у Пшибишевського трактується як акт пізнавальний і креаційний, який потенційно суголосний з природною гармонією й повнотою буття.⁹ Подібно у Винниченка еротика—не лише елемент віталістичного потоку життя, а ще й момент щастя, рівноваги. При цьому еротизм Винниченка має

сочинений, т. 5 (Москва, 1910), стор. 19. Далі том і сторінку цього видання вказано в тексті.

7 Володимир Винниченко, «Спостереження непрофесіонала: Марксизм і мистецтво», *Дзвін*, 1913, ч. 12, стор. 478.

8 Ролян Барт, *Удовольствие от текста: Избранные работы. Семиотика. Поэтика* (Москва, 1989), стор. 494, 495.

9 Teresa Walas, «Stanisław Przybyszewski a dekadentyzm», у кн.: *Stanisław Przybyszewski: W 50-lecie zgonu pisarza*, стор. 65.

виразний нігілістичний відтінок, оскільки інтенсифікація світопереживання його суб'єктів закроена значною мірою на критиці сучасної моралі та переоцінці цінностей. У Пшибишевського, натомість, активно виявлена гностична проблематика, яка фіксує еротично-метафізичну, сатаністську тугу людини за цілісністю в ситуації її майже космічної самотності й дезінтеграції.

Притому сатана Пшибишевського, як справедливо зауважує Марта Вика, є дияволом цивілізаційним, на протигагу дияволу середньовічному.¹⁰ Характерна, зрештою, і поява своєрідного “цивілізаційного” диявола у Винниченка—Кирпатого Мефістофеля. Місце його—як цивілізованого напівдиявола, який іноді навіть визнає себе надполовиненим, “нікчемним, недоробленим Мефістофелем”,—в ряді “дітей сатани”, що його Пшибишевський охрестив богом нового: “Він править безмірним царством думки, який знову і знову перекидає закон і розбиває скрижалі; він запалює бажання відгадати сокровенне, читати в руїнах ночі, він дає злочинну відвагу знищувати щастя багатьох тисяч, щоб дати виникнути новому” (5: 120).

Кирпатий Мефістофель Винниченка так само один з носіїв сатаністської претенціональності нового, метафізики нового. Він займає цілком певне місце, яке можна вважати центральним в модерній ідеології, оскільки демонструє усім своїм характером особливий спосіб перетворення й освоєння реального світу—спосіб помислення немислимого, ситуацію переходу за межі сакрального, гуманного, автономізацію раціонального, відношення до світу як світу гри, де виявляється “підвладність якимсь силам, які роблять мої вчинки випадковими, необґрунтованими, незалежними від моєї волі й свідомості”.¹¹

Ця, власне, модерністська, перспектива формулювання нового дискурсу розгортається в амплітуді від антимімесису до візії, від “пустого” простору до інсценізації у творах Пшибишевського, як це свідчать польські дослідники.¹² У Винниченка, натомість, вона формулюється трансреально, з прихованою деструкцією реалістичної предметності і конкретності, за рахунок введення дискурсу несвідомого, “іншого”, з допомогою іронії, психоаналізу, парадоксу.

10 Marta Wyka, «Przybyszewski—powieściopisarz», стор. 82.

11 Володимир Винниченко, *Записки Кирпатого Мефістофеля*, т. 21 його *Творів*, вид. 2-е (Київ, 1928), стор. 55. Далі сторінку вказуємо в тексті.

12 Див. Krystyna Kralkowska-Gatkowska, «Antymimesis i wizja: Typy konstrukcji przestrzeni w powieściach Stanisława Przybyszewskiego», у кн. *Przełom antypozytywistyczny w polskiej świadomości kulturowej końca XIX wieku* (Вроцлав, 1986), стор. 131–61.

Еротика виступає при цьому онтологічним принципом освоєння і перетворення світу з точки зору свободи волі модерного суб'єкта. У Винниченка вона набуває конкретного індивідуалістичного підтексту в аспекті етики "чесности з собою". Ідея "чесности з собою" засвідчує новий смисл модерної етики: думка (ідея, мораль), перш ніж передбачати і накреслювати майбутнє, перш ніж провіщати, що треба робити, перш ніж закликати або просто застерігати, є вже дією. Вона може звільняти або поневолювати, вона фіксує собою владу (Мішель Фуко).

Еротизм в цьому відношенні познає сферу, непідвладну думці, несвідому, природну, мораль—сферу розуму. Винниченкова утопія "чесности з собою" мислиться як переборення християнської розірваності душі і тіла, ідеї і чуття, розуму і природи. Антицивілізаційний підтекст такої моральної утопії Кирпатого Мефістофеля полягає в тому, щоб *раціонально* вийти поза межі влади думки. Нова мораль в тому, що "вона не потребує ні заповідей, ні людських законів, ні панів адвокатів; така, в силу якої мати любить своїх дітей, мужчину тягне до жінчини, і навпаки; в силу якої революціонер іде на смертну кару" (стор. 157).

Еротизм як природна, субстанційна основа всесвіту у Пшибишевського так само відкриває "таємні зв'язки, які єднали з природою душу людську, душу, як абсолютизм, як феномен, що не залежить від мозку" ("Синагога Сатани"). "Гола душа" фіксує своєрідне ірраціональне "стирання" реальності. Однак, така утопія не означає заміну реального трансцендентним і не зводиться до повторення жестів мистецтва та перенесення їх на психіку героїв.¹³ Швидше, в обох випадках—і у Винниченка і у Пшибишевського—йдеться про відкриття потенційного, нового, іншого відчуття реальності у формах "наднатуралістичних" (Шарль Бодлер) і надраціоналістичних.

Постнатуралістичний розрив між духом і природою, свідомим і несвідомим, кінечним і вічним, між "надлюдиною" і "людиною-мікробою" переплітається в декадансі з руйнуванням християнського погляду на "добродійну" й "гріховну" природу людини, що веде свій початок "від Бога і Диявола" (за Винниченком). Пшибишевський, як гностик,¹⁴ розгортає на основі такої кризи логіку душі, протилежної і непідвладної розуму, несвідомої, ірраціональної, надприродної. Винниченко, зі свого боку, прагне з'єднати закони природи і розум з допомогою етики "чесности з собою". "Чесність з собою", подібно до "голої душі", є способом *відношення*, формою "потенціального"

13 Wyka, «Przybyszewski—powieściopisarz», стор. 85.

14 Див. Edward Boniecki, *Struktura «Nagiej duszy»: Studium o Stanisławie Przybyszewskim* (Варшава, 1993), стор. 17.

переживання. І в цьому відношенні “гола душа” Пшибишевського, “чесність з собою” Винниченка, “вічне повернення” Ніцше постають метафорами радикального модерного мислення, що відкриває “безкінечні горизонти і безмірні перспективи” (“Moji współczesni” Пшибишевського), перетворює реальне, до того ж є аналогом самотренування, сугестії, гіпнозу, радикальних мовних інновацій.

“Гола душа” Пшибишевського і “чесність з собою” Винниченка фіксують також новий онтологічний модус буття модерного суб’єкта— його дзеркальне відображення “я”—буття. Пшибишевський і Винниченко сходяться в перспективі відкриття модерністської рефлексії, яка актуалізує сферу двійника. Остання виявляється сферою несвідомого, непомисленого, що, за словами Мішеля Фуко, починаючи з XIX століття, є тихим і ненастанним акомпанементом людини. Двійник і двійництво у цьому відношенні виявляють межі самої думки, поверненість її на саму себе. В такий спосіб експлікуються ілюзії і домагання раціонального, автономного “я”, накреслюється синтез “я” і “не-я” в перспективі “надлюдини”, програмується модерна метафізика суб’єктивного.

Пшибишевський знаходить гностично-маніхейську ідеальну реальність, в якій суб’єктивістські аналогії сучасного індивідуума значною мірою розсіюються. У Винниченка, натомість, непомислене, метафізичне, несвідоме позначені окремими символами-ідеологемами типу “Великий Молох”, “Щаблі життя”, “Рівновага”, “Купля”, “Базар”. Це ідеологеми самого життя, яке, несвідоме, наділяє цінністю все, що служить продовженню роду і його інтенсифікації. Відповідно “все є цінність”, як зауважує Мирон Купченко: “і мрія, і чобіт, і тіло, і душа” (“Чесність з собою”). Відтак, “задзеркалля” модерного суб’єкта у Винниченка ідентичне ірраціоналізму, а двійництво—ілюзорній владі расі, моралі, “я”. Тотальний механізм “куплі”, як в одноіменному оповіданні, означає підставляння духовного на місце фізичного і навпаки. Цивілізація, культура, мораль насправді виявляються владою раціоналізованих фікцій, самогіпнозом.

Потракування людини соматичної, людини “хочу!”, людини з плоті стає прикметною особливістю творів Винниченка. Своєрідне розсіювання, диференціація індивідуума від натуралістично конкретно до гіперболізованої, галюцинаторної візії “я” (“криваво-червоного кола”, “вогненного кола”, в якому відлунює передвічний родовий гріх), просвічування через реальне людське життя метафізичної сутності “душі”—“як абсолюту, як феномена”—становить підоснову майже всіх творів Пшибишевського.

Однак і у Винниченка і в Пшибишевського дискурс розгортається через відкривання “я” як “іншого”, через своєрідну гру із світом і його

подвоювання. За словами німецького філософа Ойгена Фінка, “ігровий світ не існує ніде і ніколи, однак він займає в реальному просторі особливий ігровий простір, в реальному часі—особливий ігровий час”,¹⁵ отже, світ постає іманентним теперішнім, владою бажання, еротики.

Галюцинаторний, фіктивний, іманентний світ модерного суб'єкта виявляється у творчості Пшибишевського і Винниченка у формі “мозкового еротизму”. Іншими словами, це “сатанізм розуму”, “тривалий інтелектуальний еротизм, з його каталептичним станом, самонавіюванням і безумними уявленнями” (5: 19). Інтелектуальний, етичний сатанізм суттєво властивий і Кирпатову Мефістофелю, який зізнається в тому, як йому приємно керувати чужою волею, “приємно, коли увага застигає, й ти обережно, м'яко повертаєш його [чоловіка—Т. Г.] в той бік, який тобі потрібний. А він усміхається й гадає, що сам іде, “сам іде”!” (стор. 6).

“Мозковий еротизм”—своєрідна гіпостась модерного сатанізму й нігілізму. В основі його—автономізація раціонального і суб'єктивного. Однак в ньому просвічує, за Пшибишевським, також глибинний екзистенціальний “страх життя”, “таємний біль існування” “на межі первозданного буття, на межі злиття мого Я зі Всім, на тій межі, де земне і трансцендентальне переходить одне в інше” (5: 68 і 5: 69). Майже фізіологічно, як відгомін прадавнього родового інстинкту, переживає несвідому екзистенційну таїну буття і Кирпатий Мефістофель Винниченка: “Є туга, є нудьга, важка, гризуча, темна, неначе я зробив щось таке, що забув, і воно мені погрожує бідой” (стор. 20).

Суперечність “душі” і “мозку”, двійництво і дзеркальність “я”, екстаз спокуси, самонавіювання, гіпнозу, повернення до природи і погоня за новими враженнями і літературними спостереженнями лежать в основі інтелектуально-чуттєвих експериментів і Фалька, і Кирпатового Мефістофеля. Прикметною рисою модерного “мозкового еротизму” є його волюнтаристсько-екстатична природа, яка, однак, ближча до нігілізму, аніж до діонісійства. Фанатично-безумні сатаністські претензії Гордона в його боротьбі з Богом (“Діти сатани”), що зізнається в руйнуванні етики, відкиданні всілякого телеологізму заради відчуття себе сатаною, демоном руїни, владикою могутності. Важлива також полеміка Пшибишевського і Винниченка з Ніцше. Анархіст Гордон (“Діти сатани”) не приймає останнього за те, що своєю “надлюдиною” Ніцше закликає не до Апокаліпсису, а до

15 Э. Финк, «Основные феномены человеческого бытия», у кн. *Проблема человека в западной философии* (Москва, 1988), стор. 377.

артистизму і “вічного повернення”. В романі Винниченка “По-свій” з Ніцше полемізує з позицій “імморалізму” “антианархіст” Вадим Стельмашенко. На думку останнього, претензія Ніцше бути “по той бік добра і зла” лишається в суті своїй моральною, оскільки Ніцше не зруйнував *людську* основу будь-якої релігії чи моралі— відчуття. Стельмашенко, натомість, прагне викоринити всяке *відчуття* в стосунку до людей—не лише любов, але і гнів. Подібне “нічого-непочування” пропагує нігіліст Гартман (“Діти сатани”), стверджуючи, подібно до героїв Винниченка, *віру* “в могутність мозку, в могутність усвідомлюючої і свідомої волі” (6: 175).

Розум, “мозок”—один з основних ворогів модерного індивідуума і водночас одне з основних джерел задоволення, оскільки він забезпечує “своєрідний мозковий екстаз”, “гарячку”, що стає домінуючим психічним станом “дітей сатани”. Автономність мозку і його галюцинацій, сповзання в підсвідомість, роздвоєння (“два мозки”) характеризують магічний екзистенціональний тип мислення. Як підкреслює Жан-Поль Сартр, існує загалом така екзистенціальна структура світу, яка є магічною¹⁶ і яку складають емоції, що допомагають переключитися свідомості зі світу реально-причинного на магічний, в такий спосіб переживаючи своє “буття-в-світі”.

Нігілізм, як стан особливої афектації, може розглядатися одним з модусів такого екзистенціального світопереживання. Він виростає, як показує Мартін Гайдеггер, з історично унікальної метафізичної позиції, в якій свобода набуває своєрідної суттєвості. Відповідно, розпука і страждання стають для модерного індивідуума привабливі і культивуються в своєрідну магію руйнування. Світ такого індивідуума стає сатаністським, магічним.

Гіпнотичним вважають моральний, інтелігентський і цивілізований світ персонажів і Пшибишевського, і Винниченка. Тарас із роману Винниченка “Чесність з собою” викриває тотальну ілюзію культурного прогресу—що основою його є розум, дух, інтелігенція. “Метою життя ви оповіщаєте задоволення душі й увільнення від влади тіла; душею й духовним ви тисячоліття гіпнотизуєте людськість і себе самих”¹⁷—стверджує він.

Як відомо, переоцінка цінностей і моральна метафізика Ніцше здійснювалися з перспективи абсолютної цінності “волі до влади” і “тіла”: “Віра в тіло фундаментальніша, ніж віра в *душу*”. “Феномен *тіла*

16 Ж. П. Сартр, «Очерк теории эмоций», у кн. *Психология эмоций: Тексты* (Москва, 1993), стор. 128, 141.

17 Володимир Винниченко, *Чесність з собою*, т. 16 його *Творів*, вид. 2-е (Київ, 1928), стор. 222.

більш багатий, виразний, відчутний феномен, методично підлягає висуненню на перше місце, без будь-якого передбачення його останнього смислу. (Фрідріх Ніцше, "Воля до влади", по. 491, 489). Останній смисл такої переоцінки у Ніцше заховався, як показує Жіль Дельиз за естетичною перспективою діонісійства, за "вічним поверненням" й ідеєю "надлюдини".

І Пшибишевський і Винниченко не замикаються ніцшевою метафізикою артистизму. Метафізична структура Пшибишевського захована в містичній і символічній цінності "голої душі". Винниченко ж виступає принциповим антимістиком і антисимволістом. На це вказував свого часу один з критиків "Дзвону", зауважуючи, що Винниченко як позитивіст не переходить за межі дійсності.¹⁸ Він різко на сприймає символізм та містицизм, як свідчить стаття "Спостереження непрофесіонала: Марксизм і мистецтво", де Винниченко критикує "шляхотних, поранкових, поетично-зажурених" "самітників", очевидно, натякаючи на галицьку "модерну", за те, що "скільки є змоги, вони фарбують свої ряденця в романтичні, демонічні, сатанинські, «символістичні» кольори".¹⁹ Символістська самотність, на думку українського письменника, ставить людину перед "глухою, містичною, непереможною", майже сартрівською стіною.

Таким чином, відкриття екзистенційального простору буття диференційованого модерного суб'єкта і його метафізичної туги, радикальна критика раціоналізму, аналітика кінцевого і несвідомого, складання іронічного модусу мови, нігілістично-сатаністсько-раціональний комплекс розгортали дискурсивну практику слов'янського різновиду європейського модернізму, в якому зовсім не випадковою нотою була еротична проблематика Станіслава Пшибишевського та Володимира Винниченка.

18 М. Троцький, «Пролетарська творчість (В. Винниченко, "Історія Якимового будинку", "Таємність", "Брехня")», *Дзвін*, 1913, ч. 3, стор. 192.

19 Винниченко, «Спостереження непрофесіонала», стор. 479.

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The Novelization of the Pamphlet: Aesthetic Compromise as Argument in Mykola Khvylovy's *Woodcocks*

Peter Sawczak

At the beginning of the twentieth century Ukrainian literature was still dominated by a tendency towards romantic contemplation of national and ethnic identity, which had become traditionalized as a defensive protest against Ukraine's provincial status and the tsarist government's consistent policy of Russification. The Revolution of 1917 dramatically, if briefly, changed this state of affairs. Its claim to foster respect, friendship, and equality among nations initiated a process of political and cultural decolonization of "Little Russia." A direct result of this was an unprecedented outburst of literary activity that one critic labels "the golden decade of modern Ukrainian literature."¹

Among the most vocal representatives of the rigorous post-colonial re-thinking of Ukrainian culture and society at this time was the polemicist and prose writer Mykola Khvylovy. Indeed, such was his influence that in April 1926 Stalin himself was compelled to voice his displeasure in a letter to Lazar Kaganovich, then secretary of the Bolshevik party in Ukraine, offering a succinct summary of Khvylovy's views: "Khvylovy's demands that the proletariat in Ukraine be immediately de-Russified, his belief that 'Ukrainian poetry should keep as far away as possible from Russian literature and style,' his pronouncement that 'proletarian ideas are familiar to us without the help of Russian art,' his passionate belief in some messianic role for the young Ukrainian intelligentsia, his ridiculous and non-Marxist attempt to divorce culture from politics—all this and much more in the mouth of this Ukrainian Communist sounds (and cannot but sound) more than strange."²

1 George Luckyj, introduction to *Before the Storm: Soviet Ukrainian Fiction of the 1920s*, ed. George Luckyj, trans. Yuri Tkacz (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1986), 7–12, here 7.

2 Cited in Myroslav Shkandrij, "Mykola Khvylovy and the Literary Discussion," introduction to Mykola Khvylovy, *The Cultural Renaissance in Ukraine: Polemical Pamphlets, 1925–1926*, ed.

As the spokesperson for a generation of like-minded compatriot writers of the 1920s, Khvylovy expounded the need for radical formal and stylistic extroversion in the Ukrainian literary process. Only by such means, and by accepting Ukrainian statehood as a *fait accompli* of the post-revolutionary Soviet order, he argued, could the stigma of cultural parochialism be overcome. His own prose, which takes stock of contemporary European trends and freely moves among the stylistic modes of surrealistic and expressionistic experimentation, ornamentalism, intense psychologism, and satire, serves as the most convincing expression of this sentiment.

In light of this, Khvylovy's unfinished novel *Valdshnepy* (*The Woodcocks*) presents something of an anomaly, if not a rude shock, to the reader. Written during the years 1926–7, it reads as an admission of defeat by the social, political, and cultural forces that initially rallied to the revolution with a view to the rebirth of Ukrainian nationhood.³

Such a concession, coming, as it does, from a leading exponent of Ukrainian national and cultural independence, is not without interest from the literary, as well as political, point of view. *The Woodcocks* brings together the unlikely literary bedfellows—aesthetically unsatisfying both singly and in combination—of political polemics and the two-penny romance, and presents the reader with an artless pastiche of contemporary socio-political slogans, programmatic political pamphlets of national-Communism, and disarmingly anachronistic borrowings from nineteenth-century Russian literary classics. It is as though the novel's literary pretence to aesthetic value is intentionally compromised. It is useful to consider why this might be the case.

As the reader's acquaintance with *The Woodcocks* cannot be presumed, we cite below George Luckyj's plot summary, particularly since it identifies some of the texts that make their presence felt in the novel:

The hero, Dimi Karamazov, is reminiscent of Dostoevsky's hero in more than name: he is a man with a divided self, doomed to self-destruction. We meet this Ukrainian communist at a resort, where he is staying with his wife, Hanna, and a friend, comrade Vovchuk. Gradually Dimi falls under the spell of Aglaia, a woman who is also vacationing there. Aglaia is a faint echo of Dostoevsky's Aglaia from *The Idiot*, the object of Prince Myshkin's love. Khvylovy's heroine is out to convert Dimi to a creed of Ukrainian nationalism. Although herself a Russian, she mesmerizes Dimi not only with her sex appeal but with her strong and willful personality. Together they plan to find a way "out of the blind alley

and trans. Myroslav Shkandrij (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986), 1–26, 14.

3 For a detailed discussion of Ukrainian national-Communism and its role in determining social, political, economic, and cultural structures in the 1920s, see James E. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918–1933* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1983); and Bohdan Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (London: Macmillan, 1985), 46–112.

of the revolution" and to proclaim a toast to the "madness of the brave." Under her spell Dimi dreams of a Ukrainian national state and drifts away from his conventional wife and from communism.⁴

We can discern in *The Woodcocks* a clear strategy of opposition between the compositionally distinct texts of pamphlet and novel. The work is saturated with the content and aphoristic style of a pamphlet: artificial dialogues riddled with the clichés of Ukrainian national-Communism are pushed to the fore, while relations between characters amount to little more than the interaction of contrary polemical stances. Provoking the polemical text, on the other hand, the main drama of the work enacts "Great Russia's" ongoing hierarchical superiority over "Little Russia," thinly veiled by the plot of an uneven courtship between the headstrong Russian, Aglaia, and the confused Ukrainian revolutionary, Dmytrii (Dimi being a diminutive of this name). Further, extensive borrowing from the Russian classics, including a protagonist whose namesake is Dmitrii Karamazov, absurdly inappropriate Chekhovian settings, and an intermittently appearing Gogolian narrator who ironically stereotypes the provincialism of the "steppe South," underline the sense of defeatism that attended attempts at pursuing a nationally differentiated artistic path in Soviet Ukraine of the early Stalinist era.

The genre opposition between pamphlet and novel, therefore, structures a whole range of oppositions that directly related to the problematic of the continuing legacy of Ukraine's colonial relationship to Russia. Such oppositions include those between colonial province and imperial capital, parochialism and cosmopolitanism, and nationalist polemics and international culture. What is implied by such a structuring of oppositions in the encounter between pamphlet and novel is that, while the provincial culture is reduced to polemics and ineffectual discussion, the imperial culture needs no justification or qualification for its creative activity. The irony of this situation is all too apparent—the backdrop of the work is a time of supposed decolonization, the so-called era of Ukrainization that was roughly contemporaneous with Lenin's New Economic Policy and had the de-Russification of Ukrainian society as its objective.

At the core of this representation of opposition between the polemics of Ukrainian national-Communism, on the one hand, and a reality that renders them absurd by exposing their failure to initiate change, on the other, is parody. The unsavoury blend of pastiche texts in *The Woodcocks*, the author's insertion of reminiscences from Russian literature into what is a Ukrainian novel, his ironic citation from political pamphlets, and his extra-literary open-ended argument about Russian political and cultural imperialism in Ukraine demand to be understood as parody in the modernist-cum-postmodernist sense of that term: "through a double process of installing and ironizing, parody signals how present represen-

4 Luckyj, introduction to *Before the Storm*, 10–11.

tations come from past ones and what ideological consequences derive from both continuity and difference.... In other words, parody works to foreground the politics of representation.... [It] is a value-problematizing, de-naturalizing form of acknowledging the history (and through irony, the politics) of representations."⁵

In *The Woodcocks*, representation concerns the colonialism of Ukrainian culture and society that has continued despite the promises and events of the revolution. While arguing on a polemical level for a new art and a new society free of colonial fetters, the novel does so on a literary level from a position of self-indulgent entrapment in the old. Through parody it takes to task nineteenth-century Ukrainian literary attitudes to the hierarchy of capital and province by demonstrating how these have perpetuated colonial features in Ukrainian national and cultural self-conceptions. Such attitudes are, on the one hand, romantic opposition of the type outlined at the beginning of this paper (the key figure here is Taras Shevchenko), and, on the other, collaboration with nineteenth-century Russian culture in highlighting the provincialism of Ukraine (as in the works of Nikolai Gogol.)⁶ Further, the opposition between pamphlet and novel parodically acknowledges the fact that in Ukrainian literature the novel is an immaturely and inadequately represented genre. We shall return to these points after illustrating how this opposition works in *The Woodcocks* to parody both colonialism and the pretence to post-colonialism. For this purpose, we shall focus on the character Dmytrii.

While the resonance of many ideas that Khvylovy expressed in his polemical pamphlets and essays makes itself felt throughout the author's fictional prose, in *The Woodcocks* this results in overt politicization. Indeed, one commentator argues that this work amounts to an attempt at creating a new genre of the *roman engagé* that derives not only its thematic, but also its formal impetus from the polemical pamphlet.⁷

This assertion is certainly borne out in the narrative role that Dmytrii plays as a mouthpiece for some key ideas of Khvylovy's polemical works, and particularly for his notorious imperative "Away from Moscow."⁸ This imperative is a call for Ukrainian culture to steer a post-colonial course, independent on the

5 Linda Hutcheon, *The Politics of Postmodernism* (London: Routledge, 1989), 93–4.

6 For a further discussion, see George S. N. Luckyj, *Between Gogol' and Ševchenko: Polarity in the Literary Ukraine, 1798–1847* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1971).

7 Hryhorii Kostiuk, "Mykola Khvylovy: Zhyttia, doba, tvorchist," introduction to Mykola Khvylovy, *Tvory v p'iatokh tomakh*, vol. 1, comp. and ed. Hryhorii Kostiuk (New York, Baltimore and Toronto: V. Symonenko Smoloskyp Publishers and Ukrainian Writers' Association in Exile, 1978), 15–106, here 63.

8 See "Apologists of Scribbling" and "Ukraine or Little Russia," in Khvylovy, *Cultural Renaissance*, 220–32.

one hand of the political and cultural hegemony of Russia, and, on the other, of the provincialism and ethnocentricity engendered by Ukraine's pre-revolutionary colonial status. This program for national regeneration not only determines Dmytrii's locutions, which closely imitate contemporary polemics in their language and rhetoric, but also sets the limits of his characterization. His point of view on any issue is filtered through his political ideas. Even the contemplation of his spouse, Hanna, leads him to an anti-colonial reflection: "Was she not the typical Ukrainian woman who, after having so disgracefully seen off Taras Bulba's sons to the Zaporozhian Sich, went off to beget more weak-willed people?"⁹ The literary allusion here is to the novella *Taras Bulba*, a work by the most influential provincializer of Ukraine, Nikolai Gogol.

At the same time, Dmytrii is an unmistakable literary reference to the character in Dostoevsky, with all the essential traits of his namesake, especially a king-sized libido and a tendency towards violent emotional outbursts. Khvylovy's Dmytrii is not a mere oblique allusion to a fictional character. Rather, the ready-made character from Dostoevsky is parodically presented as a "real" person who enters the "real world" of *The Woodcocks*. Thus, at the beginning of the story, Comrade Vovchuk makes inquiries about Karamazov and his spouse at a local bar in the resort town where they are staying. The response he elicits is one of disbelief, not because a fictional hero appears to be taken for a real person, but because this real person deigns to visit such a remote place: "Do you not know Monsieur Karamazov and Madame Karamazova?" I.L. Karasyk squirmed about and pulled a guilty face. It could be said that he had read *The Brothers Karamazov*, but it had never occurred to him that these brothers (or at least one of them) could have ventured into these remote parts."¹⁰

Dmytrii Karamazov's appearance in *The Woodcocks* is a parody of Dostoevsky's parody of the "superfluous person"; that is, he features as a parodic representation of the nineteenth-century Russian déclassé intellectual, whose characteristic instability and nihilistic attitude is the result of political frustration.¹¹ It is with this in mind that Aglaia characterizes him as "an abortion of the thirties," adding that "these years will be characterized by historians by this

9 Mykola Khvylovy, *The Woodcocks*, in *Before the Storm*, 15–67, here 18.

10 Ibid., 15.

11 The term "superfluous people" (*lishnie liudi*) came into widespread critical use at the time of the publication of Ivan Turgenev's *Diary of a Superfluous Man* (1850). D. Slagoi makes use of it in his analysis of *Evgenii Onegin*. See his chapter on Pushkin in *Istoriia russkoi literatury XIX veka*, vol. 1, ed. A. G. Sokolov (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 1960), 529. For a discussion of the historical background, see Hans Kohn, "Russia's Great Age: Encounter with Europe," in *The Mind of Modern Russia*, ed. Hans Kohn (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 3–33, esp. 11–15.

very label.”¹² Her assessment of Dmytrii shows up his similarities to the generation of the superfluous people: “Dmytriy Karamazov and the Dmytriy Karamazovs have come to a conclusion they find terrifying: there is no way out. There is no way to break ties with the party, because this ostensibly is not only a betrayal of the party, but also of those social ideals for which they so romantically went to their deaths; this would be in the end a betrayal of one’s own self. But there was no way ties could remain unbroken. In short, they stopped at a kind of idiotic crossroads.”¹³

Clearly, the circumstances in which Dmytrii, together with his generation, finds himself are outwardly not unlike those of the superfluous people in late nineteenth-century Russia, with one important exception: the phenomenon of the superfluous people becomes absurdly unreal and anachronistic when transposed into the peripheral colonial setting of Ukraine and into a time following a far-reaching social and political revolution. Further, as a literary re-representation of a character type that has a central place in the nineteenth-century Russian novel, Dmytrii’s presence in *The Woodcocks* parodically highlights the absence of a well-developed native tradition of the novel in Ukrainian literature. By indulging in such anachronistic mimeticism, the author provokes the ugliness of colonialism in Ukrainian culture.

The point of encounter between the polemical Dmytrii—the Ukrainian national-Communist—and the literary Dmitrii of *Brothers Karamazov* fame is, therefore, in the fact that neither has any business being the other. As a consequence, the polemical post-colonial text of the former is rendered absurd by his parodied literary identity as the “broad Russian soul” (*shirokaia russkaia dusha*), a product and type of imperial culture. Indeed, the only concession to his Ukrainianness, beyond his polemical exposition of national-Communism, is the partly Ukrainian rendering of his first name as “Dmytrii” rather than the Russian “Dmitrii” or the Standard Ukrainian “Dmytro.” In this sense, Dmytrii is representative of Ukrainian-Russian social and cultural hybridization. It is precisely such an effect that was sought by the doctrine of “official nationality,” formally proclaimed in 1833 under the reactionary reign of Nicholas I. By socially subsuming an already politically dependent Ukraine under the principles of Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality (*narodnost*), “official nationality” promoted a “Little Russian” identity for Ukraine, reinforcing the view of the Ukrainian language as a Russian dialect and Ukraine’s culture as that of a peripheral Russian region.

In parodying the failure of Ukrainian national-Communism to oppose the return of Russian imperialism, *The Woodcocks* asserts the persistence of colonial

12 Khvylovy, *The Woodcocks*, 56.

13 Ibid., 63.

features in Ukrainian literary culture into the post-revolutionary age. In effect Khvylovy suggests that the national-Communists' enthusiasm for the policy of Ukrainization and for Ukraine's newly acquired national and cultural status amounted to self-deception. They disregarded a past dependent on colonial structures while promoting the revolution as a fresh point of departure for a new and universally respectable national culture. But a prerequisite for post-colonial cultural politics, Khvylovy argues, is that the colonial past be fully addressed and demythologized. Only then can it be legitimately discarded.

Khvylovy begins this process through his literary debunking of the traditionalized views of Ukraine as a Russian imperial province, parodically unmasking them as anachronistic in the socio-political situation of the 1920s. In the opening paragraph of *The Woodcocks*, for example, the rural and provincial image of Ukraine that Gogol had popularized for the Russian reading public is parodied by a dismissive grammatical negation of the traditional idyll: "Hanna and Dmytrii arrived in this once quiet small town, which was some six hundred kilometres from Non-Paris (someone had once so ironically dubbed our capital city), in the middle of June—a time when our steppe South no longer exuded the scent of grapes, let alone apricots."¹⁴

It is the Gogolian picture that attracts the Russian cosmopolitan Aglaia, who often came to rest "in the beautiful steppes," spoke Ukrainian fluently and commended it as "such a musical language," lauded "Gogol's phantasmagoria," and generally "loved Ukraine very much and, be it known, even eccentrically."¹⁵

Less restrained and less literary, however, is Dmytrii's (i.e., Khvylovy's) attack on the Ukrainian national bard Taras Shevchenko, and the tradition of nineteenth-century nationalism for which he stands:

"[I]t was Shevchenko who castrated our intelligentsia. Wasn't it he who fostered this dim-witted slave-enlightener, whose name is legion? Wasn't it Shevchenko—perhaps not such a bad poet but a weak-willed person amazingly lacking in culture—wasn't it he who taught us to write poems, sentimentalizing in 'Kateryna style,' rebelling in 'Haidamak' style, to look absurdly and aimlessly at the world and its construction through a prism of backwardness sweetened with frightening phrases? Wasn't it he, this serf, who taught us to berate the lord behind his back, so to speak, and drink vodka with him and grovel before him when he slaps us familiarly on the shoulder and says: 'You, Matiusha, are a talent, after all.' It was just this image-painting 'Father Taras' who halted the cultural development of our nation and stopped it from forming a state-wide unity at the right time."¹⁶

14 Ibid., 15.

15 Ibid., 26–8.

16 Ibid., 29–30.

Here parody gives way to a polemical call for the demythologization of the cult associated with Shevchenko, whom Aglaia calls a "bozhko," that is, a demigod. It is not so much the authority Shevchenko commanded as a gifted and original writer that is called into question as it is the romantic ethnocentric tradition he represents. It is perhaps a weakness of Khvylovy's novel that in it the Shevchenkian is the object merely of cheap polemical attack, not of parodic representation. But the provocative nature of such an attack is not to be underestimated, given the venerated position that Shevchenko commands in the Ukrainian literary pantheon. Indeed, it is this venerated position that disallows parody, even today, making it tantamount to blasphemy as far as most Ukrainian readers are concerned.

Ultimately *The Woodcocks* is not a victim of its own timeliness, since its argument remains a valid one. As a confrontation with colonialism, it provokes the stigma of provincialism by contesting its traditionalization in Ukrainian literature, whether as defensive opposition or as collaboration. Trends in Ukrainian literature during the Gorbachevian thaw reflected just such a recognition of the need to address colonial features and their historical framework.¹⁷ While *The Woodcocks* is perhaps not the subtlest or aesthetically most pleasing of novels, it presents the beginning of a way out of the colonial mentality, in part through its readiness to shock its reader by discarding colonial cultural habits. More than this, however, by indulging in rather than being fettered to colonialism, it suggests a literary way out, namely, that of the parody of Ukrainian literature and cultural self-conceptions.

17 See Marko Pavlyshyn, "Thaws, Literature and the Nationalities Discussion in Ukraine: The Prose of Valerii Shevchuk," in *Glasnost' in Context: On the Recurrence of Liberalizations in Central and East European Literatures and Cultures*, ed. Marko Pavlyshyn (New York: Berg, 1990), 49–68.

Masked Feminism in Ukrainian Literature

Halyna Koscharsky

Before we can discuss the new literary term “masked feminism” (which I propose as an aid to feminist criticism), we should firstly define briefly the feminist critical approach to a literary text. One of the main aims of feminist criticism is an analysis of literature as the product of human social relations, particularly gender relations and expressions of gender power. This process of discovery of hidden codes of often unconscious motivations and expressions enables us to “find a new language, a new way of reading that can integrate our intelligence and our experience, our reason and our suffering, our scepticism and our vision.”¹

The reasons for codes being hidden are many. For example, a feminist interpretation of Charlotte Brontë’s *Jane Eyre* (1847) reveals the masked, repressed, or secret text concealed beneath an apparently straightforward story concerning a young governess who finds happiness in her employer’s home. The character and meaning of the masked text may be read variously—revealing, for example, that Jane is an instinctive feminist who conceals her feminist intuitions; the latter, however, manifest themselves in her turbulent dreams. A text such as this was regarded as dangerously subversive, and *Jane Eyre* was virtually banned in girls’ schools until the end of the century.²

In Ukraine the feminist movement itself first appeared a little later in the same century. The first feminist anthology, *Pershyi vinok*, was published in 1887 by Nataliia Kobrynska and Olena Pchilka. Several of Olha Kobylianska’s published works, including the novels *Liudyna* (A Person, 1891) and *Tsarivna* (The Princess, 1895), have as their heroine an intelligent, cultured, emancipated

1 Elaine Showalter, “Toward a Feminist Poetics,” in *The New Feminist Criticism: Essays on Women, Literature, and Theory*, ed. Elaine Showalter (New York: Pantheon, 1985), 141.

2 For a detailed analysis of this text, see Gill Frith, “Women, Writing and Language: Making the Silences Speak,” in *Introducing Women’s Studies: Feminist Theory and Practice*, ed. Diane Richardson and Victoria Robinson (London: Macmillan, 1993).

woman living in an oppressive and intolerant provincial community. Although the question of female emancipation is usually addressed directly and openly, some feminist elements of Kobylanska's writing are masked. The reason for masking was most probably the aesthetic power gained through a masked discourse. We will later examine the text by Kobylanska that best illustrates this assertion.

As Roman Weretelnik has already demonstrated, Lesia Ukrainka's dramas were "a revolutionary challenge to the patriarchal social order which existed in the literature of the time."³ Focusing on the woman as the active force in the history of her own life and applying interpretations from the feminine rather than the masculine sphere of values, Lesia Ukrainka's dramas represent a protest against the norms and the values of the dominant tradition, a protest that develops into self-discovery and a search for an independent identity. This modern woman, states Weretelnik, appears in the dramas *Blakytina troianda* (The Azure Rose), *Kaminnyi hospodar* (The Stone Host), and *Boiarynia* (The Noblewoman), where "the feminine triumphs over the masculine."⁴ Here the term "masked feminism" applies because of the inaccessibility of this reading to the average reader, who is likely to assign to the texts the standard, generally accepted interpretation.

A challenge to the patriarchal social order is also apparent in contemporary Ukrainian poetry. In her treatment of Ukrainian history, Lina Kostenko highlights historical details that are little known and sometimes idealized by historians; she offers new and unexpected interpretations. In her novel in verse *Marusia Churai*,⁵ the values privileged are not those belonging to the patriarchal social order, but opposing ones. The protagonist is not the traditional, male-dependent female, but, instead, one who is completely independent—physically, emotionally, and psychologically.⁶ Kostenko's *Churai* is very different from the one portrayed in Volodymyr Samiilenko's play *Churaivna* (1886).⁷ Samiilenko's version emphasises Marusia's dependent character: she is repeatedly shown to rely on the play's male characters.⁸ A comparison of the two depictions serves

3 Roman Veretelnik [Weretelnik], "Feminizm u dramaturhii Lesi Ukrainky," *Suchasnist*, 1991, no. 2, 29.

4 *Ibid.*, 32.

5 Lina Kostenko, *Marusia Churai* (Kyiv: Radianskyi pysmennyk, 1979).

6 See my *Tvorchist Liny Kostenko z pohliadu poetyky ekspresyvnosti* (Kyiv: Vydavnychiy dim "KM Academia," 1994).

7 Volodymyr Samiilenko, "Churaivna," in his *Poetychni tvory, prozovi tvory, perespivy ta pereklady, statii ta spohady* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1990).

8 See my "Feministychnyi pidkhid do poezii Liny Kostenko," *Slovo i chas* (forthcoming).

to illustrate Virginia Woolf's statement that the values held by women very often differ from those held by men.⁹

The question of dependence in the context of misfortune and despair is present in two contemporary poems, both of which take as their central character the medieval Rus' princess Rohnida: Lina Kostenko's "Horyslava-Rohnida" and Oksana Zabuzhko's "Polon Rohnidy."¹⁰ Both texts strongly condemn the patriarchal social order. Although Kostenko's poem expresses a political message, which culminates in the line, "Oto ne treba voroha liubyt!" (One must not love one's enemy!), the main discourse of both poems concerns the apparently factual and detailed description of two historical episodes. The first of these is the subject of Zabuzhko's "Polon Rohnidy," which is written in the first person: young Princess Rohnida of Polatsk describes the circumstances of her captivity after the destruction of her people by Grand Prince Volodymyr of Kyiv in the tenth century. Her voice carries passionate hate for Volodymyr. Rohnida's father, the ruler of the Polatsk land, has been killed, and she and other Polatsk girls have been tied together by their long braids and thrown into a tent. She finds herself in the role of captive, where the captors are men and the patriarchal order rules, though benevolently.¹¹ Rohnida decides that she will mask her true feelings and go to her captor, the prince:

Ось ціна перемог твоїх, хижою сіллю замочених,
Ось вага полонянських, загравою стертих облич—
Я ховаю під сукню ножа
У чеканні цієї ночі,
Я звільнюся, коханий, поклич мене, любий, поклич ... (112)

[Here's the price of your victory, soaked with coarse salt, / Here's the value of the captives' faces, ragged from the heat— / I hide a knife beneath my dress / In anticipation of this night, / I'll be free, my beloved, just call me, my love, just call ...]

Of course, irony is at work in this text: the reader is conscious of the fact that Rohnida will not carry out this planned revenge. Instead, she will be forced to marry Volodymyr and, in spite of herself, will fall in love with him. But she will forever remain the less worthy, dominated member of this partnership, and her life will soon become unbearably wretched.¹²

9 Maggie Humm, ed., *Feminism: A Reader* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), 224.

10 Lina Kostenko, *Vybrane* (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1989), 379; Oksana Zabuzhko, *Dyryhenty ostannoï svichky* (Kyiv: Radianskyi pysmennyk, 1990), 111. All translations are mine. Page references in the text are to the editions cited.

11 Benevolence, which sometimes masks coercion and is closely associated with it, may be typical of the relationship between inferiors and their superiors. See John Wiltshire, *Jane Austen and the Body* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 91.

12 The question of domination is discussed in Deborah Tannen, *Gender and Discourse* (New

The feminist theorist Hélène Cixous has offered an analysis of sexuality and desire as expressed in the literary text.¹³ Such an expression is apparent in the passage quoted above, although it is partly masked by Rohnida's indignant and vengeful tone. The text is a monologue in which she mentally addresses the prince while planning her strategy. But the use of "ty", the familiar form of address, hints from the very first line at a possible intimacy between them. There is also a subtext of sexuality and unexpected desire in Rohnida's description of Volodymyr—his strong, sure movements ("[he] flung the canvas aside with his hand") and his appearance and smell ("and your sheepskin coat, thrown over your shoulders, smelled of the dry warm hay")—as well as in the terms "beloved" and "my love." Perhaps the ironic hyperbole of her idolizing address—"O, Prince, you, who have been hewn by violent storms! God-like—idol-like!"—is a sign of suppressed, unconsciously harboured thoughts of intimacy. In addition, there is a direct reference to the desire Rohnida has stirred in order to achieve her objective:

Як я тобі промайнула в ту ніч—
Гола, біла, летюча, мов сніг ...
І стиснув тобі обручем спогад чоло,
І тоді ти мене покликав—(112)

[When I flashed past you that night, / Naked, white, flying past like the snow ...
/ And the memory squeezed like a ring round your forehead, / Then you called me.]

Lina Kostenko's "Horyslava-Rohnida" concerns an episode subsequent to the one described in Zabuzhko's poem. Rohnida is now addressed by what appears to be a female voice. Prince Volodymyr has forced her into marriage and has been successful in winning her heart; the horrors of the past are now distant memories to Rohnida, who is deeply in love and happy. Her joy is short-lived, however, for Volodymyr tires of her and turns his attention to a succession of other beauties, leaving each with a broken heart.¹⁴ Rohnida herself is sent to a monastery. The picture created is of the wife sacrificed to the patriarchal order. The sense of betrayal is heightened by the narrator's use of the present tense. This unexpectedly negative portrayal of the revered Prince Volodymyr, the first Christian ruler of Kyivan Rus', as an immoral and cruel man destroys the romantic illusion traditionally associated with his name and presents him as the expression of a patriarchal social order that heedlessly victimizes women:

York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 7–12.

13 Cixous's ideas are discussed in Toril Moi, *Sexual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory* (London: Routledge, 1985, 1988), 110.

14 Volodymyr was the father of eleven princes by five wives. See the entries on Rohnida and Volodymyr in *The Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vols. 4 and 5, ed. Danylo Husar Struk (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).

У нього сто таких у Берестові,
і кожна з них заходиться плачем,
бо князь розлюбить, то уже любові
ні слізьми не повернеш, ні мечем. (379)

[He has a hundred such women in Berestove, / and each of them is weeping and distressed, / for when the prince falls out of love, / neither tears nor sword will bring love back.]

Rohnida's humiliation at the hands of this symbol of goodness (Volodymyr was canonized in the mid-thirteenth century) is compounded by the fact that the prince is guilty of the death of her family:

... тебе цілує той, хто їх убив.
О найстрашніше із усіх принижень!
О найдивніше з найдивніших див! (379)

[... the one who killed them kisses you. / O, worst of all humiliations! / O, strangest of the strangest sights!]

The sense of Rohnida being a victim is strengthened by the narrator's personal, sympathetic tone and the use of the affectionate diminutive form when addressing her: "O, my dear God, how he has abandoned you, my darling princess, now grown old from weeping."

The above use of examples from Lesia Ukrainka, Kostenko, and Zabuzhko should not be taken to imply that only texts by women writers are the proper object of feminist interpretations. Cixous states that it is inappropriate to talk about "female writing," since it is not a writer's gender that is relevant, but that which she or he has written.¹⁵ The fact that male writers often show deep understanding in their portrayal of women's experiences and emotions is evident, for example, in Nikolai Gogol's *Taras Bulba*. The main themes of the novel are patriotism, the Cossack spirit, the nature of male-female relationships, and the patriarchal social order of the time.

If we focus on the latter two themes, we can indeed say that Gogol had a deep understanding and sympathy for the role of women of the time. Writing on the subject of relationships in the novel, George Grabowicz explains: "the most basic dichotomy [in *Taras Bulba*] is man and woman, and the next one, which is naturally built on it, is the opposition of a settled way of life to that of the Cossacks.... The difference between the male and the female world immediately becomes apparent." Grabowicz points to several cases where Bulba emphasizes this difference, at times in a brutal fashion. "At a deeper level," he writes, "Andrii's renunciation of Cossack concerns equals a move to the female world,

15 Moi, 110.

to 'the family' and personal values; this constitutes a betrayal at all levels."¹⁶ Everything that belongs to the female world is regarded by Bulba as inferior and not worthy of attention. Yet Gogol understands and sympathises with this world, as can be seen from his description of the suffering borne by the mother of Andrii and Ostap as she sits by them all night before their departure. Without any regard for the fact that their mother has not seen them for a long time, Bulba suddenly decides to leave with them for the Sich the day after their return from the seminary in Kyiv. Gogol describes the mother's grief thus: "The poor mother alone did not sleep. She bent over the pillow of her beloved sons who were lying side by side;... she gazed at them not only with her eyes, but with the whole of her being; all her feelings seemed to be concentrated in that gaze, and she could not gaze enough on them."¹⁷ Here and throughout his narrative Gogol reveals an understanding of the difficult role of women in the context of the Cossack patriarchy.

In Olha Kobylanska's works, particularly in her story "Nekulturna" (The Boorish Woman),¹⁸ we discover an interesting example of masked feminism. A feminist reading reveals a strong expression of sexuality and desire.¹⁹ Although it is hidden in the story, its presence is signified by two mountains, at the foot of which stands the home of the protagonist, Paraska. Through personification, the mountains—Magura and Rung—acquire romantic and sexual significance. Magura is at first described as an untouched young girl: "The lushness of her undergrowth ... and her steepness saved her from the visits of summer guests. She stood on weekdays, as on holidays, alone, listening intently to the even hum of her own firs, or, glancing around the peaks of neighbouring mountains, she would become absorbed in thoughts about her nearest neighbour" (469).

Magura was absorbed in thoughts of Rung, "a good-looking giant, tall and wide". The two mountains are "divided for eternity" by a stream, which "sprayed them with its cold pearls." But there exists between them an actual, tangible link in the form of the hawks that "rose from the depths of Rung's forest ... and, having circled dreamily around his peak, sank into the dark green forests of Magura.... Lingered here and there on the thick branches of her firs, they called

16 Hryhorii Hrabovych [George G. Grabowicz], "Hohol i mif Ukrainy," *Suchasnist*, 1994, no. 10, 147–8.

17 Nikolai Gogol, "Taras Bulba," in *Mirgorod*, trans. David Magarshack ([n. p.]: Minerva, 1968), 38–9.

18 Olha Kobylanska, *Tvory*, vol. I (Kyiv: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo khudozhnoi literatury, 1956), 469–81.

19 These themes are frequently the focus of feminist readings. See David Buchbinder, *Contemporary Literary Theory and the Reading of Poetry* ([Perth]: Curtin University of Technology, 1991), 124.

out in far-reaching voices that they were from Rung, while she, catching their sounds, carried them into herself and later murmured something with a far-reaching sound" (469).

Each part of this scene can serve as a metaphor for the corresponding stage of a sexual relationship. As if pleased by the encounter, Magura now "bathes in a golden light," smiling at Rung, while he "shines brightly." The side of Rung that faces Magura—"sloping and proudly decorated with pines from the ground to the top"—reminds one of the male body covered with hair and perspiring, for it is "covered with dew, as if with a thick silver netting." At the point where the two mountains "sloped gently and almost joined, they both bathed in sunshine," and here grew tall, lush vegetation. Noteworthy is the mention of "the warmed air" and "warmed water that, weakened to the point of softness, now spilled gently and almost soundlessly over the stones, changing unobtrusively into shimmering gold." The description of the two mountains concludes with the words, "mutually defeated by each other's beauty, they leaned forward and sank into the darkened depths.... Their paradise was there."

This sensitive depiction undoubtedly contributes to the story's aesthetic appeal, and it creates a specific mood for the narrative; it simultaneously provides an idealized parallel to the events themselves, events that concern Paraska—a feminist whose relationships, by comparison, do not occur in paradise. Whether Kobylanska was fully conscious of these hidden textual codes and intended to bring them to the readers's attention is not the central issue here, especially if we follow Derrida's dictum that there is no writerly or textual "essence" of meaning that is forever fixed and determined.²⁰ What is at issue is that a feminist reading opens hitherto unexplored aspects of literary texts, providing new information about our social interaction and the various structures of our lives. The term "masked feminism" has a place in this approach to literary criticism, since it describes textual strategies that, for a variety of reasons, are hidden from the uninitiated reader and require an informed interpretation.


20 Jacques Derrida, "Living On," in *Deconstruction and Criticism*, ed. Harold Bloom et al. (New York: Seabury Press, 1979).

Ukrainian Musical Elements in Classical Music

Yakov Soroker

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From Osadchy to the "Koleso" Controversy: Modernity and Its Meanings in Ukrainian Culture since the 1960s

Marko Pavlyshyn

To refer to the polemical exchange that followed the publication of Iurii Mushketyk's essay "Koleso" (The Wheel) in *Literaturna Ukraina* in October 1994¹ as a "controversy" is, doubtless, to engage in hyperbole. The volume of the discussion was not great, and the depth of its penetration into the issues raised was not impressive. Nevertheless, this polemical exchange deserves attention as symptomatic of the situation in contemporary Ukrainian culture generally and Ukrainian literature in particular. At issue is a question of direct personal significance to many writers: do the creative habits and capabilities of the older generation of literati have any utility in a post-Soviet world? Mushketyk, born in 1927 and chairman since 1986 of the Writers' Union of Ukraine, in which the traditionalists far outnumber the innovators, launches in "Koleso" an angry attack on a phenomenon that he brands variously as "modernism," "avantgardism," "postmodernism" and "post-avantgardism." He uses these terms quite interchangeably to label a group of features of which he greatly disapproves in some recent literary works by writers under forty years of age who are conventionally regarded as "young." Such writers have in common, according to Mushketyk, the claim to a universalism that rejects national roots; a preoccupation with form and aesthetic play that runs parallel to neglect of serious issues, both societal and national; a rejection of humanist values; and "licentiousness"—verbal profanity on the one hand, and disrespect for the canon of

1 Iurii Mushketyk, "Koleso: Kilka dumok z pryvodu suchasnoho ukrainskoho postavanhardu," *Literaturna Ukraina*, 27 October 1994.

Ukrainian literary culture on the other. Mushketyk seeks to rally the troops under the banner of a no-longer-socialist realism—he calls it “eternal” (*vikovichnyi*) or “genuine” (*spravzhnii*) realism—and to reassert the obligation of literature to serve the interests of society at large (in particular, to defend and strengthen Ukrainian culture). Innovation, he contends, is natural and desirable, providing, however, that it remains within reasonable limits and does not take its inspiration from “foreign dustbins.”

Mushketyk does not attack particular miscreants. Indeed, the only contemporary name mentioned in “Koleso” is that of the young prose writer Oles Ulianenko, whose *Stalinka*² Mushketyk calls “a talented novel.” This is one of the article’s many surprises, for Ulianenko’s work manifests in extreme measure most of the tendencies that Mushketyk condemns. Nevertheless, the objects of his tirade are transparent. They are, almost certainly, such literary groupings as Bu-Ba-Bu and Nova Degeneratsiia, and such individuals as the writer Ihor Malenky. Malenky, who four years earlier had launched an especially merciless attack on the literary establishment,³ may well have been in Mushketyk’s mind as one of the “young artists” whose “invectives against the Writers’ Union ..., which consistently defends the shrines of Ukrainian culture [*ukrainski sviatyni*] and the Ukrainian language, do harm to the Ukrainian cause.” Even though personal denunciations are absent from “Koleso,” there is much in the article that is reminiscent of the official criticism of high Brezhnevism: Mushketyk’s patriarchal and didactic tone, his rhetoric of moderation and tolerance (which is supposed to contrast with the supposed shrill irrationality of his opponents), and his unhesitating assumption of the right to speak authoritatively on behalf of the general (today, the national) interest.

The tenor of “Koleso” is, perhaps, not unexpected, given Mushketyk’s role in the Writers’ Union and the cultural profile of a majority of its members. More surprising are the responses to “Koleso.” Volodymyr Morenets, a specialist in contemporary poetry at the Institute of Literature of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, while addressing the Council of the Writers’ Union, defended cultural pluralism against Mushketyk’s call for a unified culture. As part of his rhetorical strategy, he adopted a patronizing attitude toward Mushketyk, pooh-poohing his credentials to make judgments in the domain of literary and aesthetic theory and implicitly claiming such authority, instead, for himself as a member of “the

2 Published in *Suchasnist*, 1994, no. 9, 21–76.

3 Ihor Malenky, “Vidrodzhennia chy zhart? Neradisni rozdumy z pryvodu deiakykh rys sohodnishnoi literaturnoi sytuatsii,” *Literaturna Ukraina*, 15 November 1990. The episode is analysed in my article “On the Possibility of Opposition under *Glasnost*,” in *Literature and Opposition*, ed. Chris Worth, Pauline Nestor, and Marko Pavlyshyn (Melbourne: Centre for Comparative Literature and Cultural Studies, Monash University, 1994), 165–78.

community that, from time to time, does a little reading."⁴ It is all the more extraordinary, then, that Morenets should regard Mushketyk as absurdly mistaken in considering avantgardism to be a subcategory of modernism. The two are as different, Morenets asserts, as "a November Sunday from Easter." This belief, however, is eccentric rather than mainstream. The conventional view, of course, is that avantgardism, especially during its heyday in the years 1910–1930, was, in its dedication to aesthetic experiment, its extreme rejection of realistic convention, and its impatience with the received order of the world, the most radical expression of a modernist sensibility.⁵ Morenets, it transpires, is not much better informed on the matter than Mushketyk.

Even stranger is the reaction of Maksym Rozumny, who writes on behalf of Association 500, a grouping of the very youngest literati, born mostly after 1970. Rozumny's short and polite note in *Literaturna Ukraina* objects to Mushketyk's "collective image of [the unconventional writer as] the enemy of the Ukrainian ethos," but on the whole registers scant interest in the passions of Mushketyk and the Young Turks whose literary scandals have so offended Mushketyk. Rozumny calls vaguely for reconciliation before proceeding to his main business: to present Association 500 to the reader in all of its non-doctrinaire variety as the carrier of a "new quality" in contemporary Ukrainian letters.⁶

How can we explain a situation where a senior writer and a widely-published literary critic appear to be all at sea with regard to concepts that in the West are among the basic structuring notions of twentieth-century cultural history? How is it that the spokesman of a youthful literary grouping feels only peripherally affected by a declaration of the eternal validity of the ancien régime? The cultural historian might name several contributory causes. The vague and promiscuous use of terms on both sides of the controversy is related to residual cold-war and colonial cultural barriers. The Western cultural studies discussion is known to most intellectuals in Ukraine at best by hearsay and in the form of catchwords. This is not surprising: translations are few, the material is too expensive in the original even for major libraries to acquire it, and even if it were available, the middle and older generation of intellectuals could not respond to it, because their Soviet education did not endow them with a knowledge of the relevant foreign languages. Thus, Morenets makes claims to a spurious erudition in the expectation that nobody will be competent to verify them, while

4 Volodymyr Morenets, "Poshukovyi prostir i 'iedyna pravda,'" *Suchasnist*, 1994, no. 12, 137–41, here 140.

5 Soviet consensus of the 1970s and 1980s did not dispute this definition. See the articles on modernism in *Bolshaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia*, 3d ed., vol. 16 (Moscow: Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1974), 402–4; and *Ukrainskaadianska entsyklopediia*, 2d ed., vol. 7 (Kyiv: Holovna redaktsiia Ukrainskoi radianskoi entsyklopedii, 1982), 67.

6 Maksym Rozumny, "Pid kolesom," *Literaturna Ukraina*, 1 December 1994.

Mushketyk juggles with terms whose conventional meanings he does not know. Because the controversy reflects a tension between a group with considerable power in the Writers' Union and a group that resents that power, the dispute is seen by novices as being not about literature, but about strategic advantage in the literary establishment. To Rozumny, therefore, the debate appears as transparent and sordid, but not especially interesting.

It could further be argued that, in addition to these social grounds of recent provenance, the "Koleso" controversy has its roots in the peculiarly contradictory Soviet attitude toward the issue of the modern that dates from the 1930s. The project of modernity, to summarize the consensual view, is the European secular preoccupation, especially potent from the seventeenth century onward, with the idea that human beings, through the proper use of their own minds, can and must change the world so as to bring about the greatest human happiness and fulfilment. Marxism-Leninism, accordingly, is one of the more outrageously self-confident formulations of the project of modernity.

Modernism in culture, as a sensibility and a cluster of styles, is a natural ally of the project of modernity to the extent that it apprehends the existing world and, indeed, humankind in its present form as corrupt, complacent and to be changed. Artists in the first decade of the existence of the USSR understood this intuitively. Their participation in European modernism, their formal experimentation, and their emphatic avantgardism were an attack on bourgeois taste and, simultaneously, an attack on the received world order. To quote the most obvious Ukrainian example, the symbolic "Evropa" that Mykola Khvylovy so emphatically celebrates in his pamphlets of the 1920s is a *modern* Europe of social and aesthetic progress that is imagined as an ally of the revolution.

The violent institutionalization of socialist realism as the measure and guideline for all artistic activity in the U.S.S.R. in the 1930s proclaimed the end of this seemingly natural alliance. Henceforth modernism would be denounced as a backward step on the path toward communism. After Stalin's death it would become officially mentionable and discussable, but only in the context of polemics against it. In 1962, with Khrushchev's thaw still under way, the seventeen-volume Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopaedia would dedicate less than one sentence to modernism in art: "The general name for various degenerate currents in bourgeois art and literature (see *decadence*, *art nouveau*, *formalism*)."⁷ Nevertheless, the classics of European literary modernism found their way, in translation, to the Soviet reader. Franz Kafka appeared in the Ukrainian journal *Vsesvit* (Kyiv) in 1963, even before the first Russian-language publication, and excerpts from James Joyce's *Ulysses* appeared in the same journal in 1966. Scholarly discussions addressed the possibility of incorporating this or that

7 *Ukrainska radianska entsyklopediia*, 1st ed., vol. 9 (Kyiv: Akademiia nauk URSR, 1962), 285.

modernist into the proletarian realistic heritage, especially in the wake of the insistence of Jean-Paul Sartre, a valuable ally of the Communist cause in the West, that Proust, Kafka, and Joyce be so treated.⁸ Campaigns against particular representatives of the modernist canon, such as that of the Ukrainian critic Dmytro Zatonsky against Franz Kafka,⁹ had the (perhaps not entirely unintentional) effect of spreading knowledge of it. Camus and Faulkner were widely translated and read. Beneath the official critics' negative assessments one senses a broad recognition among readers of the interest and value of the modernist canon, as well as a perception of its special, if accidental, relevance to their lives. As one commentator put it, the nightmare world of Kafka's fictions could be read as a realistic description of everyday Soviet reality.¹⁰ (As the Swedish scholar Jensen has interestingly argued, the common view that modernism distances itself from "life" is a misconception or, at least, an oversimplification. It is rather the case that, from a modernist perspective, life as represented in traditional texts does not appear very lifelike, and modernism practises a higher-order mimesis according to its own rules.)¹¹ Equally, if one approaches modernist texts with the expectations of a reader alert to the operations of Aesopian language, they may well appear to have a far more directly political dimension than modernist texts are traditionally regarded as possessing. Thus, just as "modern" formal devices—discontinuity, montage, refusal of rational connectedness—may be said to "reflect" a world perceived as fragmented and absurd, so modernism's departure from conventional language in favour of the obscure or the shocking could be read as an allegory of liberation from totalitarian convention.

These potentially subversive readings of the formal language of modernism in the peculiar Soviet context of the early 1960s were, plausibly, what made the poetry of some of the "shistdesiatnyky" (people of the 'sixties) especially sensational for the reading public in Ukraine. Emblematic of this sensationalism was the surreal, indeed Daliesque, image of the "knife in the sun" (*nizh u sontsi*), which the young Ivan Drach made the title of one of his long poems. In point of fact, only a few of the "shistdesiatnyky" could, with good conscience, be seen to exhibit a modernist dimension. Aside from Drach, Mykola Vinhranovsky

8 I. I. Anisimov, "Sovremennye problemy realizma i modernizma," in *Sovremennye problemy realizma i modernizma*, ed. I. I. Anisimov et al. (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), 7–26, 15.

9 In her article "Who's Afraid of Franz Kafka?: Kafka Criticism in the Soviet Union," *Slavic Review* 33 (1976): 484–503, Emily Tall discusses one book and five articles dedicated by Zatonsky to this project.

10 Iurii Glazov, quoted in Tall, 497–8.

11 Peter Albert Jensen, "Art—Artifact—Fact: The Set on 'Reality' in the Prose of the 1920s," in *The Slavic Literatures and Modernism: A Nobel Symposium, August 5–8 1985*, ed. Nils Ake Nilsson (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1986), 113–25, here 113.

(among the extensively published poets) and Vasyl Holoborodko and Ihor Kalynets (among those who were soon silenced) stand out in this respect. Other notable members of the generation—Lina Kostenko, Vasyl Symonenko, the young cohort of prose writers (Ievhen Hutsalo, Valerii Shevchuk, Iurii Shcherbak), and, perhaps most influentially, the critic Ivan Svitlychny were not modernist in their aesthetics, though they were, without exception, committed to the secular humanist project of modernity. Yet it was certainly the case that the unmistakable stylistic gesture of modernism, practised by some, as it were, on behalf of the group, helped identify the “shistdesiatnyky” for their émigré Ukrainian contemporaries as kindred spirits. Drach, for example, was instantly recognized by the New York Group of poets as one of their own, a recognition that eventually led to translation workshops for Drach’s poetry in the United States and, in turn, to an English-language edition of Drach’s poems.¹²

In Ukrainian literary prose of the 1960s, modernism was even less in evidence than in the poetry. It is represented by one notable text, a *samvydav* document written in 1968: Mykhailo Osadchy’s *Bilmo* (The Cataract). Remarkable in many respects, *Bilmo* is undoubtedly the work that in recent Ukrainian literature most deliberately puts the features of modernism to use as signs in a code through which the credo of a secular humanism, uncompromising in its opposition to Soviet totalitarianism, is enunciated.

Perhaps the most compelling feature of *Bilmo* is that it is a non-fictional work—a memoir of Osadchy’s own arrest, investigation, trial and imprisonment in the Gulag system. Osadchy (1936–1994) was a professional journalist who also had a higher education in philology.¹³ *Bilmo*, written in 1968 after his return from his first tour of imprisonment, reflects this dual specialization. On the one hand it is a document reminiscent of the Western New Journalism, with its application of the literary code to non-fiction. On the other hand it is, clearly, informed by a familiarity with modernist prose and such sources of the modernist world-view as Freud and French existentialism. It is one of the paradoxes of the Soviet system that the reading on which Osadchy’s modernist erudition is based was done, as his correspondence attests, in the prison camp.¹⁴

In *Bilmo* Osadchy chooses to speak what one critic calls “the language of modernism”¹⁵—to use a repertoire of effects and devices that are immediately

12 Ivan Drach, *Orchard Lamps*, trans. Daniel Halpern et al., ed. and introduced by Stanley Kunitz (New York: Sheep Meadow Press, 1978).

13 For biographical information, see the death notice in *Literaturna Ukraina*, 14 July 1994; and Marco Carynnyk, “Caliban’s Education,” introduction to Mykhailo Osadchy, *Cataract*, trans., ed., and annotated by Marco Carynnyk (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), ix–xxiii.

14 See V’iacheslav Chornovil, *Lykho z rozumu* (Portrety dvadtsiaty “zlochyntsyv”): *Zbirnyk materialiv*, 3d ed. (Paris: Persha ukrainska drukarnia u Frantsii, 1968), 218.

15 Randy Malamud, *The Language of Modernism* (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press), 1989.

recognizable as properties of modernist texts, having been established as such in the definitive works of the modernist canon: formal fragmentation of image, narrative and character; a formal tautness and constructedness of the text so intense as to distance the text considerably from everyday speech, often giving rise to the effect of obscurity; rejection of the common-sense view of time and of the human psyche; recourse to stylistic barbarism; and a preference for philosophical models of an anguished, rather than serene, profile, such as existentialism.¹⁶

But it is clear that for Osadchy this "language of modernism" is *acquired*; it is the product of artifice and craft rather than of nature and inspiration. For there exists another Osadchy: Osadchy, the writer of prison verse. This verse is semantically transparent, formally traditional, and rendered interesting only by its status as a human document of courage in the face of adversity. Kateryna Horbach, in her rather embarrassed introduction to Osadchy's collection *Quos ego*, which was published in the West, feels herself under obligation to apologize for the failure of this writing to measure up to "standards of poetry either classical or sophisticatedly ... modernist," and locates it in the peculiar prison-camp genre of "the poetry of non-poets."¹⁷

The modernist language of *Bilmo*, then, may justifiably be regarded as deployed to specific purpose. There is sufficient internal evidence in the text to suggest that at least two such purposes are both intentional and politically oppositional. The first of these is to demonstrate a cultural affinity with Western Europe and its high modernist culture—indeed, to signal participation in that culture. The obvious subtextual, Aesopian meaning that we cannot help ascribing to this is an equal and opposite rejection, not only of the Soviet regime in all its inhumanity, but of Soviet culture and, above all, its claim to authority. *Bilmo* is laden with intertextual reference. In it Kafka (20, 100),¹⁸ Joyce (57, 100), Faulkner (46, 56, 73), Dostoevsky (100, 107), Bulgakov (44), Kurbas (53), and Vynnychenko (73) are named, in some cases several times. The terms "surrealism," "imaginism," "impressionism," indeed "modernism" are directly invoked (56–7). Situations in life are cross-referenced with situations in modernist literature. The work is a stream-of-consciousness narrative in the style of James Joyce. The world of objects is represented in ways that recollect the perspectives

16 The presence in Osadchy's book of features associated with surrealism was noted by Marika Boshyk in her review of several editions of *Bilmo* in the *Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies* 1 (1976), no. 1: 75–9, here 78. On the issue of Osadchy's affinity with existentialism and the absurd, see Romana M. Bahrii [Bahry], "Motyvy ekzystentsializmu i absurdu v tvorakh pysmennykh V. Shevchuka ta M. Osadchoho," *Suchasnist*, 1988, no. 11: 18–34.

17 Kateryna Horbach, "Poet ukrainskoho oporu," introduction to Mykhailo Osadchy, *Quos ego* ([Munich]: Suchasnist, 1979), 6 and 5 respectively.

18 Mykhailo Osadchy, *Bilmo* (Lviv: Kameniar, 1993). All page references in the text are to this edition.

of various modernist movements in the visual arts. Critics have observed the cubist qualities of Osadchy's portrait of V'iacheslav Chornovil: "If one were to paint him, one would have to do it in small pieces. Each part separately. A separate nose, eyes, lips, mouth, hands. 'Excuse us, we're in a hurry,' say the eyes. 'We'll meet again,' say the ears. 'Urgent business, you understand', says the nose"(123).¹⁹ The table on which Osadchy's eyes become fixed during his interrogation, and which remains the only object that persists in his vision while all else dissipates, suggests that there are ways in which geometrical abstraction is directly mimetic of particular kinds of sense experience. Osadchy's interrogation by Major Halsky, with its maddening illogic, is no less absurdist than the dialogues in Samuel Beckett. A full register even of the most explicit allusions to modernist artworks and texts in Osadchy's memoir would be an extensive document indeed.

The second intentional meaning of Osadchy's modernism is also political. *Bilmo* may be read as the extensive formulation of the paradoxical thesis that non-representational art, the surreal, the grotesque, and the absurd give a reliable and mimetic image of Soviet reality. The apparent distortions of the world that are characteristic of many modernist works of art do not appear as distortions if they are understood as representations of the *Soviet* world. On the contrary, they imitate aspects of Soviet reality that are inaccessible to realism, and that are systematically concealed by socialist realism. In this subtextual argument there is, of course, agreement with Andrei Siniavsky's claim that socialist realism should in fact be called socialist classicism, since it prescribes the representation of the world not as it is experienced, but in accordance with an ideal, ideologically determined, model.²⁰ The peculiarity of the relationship of the real to realism in the Soviet world as perceived by Osadchy and his fellow prisoners is wittily exemplified in the following exchange between the Ukrainian Ivan Hereha, who against all odds has managed to grow a sunflower in the camp compound, and the Latvian poet Knut Skuenienks: "'How do you like my sunflower?' 'It's not bad. But your creation lacks realism. You should grow a rope with a hangman's noose on it'" (86).

If the modernism of *Bilmo* signals silent assent with Siniavsky, it also enters into an equally unspoken polemic with the early classical text of Gulag prose, Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* (1962)—a text, it should be noted, conspicuously absent from the whirlwind of intertextual references in *Bilmo*. Solzhenitsyn's choice of the perspective of nineteenth-century realism for the depiction of the Gulag, Osadchy's point here seems to be, turns a nightmare

19 This and all subsequent translations are mine. Carynnyk (xxi and 198, n. 13) acknowledges Wolfram Burghardt as the source of this insight.

20 Abram Tertz [Andrei Siniavsky], *The Trial Begins* and *On Socialist Realism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 201.

into an idyll. Osadchy's purpose is to turn it back into a nightmare again. If there is a way in which *Bilmo* nevertheless maintains its attachment to the essentially optimistic project of modernity, it is through the roundabout argument that a dystopia is, in the final analysis, still a statement of the desire for (and therefore testimony to the at least conceptual possibility of) a better world.

For all of the stridence of its modernist code, there is one feature in *Bilmo* that, with cultural hindsight, some might prefer to view not as modernist but, rather, as postmodernist. This perspective is certainly not intended by Osadchy, and it has the potential to place an unexpected twist upon our conception of the work. The feature is the role of writing in the memoir. We have already seen that the reference points for this account of reality are works of imaginative literature. But the dominance of the written in this memoir lies not merely in the fact that the written is the standard to which the details of life are compared, and the model on the basis of which they are interpreted. What is written (at least, in the special world of the Kafkaesque Soviet Union) *determines* what happens in life. After his arrest Osadchy's life follows the plot mapped out for it, arbitrarily, by the reports written by his interrogators. His memoir is the record of his becoming a character in the writerly world of the interrogator-as-author: "The novel about me, written by my interrogator over six months, is called 'Case No. 107.' This was the seventh book of a composite epic in nineteen volumes. In this novel everything was clear from the outset—who was a negative character, and who was the positive hero.... In this bulky novel, more than 400 pages long, there was a record of everything that I might have done" (57). Thus, although the previous page contains the authorial aphorism, "the human being has been created in order to be written about," the evidence as recorded in the memoir suggests the opposite: that it is writing that generates the narrative of life. There is something uncannily Derridean in this inversion—this deconstruction—of the conventional hierarchy of life and art, which today cannot but remind us of the classical deconstruction of the opposition between speech and writing in *De la grammatologie*.

But it would detract from the intentional argument of *Bilmo* to regard it as an example of a postmodernity *ante datum*. *Bilmo* is not the formulation of a subtle observation on the charmingly contingent nature of all hierarchies and on the possibility of all things being different. *Bilmo* is a cry of outrage at the usurpation of the authorship of the human character's life by the interrogator, and an expression of acute yearning for a world where individuals write the script of their own lives.

Bilmo presents its argument to the reader in the sophisticated, prestigious, and, in the Soviet context, emphatically unconventional garb of international modernism. But, in the final analysis, this argument is still the familiar and inescapable one that structures much, perhaps most, of Ukrainian literature between Shevchenko and Andrukhovych: that until basic conditions of human

liberty are met, there can be no culturally or morally responsible discourse about any other matter. The problem with both official literature and official literary and cultural criticism in the bad years of the 1970s was that many writers who knew better pretended that such discourse was possible. They were encouraged by the apparent gradual legitimization of the stylistic trappings of modernism. It became possible to write poetry that was as obscure as W. H. Auden; even the arch-orthodox Pavlo Zahrebelny was able to write, in *Ia, Bohdan*, something like a modernist propaganda novel without being accused of formalism. But the term "modernist" remained out of court. In situations of dire need, when the obviously modernist formal features of one group of officially tolerated poets needed to be contrasted to the obviously traditional formal features of other officially tolerated poets, substitute terms could be invented ("metaphorists" as against "confessors," "innovators" as against "traditionalists").²¹ The need for the term "modernism" to remain in ellipsis made it difficult for critics to describe these processes. Progressively more embarrassed by the coarseness of the conceptual apparatus available to them, they retreated into empirical description and subjective judgment, to the neglect of theoretical generalization. The international context, evident in the criticism of the 1960s in the mirror of polemics, faded from view in the 1970s and 1980s.

Thus, the situation degenerated into one whose fruits we observe in the perverse "Koleso" controversy: a cultural elite long sceptical about and indifferent to the theoretical potential of Marxism-Leninism, yet largely uninformed about contemporary cultural preoccupations of the West, responds inadequately and even comically to the sudden importation of the buzzwords of Western criticism. As a result, a consideration of the specificity of the cultural innovation now in train in Ukraine, both in its own terms and in the broader context of Eastern European and global developments, is hampered. The terms "modernity" and "modernism" (and, of course, "postmodernism"), elsewhere immensely useful in modelling reflections on contemporary culture and its change, appear to have little utility in Ukrainian culture, at least for the moment.

21 See, e.g., Mykola Ilnytsky, "Perehuk cherez pokolinnia: Notatky pro suchasu molodu poeziiu," *Kyiv*, 1986, no. 4: 133-42.

Iurii Andrukhovych's *Recreations* and Ukrainian Postmodernism

Slobodanka M. Vladiv-Glover

My point of departure for an analysis of Iurii Andrukhovych's novella *Rekreatsii* (Recreations)¹ as a product of the Ukrainian avant-garde of the 1990s will be a model of postmodern discourse extrapolated from cognate literary creations outside the orbit of Ukrainian culture and from contemporary Western critical theory.

Andrukhovych dedicates his novella to two of his contemporaries, Oleksandr Irvanets and Viktor Neborak, who, like Andrukhovych, are members of the Bu-Ba-Bu (**B**urlesque, **B**alagan [Farce], **B**uffoonery) group. This group is thus generationally (the members being born around 1960) and stylistically marked as both post-Perestroika and post-Soviet. A similar grouping of artists exists in Russia and is also characterized by its adherence to a style of artistic production that could be subsumed under the term "the post-avant-garde." But there is no generational homogeneity in the Russian group, which thus approximates more closely the heterogeneous mix of styles and generations that characterizes Western (French, German, and Anglo-American) postmodernism.

As is the case with his non-Ukrainian postmodern contemporaries, Andrukhovych's stylistically innovative and challenging work represents an attempt to "re-present" (present as a representation *and* present anew) and to re-evaluate the past through the present.

This does not mean that the novella is set in a concrete historical time and place. On the contrary, while allusions to recent political events of the last days of the Soviet empire proliferate, the locus of action is a quasi-mythological, almost primeval, Ukrainian countryside, recaptured around a provincial centre

1 Iurii Andrukhovych, "Rekreatsii," *Suchasnist*, 1992, no. 1: 27-85. Page references in the text are to this edition. I am indebted to Marko Pavlyshyn for making available to me his unpublished translation of Andrukhovych's novella during the preparation of this paper.

fictitiously named Chortopil (Devilsburg). This name is pregnant with allusions to the Russian (and not Ukrainian) literary canon: Dostoevsky's *Devils*, Mikhail Bulgakov's *Diavoliada*, or the devilry of Bulgakov's "magic realism" in *Master and Margarita*. The general atmosphere of the festival organized in this town is reminiscent of the carnivalesque abandon and mateship that coalesced into oppositional moral values in oppressed Soviet society. But there are no working people here; there is no sign of either the Soviet working person or the Western, Hegelian *homo laborans*. Instead, the actors are a group of poets—intellectuals with no particular aim in life and no destiny other than that created by their writing and the national reputation this writing engenders.

This, I think, is the point. While the novella's content may be viewed as a deconstruction of both a traditional and a post-Communist Ukrainian nationalism, it is at the same time a celebration of the newly found freedom that resides in the heterogeneity of discourse. The only values that are affirmed are the openness of language and the heterogeneity of meaning. It is no accident, then, that the chief protagonists are all "workers of language"—poets—and that the setting of the action is not a real but a "virtual" scene, namely the "scene of writing."²

The four Ukrainian poets, who are the central protagonists of the novella, converge on the locus of action—Chortopil—via three different routes. Khomsky, who is writing "a novel in short stories," comes by train. Martofliak, the leader of the group and the only one with a wife, arrives asleep on a bus. And the Gogolian Bobchinsky-Dobchinsky pair, Shtundera and Nemyrych, hitch a ride with one of the festival's sponsors, who is a Ukrainian émigré psychiatrist with Swiss citizenship. While these means of transportation might appear conventional enough in paraphrase, they are anything but prosaic "means of communication." Everything in the narrative partakes of the dimension of the *uncanny*, the humorous, and the hyperbolic: the wry, self-deprecating tone adopted by the various first-, third-, and even second-person narrators; the scenery of the various restaurants and halls of festival activities; and the outfits and demeanour of the youth attending the festival in Chortopil.

The uncanny is thus the ground-tone of the narrative. It is the condition of possibility of the coming into existence or of the coming into representation of the story. The uncanny is the story's own mimicry, its self-contortion, its folding over so that it can double up upon itself. In this process of doubling, the story produces its "Other." At some stage, this "Other" begins to speak in the second person, addressing the story itself from within the story. This second-person narration, which appears to address no one in particular, no identifiable character

2 Compare Slobodanka Vladiv-Glover, "[Danilo Kis's] *Hourglass* as the Scene of Writing," *Review of Contemporary Fiction*, 1994, no. 1: 147–60.

from within the story, is not the subversion of dialogicity, as has been suggested.³ It is the very condition of possibility of dialogicity or discourse. The narration in the second person is the "voice" of the story's Unconscious—the *ça parle* of Lacan⁴—which pours forth out of a "dead centre" that is spirally connected to the story's chief embedded memory trace. This is the story of Shtundera's journey through the landscape of the "dead village," Siltse (Little Village), the archaeological site of "murder" or "displacement."

This journey in the imaginary is a nodal point in the novella's development. It is the site of the *recreation* of a past, which now lives as memory, without clear-cut origins, in the psyche of the poet. This is the memory not of Shtundera's own experience of World War II, but of a generalized terror of both Nazism and Stalinism, which have erased Little Village from the surface of the earth; it only remains as a trace, as an imaginary map, in Shtundera's thought.

While these allusions to the enforced migrations of nationalities during the Stalin era may be grounded in actual historical truth, the function these details have in the story is not to re-evoke but to subvert the notion of history as a necessary and linearly progressive or teleological movement.

The mysterious "old man," "that man," or "uncle" who has passed on this lore of terror to Shtundera, was himself a native of Little Village, as is the mysterious Dr. Popel from Switzerland, the prime mover of the festival of recreations. But this "old man"/"uncle" is absent; he is experienced in the narrative as—literally—a voice from/of the past, which is the voice of *absence* itself. Popel, who buys Hryts Shtundera's poetry manuscript for ten U.S. dollars, assigning thereby the poetic word to the process of both exchange and commodification, stands *in loco parentis* to the young poets whose work he patronizes. So Popel is another "uncle" from Little Village, who distributes goodies to the talented "boys." The mysterious "uncle" from Karaganda (the place of exile in Kazakhstan) and Popel, the benefactor of the Festival of the Resurrecting Spirit, thus stand in a strange correspondence to each other. Popel, whose knowledge of the past is *uncanny*, and the "uncle" from Karaganda, who is the "voice of the past" in Shtundera's psyche, are metonymies of each other. While the "uncle" is an *absence*, Popel is the *presence of an absence*. The intervention of both is necessary to institute a memory trace. That is, the memory trace becomes a function of metonymy, not of history.

Shtundera, who was born in Karaganda—the place of exile and the locus of the Other—is thus the accidental carrier of meaning, which constitutes itself as memory trace. That meaning is contingent and "unnecessary" was demonstrated

3 Compare Marko Pavlyshyn's "Shcho peretvoruietsia v 'Rekreatsiakh' Iurii Andrukhovycha?" *Suchasnist*, 1993, no. 12: 115–27.

4 Compare Jacques Lacan, *Écrits: A Selection*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977), 285: "It speaks in the Other...."

decades ago by the Dada and Surrealist movements, with their automatic writing and insistence on the constitutive role of chance in the creation of meaning. Thus Shtundera, a Ukrainian poet who was born in Karaganda "not for nothing" (i.e., not accidentally), is determined by this strange locus of his birth not as a displaced national, but as a displaced subject of consciousness. For it is in the nature of the subject of consciousness that this subject is constituted in the place of the Other.

The memory trace does more than subvert history: it puts narrative or poetry in history's place. The memory trace about the "historical past" of Little Village has its origins in an unpublished poem by Shtundera, which he sells to Popel. It is, curiously, a "poem about a village" which he cannot *remember* when he tries to recite it for his friends at the festival. This forgotten or repressed poem comes to life as a somnambulant, almost hallucinatory journey that Shtundera undertakes after he goes through a change of theatrical appearance: he gets a traditional Cossack *oseledets* hair cut and puts on an old uniform in order to assume the pose of a historical marionette.

Thus, while history is revealed as undetermined and belonging to the realm of the imaginary, the construction of fictional characters is strictly determined, through the use of literary allusion to the Russian, European, and Ukrainian canon and through strict adherence to literary clichés. In other words, for the construction of characters the author relies not on history or reality, but on other texts, on intertextuality, and even stylization.

The theatrical and archaicized outfit—with its obvious allusion to Bulgakov's Moscow devil, Woland—of the mysterious Popel, who is staying with "relatives" who are, however, all "dead," turns this character into a literary cliché, that is, a verbal reminiscence or literary trace. Similarly, the tavern ("The Sign of the Herring"), which Marta calls a "stinking snake pit," and the Chortopil marketplace's restaurant, which is reached through labyrinths and appears to belong to a subterranean region whose inner sanctum is the kitchen, are reminiscent of the restaurant kitchen in Peter Greenaway's film *The Cook, the Thief, His Wife and Her Lover*. The presence of the poets and their entourage at this locus of sorting and separating (compare Mary Douglas on food prohibitions)⁵ the "clean" from the "unclean," the "consumable" from the "excluded," renders their passage from banquet table to banquet table a passage through the region of prohibition and its converse—*transgression*. Khomsky's novel "in short stories," "Merzotnyky" (The Miscreants), alludes through its form to André Gide's *Les Faux Monnayeurs* (The Counterfeiters).⁶ This creates a subtext that adumbrates the four

5 Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* (London: Routledge, 1966).

6 Although "merzotnyky" does not translate literally as "forgers," the fact that forgery is a theme in both Gide's and Andrukhovych's narrative suggests more than an accidental correspondence

poetic friends as *forgers* as well as agents of *exchange*. The allusion to *forgery* is played out in the multiple frames of the story, with its multiple embedded narratives by various narrators. This embedding invalidates any quest for the origins of the narrative in "actual fact." The only "fact" that supports the entire text is the "fact" of language or its representative—*logos*. And the word or *logos* just *is*—it is pure Being, which rejoices in its own existence, in its own *recreation* and manifestation in the memory trace. This is the point made in Martofliak's seemingly nonsensical soliloquy on Being (56–7).

The *recreation* of the *word* is enacted twice in the novella. The first such occasion is Nemyrych's visit to Popel's family (who are all dead). Popel's "family" is having a night of revelry at the Gryphon Villa. Here Nemyrych experiences the re-enactment of the plot of Khomsky's novel in short stories, played out in a *Munster Family* type of scenario. The second recreation of the word is at the end of the festival and of the narrative itself: it is a staged re-enactment, directed by the festival's mastermind Matsapura (whose name alludes to another historical literary misappropriation⁷ or forgery), of the terror that was first constituted as a memory trace in Shtundera's psyche and played out as a somnambulant walk through the forest. *Recreations* is thus structured to include a series of re-enactments and re-creations of verbal constructions that originate as the work of the poets.

The only poet whose work is not quoted separately or in re-created form is, strangely, the chief poet, Martofliak. There is a reason for this. Although a novel in verse, which will never be finished, is attributed to Martofliak, this novel is never quoted. But Martofliak's "poetic" voice merges with and becomes identical to the narrative in the second person, which is the narrative's hidden and inexpressible, unrepresentable Other. Hence Martofliak becomes the Unconscious of Andrukhovych's narrative. Martofliak is described as the leading poet of his generation and is shown to be the idol of contemporary Ukrainian youth. On his way to the festival, while sleeping on the bus, he attracts the loving *gaze* of one of his fellow travellers, a young man. His wife Marta is almost shocked to discover that this gaze is not directed at her (absolute) Beauty, but is meant for her husband. It is thus the poet—the servant of the word—who is the ultimate object of the nation's *desire*.

between the two texts. The intertextuality of Andrukhovych's narrative thus allows us to project the roots of Ukrainian literary postmodernism into European modernism. This brings contemporary Ukrainian literature out of its imputed "colonial" dependence on the contiguous Russian culture and into the mainstream of the broader pan-European paradigm of the twentieth century. If Ukrainian culture has ever sought to transcend its post-colonial regional confinement, it has done so successfully through Andrukhovych's solo effort.

7 That is, of the first part of Ivan Kotliarevsky's *Eneida* (1798) by the publisher, Parpura. Kotliarevsky later satirized Parpura in part three of *Eneida*, referring to him by the name of a notorious criminal, Matsapura. See Pavlyshyn, 124.

The entire plot is activated by a summons—which also has the appearance of a forgery. This is the telegram Khomsky receives from the ambivalent and masquerading Matsapura. The summons, which is of questionable origin, brings the four poets together in a discursive space—represented by the topos of the market place and the banquet table. Thus their getting together takes the form of a *symposium*—a convivial eating and drinking together with the ultimate aim of discussing and reciting poetry.

The journey of the four protagonists does not end with their arrival at their destination—the market square in Chortopil. It actually begins there. Their “new” journey is first a migration from drinking place to drinking place. But besides moving through this restricted space, the protagonists also move through time, both backwards and forwards: forwards through the anticipation of Nemyrych’s imminent death (hinted at through the bad news about his latest medical tests reported by Shtundera), and backwards through Shtundera’s reliving of the generalized terror during or after World War II. The four protagonists are thus represented not as psychological characters, but as *signifiers* in a spatio-temporal arrangement or relationship. As signifiers, they are all “celebrants” (that is, “priests”) at the Festival of the Resurrecting Spirit. This quasi-religious celebration is not that of the Symbolists’ theurgy—the privileged knowledge of the unknowable, the ineffable—but the celebration of the Being of *logos*, of the word, in its dual nature: its infinite repeatability and its transgressive finitude. This dual nature of *logos* is signalled by the two transgressive acts of sexual consummation (the two Martas), which are in effect metonymic and hence representational—grounded in repetition and doubling. To resurrect *logos* it is necessary to “erect” a phallic symbol or structure. Thus the “Resurrection” of the festival turns on two giant erections. The *phallogentric* circle (*not* the hermeneutic one!) of signification is thereby completed. But this is not a completion that signals closure. Nothing is “finished” at the end of the novella, which literally ends with a “bang” or a shock—the mock attack by Matsapura’s actors, which re-enacts the memory trace about the terror that exists both as a repressed memory and as a poem forgotten by Shtundera. Thus, it is not the “spirit” that is “everlasting” after the *resurrection*, but *logos*, the word, which is “in the beginning” according to the Bible, but also at the end according to Andrukhovych.

The celebration of *logos* thus enacted in the novella is a celebration of the post-Soviet pluralist world. But this celebration also has its dark underside for the Ukrainian poet and his nation. For if the former—traditional or post-Soviet—Ukrainian national identity is assimilated to a paradigm of Western culture, which is in effect reducible to Jameson’s model of American post-

capitalism and the age of *post-histoire*,⁸ then what will remain as the unifying principle of that once national culture? The answer given by the story is: a counterfeit, like that represented by the dildo that Khomsky wants his colleague to bring him from America. And although Khomsky's virility cannot be questioned, except in a joke by his poetic friends, it can be asserted only in the form of transgression (the consummated affair, at the festival, with Martofliak's wife Marta) or as a homosexual affair (when he jokingly invites his male poetic friends to come to bed with him in order to check on whether his own member is intact). Martofliak's erotic experiences at the festival are a tautology of Khomsky's. In a drunken stupor, from which he emerges exceptionally lucid and potent for the moment of consummation, Martofliak beds the ageing Communist-era prostitute Marta. The fact that Marta is of a maternal age in relation to Martofliak implies that the affair is, in a sense, incestuous. The fact that she is a pro—able to be bought—turns it into a metaphor of exchange. Both seductions—that of the beautiful young Marta and the ageing prostitute Marta—form the climax of the story. They appear to be simultaneous in time and to share the common space of the delirium of the festival. Because the names of the two women are identical, the two seductions mark the possibility of repetition and substitution, which are the standard-bearers of metonymy. It is thus the seduction of a (Ukrainian) woman, who doubles as prostitute and wife, mother and mistress (the young Marta is also a mother but dresses and attracts attention like a common pro), that institutes the operation of the metonymic process and allows the story to take shape by folding in upon itself and doubling up in a series of repetitions that frame one another. The Bobchinsky-Dobchinsky pair, Shtundera and Nemyrych, embody the principle of doubling in the form both of a literary allusion and, more so, of a Saussurian sound-image. Their identities being interchangeable, Shtundera (who is virtually a dead man since the last medical report on his illness) and Nemyrych are living manifestations of the empty sign, the name that is a floating signifier, defined by pure difference until it finds its place in a temporarily constituted signifying chain.

But the metonymic process also has a relation to the past, retained in the form of a memory trace. The two Martas are icons of the old Communist and the young post-Communist Ukraine. These two icons not only frame each other in the story: they also constitute the difference that is the story's dynamo, or structural dominant. Both female icons—read signs—represent not so much the desire of the men in the story, although they do this as well, as a generalized desire that is at the heart of the entire action. This desire is to be understood not as the desire for a particular woman, but in the Hegelian and Lacanian sense of

8 Cf. Fredric Jameson, "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," *New Left Review*, no. 146 (1984): 53–93.

desire of the Other. For there is no logical explanation why Martofliak prefers to spend an amorous night at the festival in the company of an ageing prostitute rather than in the arms of his lovely young wife. The explanation is offered on the metaphoric level of the story—that on which the drama of discourse is enacted.

In this drama the indeterminate subject of language defines itself through desire, which is always the desire of the Other's desire. This desire of the Other constitutes a lack or a *gap*. It is through this *gap* that the story of the Festival of the Resurrecting Spirit pours out. Parodically this resurrection of the spirit turns into the witnessing (by the reader) not of a resurrection, but of an erection, or rather two erections (since everything has to double up upon itself according to the structural logic of the story). The spirit thus becomes synonymous with a Dionysian celebration of the *phallus*—the Master Signifier. That this Master Signifier belongs to the Hegelian dialectic of language, which is a universal and not a particular, implies that it can no longer be the support for a regionally or nationally marked cultural specificity or particularity. That is why even the most important of the Ukrainian poets, the leader of the younger generation, Martofliak, already has an invitation to America—the generalized locus of this new universality of the Master Signifier of post-Communist and post-capitalist culture. This means that even Ukrainian poetry—represented by Martofliak's novel in verse, which will never be finished—will become part of this new universal paradigm of the signifier. It will thus enter into circulation as a pure metonymy of the “real” culture,⁹ which, as a metonymy of itself, becomes interchangeable with a counterfeit phallus, imported into Ukrainian culture as a (freak) commodity obtained in American sex shops. The price of joining the free world, in which the only system of support for both the subject of discourse and cultural discourse itself is the heterogeneous system of language, which knows no closure and no “essences,” “ideals” or “values” except as simulacra of essences, ideals, or values, is the leap of Ukrainians out of history and into postmodern discourse. Andrukhovych makes this leap successfully with his *Recreations*.

9 The subject of what is “real” and what is a “forgery” in discourse is treated in Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic reading of Edgar Allan Poe's “Purloined Letter.” See his “Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter,’” *Yale French Studies* 48 (1972): 38–72. Andrukhovych's focus on “forgery” in discourse unfolds in the same context.

Внутрішня цензура— сфальшований таланти (спостереження над романом Юрія Андруховича «Московіада»)

Роксана Харчук

Передбачаю, вже сама постановка проблеми—внутрішня цензура і творчість Юрія Андруховича—викличе, щонайменше, здивування. Адже постать Андруховича стала, до речі, не без скандалу (досить згадати дискусію довкола повісті «Рекреації»), символом нової, вільної української літератури. Здається, саме Андрухович зробив проблему внутрішньої цензури неактуальною. Здається, ця проблема функціональна лише в тоталітарній літературі, а з падінням тоталітарного режиму межі творчості автоматично розширюються. Здається, покоління українських літераторів 1980-их років, серед яких Андрухович найпомітніший, здійснило прорив української літератури до відкритості, заперечивши герметизм. Однак, всі ці «здається» надто попередні. Про дійсну результативність прориву вісімдесятників до універсального може свідчити виключно їхня творчість.

Обставини склалися для вісімдесятників вигідно. Андрухович зазначив: «Нашим був час. Він сприяв. Ще ніколи і ніхто з поетів не мав такого сприятливого часу. Свободи зовнішньої ставало все більше, ми відчували в собі все більші ресурси свободи внутрішньої».¹ Андрухович, проте, свідомий: тотальна свобода і її реалізація—речі нетождісні.

В інтерв'ю з Миколою Рябчуком письменник конкретизує поняття внутрішньої свободи: «Митець нікого не повинен «обслуговувати», ним рухає передусім мистецька ідея, а не соціальна чи, там, національна».²

1 Юрій Андрухович, «Аве, "Крайслер"!» *Сучасність*, 1994, ч. 5, стор. 6.

2 Микола Рябчук, «Замість післямови до "Рекреацій" (Інтерв'ю з Юрієм Андрухови-

Андрухович наголошує—мистецька. Чому? По-перше, маємо реакцію на соцреалізм, який поняття мистецького підпорядковував ідеології. Подруге, це данина модернізму: мистецька ідея оголошується досконалою як ідея. Андрухович не дає чіткого визначення власної мистецької ідеї. Однак, твори письменника дозволяють стверджувати, що нею, по суті, є ідея «спортивна»: вище, далі, сильніше або, вживаючи молодіжний сленг, крутіше. Мистецька ідея Андруховича має на меті здивувати, відтак зважає на зовнішній ефект.

Зовнішньому ефекту підпорядкована також внутрішня свобода, яку так часто згадує письменник. Внутрішня свобода реалізується для нього в беззмистовному жесті: наприклад, у 1990-му році Олександр Ірванець (товариш Андруховича з літературної групи Бу–Ба–Бу) показав зі сцени Львівської опери свій голий зад, зірвавши бурю овацій. Близький цьому нахил Андруховича до молодіжної тусовки або до скандальної лексики. Здається, Андрухович не помічає: попри оплески й скандал, така внутрішня свобода реалізується в пустці. Вона дивує публіку, створює ефект, дає релакс, а в результаті містифікує мистецьку ідею. Між містифікацією й реальним існуванням мистецької ідеї—велика різниця. Може, найкраще відчував і окреслив цю різницю Вітольд Гомбровіч—письменник, який усією своєю творчістю обстоював ідею нового стилю, але якого дратувала псевдонова література і псевдоновий стиль. Останні так шалено вдосконалювали мистецьку ідею, що замість життя давали його утопію або «ніщо—ефект».

Нам вигідно сконфронтувати погляди Андруховича й Гомбровіча на мистецьку ідею й внутрішню свободу, щоб виявити істотну різницю між новим стилем і стилем, який хоче вважатися новим. За Гомбровічем, мистецька ідея, внутрішня свобода не обмежуються жестом і позою. Мистецька ідея, функціонуючи в малому світі тексту, передбачає існування інших світів. Мистецька ідея не може підпорядковуватися правам і правилам спорту: кінські перегони збуджують ще більший захват, як словесна гра, але кінські перегони не мають нічого спільного із суттєвим хвилюванням від мистецького. Для публіки мистецька ідея—не розкіш. Навпаки, спілкування з мистецьким вимагає напруги. Це важке спілкування з дозрілішим, тоншим, вищим.³ Нарешті, внутрішня свобода, за Гомбровічем,—це привілей говорити «не як раб ефекту, а як людина вільна».⁴ Таку внутрішню свободу кожний митець здобуває сам, здобуває, як долю, не завдяки, а всупереч обставинам.

чем)», *Сучасність*, 1992, ч. 2, стор. 118.

3 Ці думки Гомбровіч виклав у статті «Проти поетів».

4 Witold Gombrowicz, «Dziennik, 1953–1956,» у виданні його *Dzieł*, т. 6 (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1986), стор. 16.

Мистецька ідея, внутрішня свобода—це ключові поняття як для Андруховича, так і для всіх вісімдесятників. Вони розуміють вагу цих понять, але реалізують їх не на повну силу. Хоча їм і сприяв час, в питанні внутрішньої свободи вони виявилися мінімалістами й вдовольнилися зовнішнім жестом, позою й крутим словом. У питанні мистецької ідеї вони виявилися рабами ефекту, моди, вдовольнилися не життям, а його ілюзією. Що дивує найбільше, це переконання вісімдесятників, ніби вони відкрили й дали внутрішню свободу своїм наступникам. Дали не без жалю: «Зараз, коли цього добра [«русского мата»—Р. Х.] на кожному кроці, ми іноді чуємо свою провину. Що ж, апостоли завжди перебріхують вчителів. Свобода дісталася їм майже задурно—вочевидь, це щось на зразок кисневого отруєння»,—говорить Андрухович.⁵

Після таких слів доходиш до висновку, що й самим вісімдесятникам свобода дісталася задурно. Людина вільна, людина, що виборола власну свободу, ніколи не опуститься до подібних калькуляцій. Вісімдесятники залишилися невільниками. Невільні—вони взялися творити вільну літературу. Результат? Ця література викликає суперечливі почуття. Ми не можемо збагнути, з чим маємо справу: з правдою чи з брехнею, що має успіх, з літературою «снобістичною», кастовою чи з «попсовою», яку можна читати будь-як і будь-де або й зовсім не читати. Це література, яка починається з нового постмодерного стилю, а закінчується найгіршим ґатунком реалізму—спримітизованою банальністю.

Безперечно, такий результат має свої причини. Перше: несолідарність індивіда з самим собою. Перефразовуючи Хосе Ортеґу-і-Гасета, «я» українського митця 80-их залишається множинним, колективним і «позначає внутрішню орду».⁶ Це «я» поєднує в собі протилежні, взаємовиключні речі. Андрухович поєднує епатаж з об'єктивністю, ефект з безпристрастю, мімезис з постодернізмом, високе з нікчемним. Письменник говорить не собі, не касті обраних і не масі. Він говорить для всіх відразу і кожному те, що б той хотів від нього почути.

Такий спосіб мовлення Андруховича переконує, що тут українська недуга проявляється у крайній формі. Як в іншому контексті спостеріг той же Ортеґа-і-Гасет, нам однаковою мірою бракує як взірцевих людей—добірної меншини, так і покірних мас.⁷ Такий стан робить впливовим примітивне.

5 Андрухович, «Аве, “Крайслер”!», стор. 6.

6 Хосе Ортеґа-і-Гасет, «Кант», у його *Вибраних творах* (Київ: Основи, 1994), стор. 221.

7 Ортеґа-і-Гасет, «Безхребетна Іспанія», у його *Вибраних творах*, стор. 183.

Друге: говорячи про «попсовість» Андруховича, не можна не звернути уваги на ще один феномен сучасної української літератури. Це феномен взаємного накладання постколоніального і постмодерністичного контекстів. Марко Павлишин, розглядаючи повість «Рекреації», виявляє структурну близькість між специфічним явищем постколоніалізму й загальнолюдським явищем постмодернізму.⁸ На думку дослідника, вони збігаються в тому, що ставлять під знак запитання дотеперішню традицію, ідеали, цінності й творчо перевикористовують їх.

У творчості Андруховича з'являються й інші ознаки постмодерного стилю: (1) дегуманізація—мистецтво не виражає людину; (2) уникнення життєподібних форм—їх заступає уява; (3) мистецтво—це гра, воно не впливає на життя; (4) іронія; (5) витвір мистецтва—це тільки витвір мистецтва.⁹ Андрухович не просто прагне реалізувати новий стиль на українському ґрунті. У романі «Московіада», який, до речі, залишився критикою майже непоміченим, письменник вдосконалює цей стиль порівняно з «Рекреаціями».¹⁰ Легко було б повірити у цей успіх, якби не постколоніальна реальність—те елементарне життя, якому митець, попри весь арсенал найновітніших засобів, не може дати ради: життєва реальність виявляється повнішою, складнішою, вагомішою за мистецьку реальність Юрія Андруховича. Можливо, остання задовольняє ту групу читачів, яка визнає: між людиною й мистецтвом втрачені будь-які зв'язки. Але читач, який шукає в літературі власного вираження або ж протиставлення собі, залишається розчарованим.

Постмодернізм відмовився виражати людину. Він постулює: життя—це одне, мистецтво—зовсім інше. Мистецтво—й справді інше, але життя є підставою, предметом й критерієм будь-якої літератури, не лише реалістичної. Йдеться не про мімесис: наслідування й життєву правдоподібність. Мистецька реальність може бути всуціль вигаданою, але вона має бути значущою сама по собі. Значущою ця реальність, здається, є тоді, коли вона надає сенсу життєвій реальності, а не навпаки—позбавляє життя елементарного значення. Питання, чи розширює митець життя засобом власної уяви чи збіднює його?—не є другорядним. Принаймі у постколоніальній літературі воно кардинальне. Постколоніальна література не може не виражати людину, не може не зважати на її життя. Адже йдеться про межову екзистенційну ситуацію, естетичний сенс якої не зводиться виключно до сміху, іронії,

8 Марко Павлишин, «Що перетворюється в «Рекреації» Ю. Андруховича?», *Сучасність*, 1993, ч. 12, стор. 116.

9 Ортега-і-Гасет, «Дегуманізація мистецтва», у його *Вибраних творах*, стор. 245.

10 «Московіада: Роман жахів», *Сучасність*, 1993, ч. 1, стор. 40–84, ч. 2, стор. 10–60.

гри. Дегуманізація літератури в ситуації, що й так здегуманізована до краю, дає ефект протилежний тому, що його прагне Андрухович. Короткочасне здивування й пожвавлення змінюється почуттям деградації.

Постмодернізм та постколоніалізм мають певну дотичність. Однак, відмінність між ними суттєва. Тому взаємне накладання постмодерністичного й постколоніального контекстів супроводжується деформацією життя й викривлення сигналізують про фальш.

Це припущення підтверджується, якщо проаналізувати два моменти, на яких у «Московіаді» наголошує Андрухович: (1) момент декоронації Поета як Месії; (2) момент поррахунків із Системою як одиниці—митця, так і маси—нації, суспільства.

Проблему декоронації Поета Андрухович порушив ще в «Рекреаціях». Письменникові йшлося про те, щоб показати Поета як звичайну людину, зруйнувати шкідливий стереотип Поета як месії. Герої «Рекреацій», молоді українські поети, більше відштовхують, аніж викликають симпатію. У цьому, думаю, Андрухович здобувся на повну правду. Перед нами «хлопці ... талановиті, чесні, непродажні, цвіт нації, діти нового часу, тридцятирічні поети, кожен гадає, що він пуп землі, а насправді лиш сексуальна невдоволеність і розпалене самолюбство».¹¹ Здається, молоді поети знають собі ціну, не претендують на роль пророків. Навпаки, ця роль їх обурює й пригнічує, але «[і] ти врешті таки дочекався, Мартофляче,—народ знає поетів, тебе кличуть, тебе хочуть, ти починаєш малювати автографи для цих симпатичних молодих людей ..., це, звісно, студенти, вони марять твоїми віршами».¹² Низький міметичний модус, користуючись термінологією Нортропа Фрая, логічно завершується трагічною іронією. Як Йов не зміг стати Прометеем, так Мартофляк не може стати жертвою системи. Системі він не потрібний. Його не розстрілюють, нащадки не напишуть про нього як про трагічну фігуру розстріляного відродження.

Ця логіка й мотивація проблеми декоронації Поета зазнає докорінного переосмислення в романі «Московіада». Герой цього твору Отто фон Ф.—також талановитий український поет, поет колоніального народу. Він навчається літературі й пізнає суть імперії в її центрі—Москві. Отто фон Ф. опиняється тут випадково: «До речі, москофільства ... немає в мені ані на копійку. Якби в тих умовах я мав можливість утекти до Києва, Рима, Нюрнберга чи Сан-Франціско, то безперечно, ніяка Москва мене й не побачила б. Але втекти можна

11 Юрій Андрухович, «Рекреації», *Сучасність*, 1992, ч. 1, стор. 31.

12 Там же, стор. 55.

було тільки сюди». ¹³ Отто фон Ф. втікає від КГБ, з яким підписав контракт про співробітництво. Цей контракт така ж випадковість, як і перебування героя у Москві: «Винен я перед собою. Що приходив на їхні виклики. Що подавав їм руку з безмежної вихованості, вважаючи, зрештою, також людьми, хоч і скаліченими. Що написав той папір, котрий і досі там, в їхніх архівах,—жовкне, блякне, тліє, але він є, доказ моєї слабкості, свідок сум'яття душевного й розгубленості, підписаний дурнувато претензійним і ненависним відтоді для мене іменем». ¹⁴ Отто фон Ф. підписав контракт іменем А. Рембо. Логічно: Артюр Рембо винен у всьому, що сталося. Адже: «Історію не вибирають. Але вона могла бути інакшою». ¹⁵ Ця фраза є своєрідним ключем до «Московіади». Варто поставити її з голови на ноги—велика кількість речей прояснюється: «історія може бути інакшою, якщо її вибирають». У «Московіаді» ні вибрана одиниця—Отто фон Ф., ні маса—нація, суспільство не вибирають власної історії, але прагнуть, щоб вона була інакшою.

У «Московіаді» Андрухович відмовляється, по суті, декоронувати Поета. Відмовляється з простої причини: хоча поет і не месія, але «за якимось найвищим рахунком [поет все ж має вище покликання—Р. Х.], це, мабуть, так і є». ¹⁶ Ця думка, що її Андрухович побіжно висловив у розмові з Миколою Рябчуком, в «Московіаді» стає центральною. Талановитий але нікчемний Отто фон Ф., поет, якого вербувало КГБ, але який насправді КГБ зовсім непотрібний,—згадаймо іронію агента «Сашка»: « —... І жодної вічності для вас. Бо чим ви можете нам знадобитися?». ¹⁷ Отто фон Ф. невмотивовано виступає в ролі руйнівника Імперії, розстрілюючи її ідейні фетиші. Андруховича ця невмотивованість не турбує. Одначе, вмотивованості вимагає від письменника найнаївніший читач. Адже, за Фраєм, «якщо герой не переростає ні інших людей, ні власне оточення [у випадку Отто фон Ф. він навіть гірший пересічної людини—Р. Х.], він є одним із нас: ми ставимося до нього, як до звичайної людини й вимагаємо від поета тих законів правдоподібності, які відповідають нашому власному досвіду». ¹⁸ «Замах» Отто фон Ф. на імперію суперечить елементарній

13 Андрухович, «Московіада», *Сучасність*, 1993, ч. 1, стор. 66.

14 Там же, стор. 84.

15 Там же, стор. 78.

16 Рябчук, «Замість післямови до "Рекреацій"», стор. 117.

17 Андрухович, «Московіада», *Сучасність*, 1993, ч. 2, стор. 25.

18 Нортроп Фрай, «Анатомія критики», у кн. *Зарубежная эстетика и теория литературы XIX–XX вв.: Трактаты, статьи, эссе*, упор. Г. К. Косикова (Москва: Изд-во Московского государственного университета, 1987), стор. 233.

логіці. Це наводить на думку про свідоме фальшування Андруховичем постаті українського поета. Не спинятимусь на цьому детально. Захитую лише Чеслава Мілоша—поета, якому близька колоніальна й постколоніальна проблематика, митця, який дієво протиставлявся комунізму, який, проте, не вбачає в падінні системи своєї особистої заслуги. З приводу розпаду СРСР він сказав коротко: «Це зробив Пан Бог».¹⁹

Поза борця, в яку стає Отто фон Ф.,—він жертва системи й одночасно її кат— не викликає довіри. Як і Мартофляк із «Рекреацій», це герой низького модусу. Однак, є між Мартофляком й Отто фон Ф. суттєва різниця. Як уже зазначалося, Мартофляк—іронічний герой, це Йов, якому не вдається стати Прометеем. Отто фон Ф.—не Йов. За великим рахунком він—Юда. Юді вдається Прометеем стати. У цьому, на мою думку, найбільший фальш «Московіади». Декоронація Поета виявляється косметичною.

Треба віддати Андруховичу належне: він не говорить про Отто фон Ф. героїчним тоном. Мова залишається на рівні низького, іронічного модусу. Взагалі його мова статична. Усі ситуації, всі персонажі письменника функціонують в однаковому мовному режимі. Можливо, як зазначав один з критиків, Микола Сулима, Андрухович зробив свій перший внесок у «Національний банк Художніх Мов», «бо нею говорять не лише дипломовані філологи, а й прибиральниці та окремі алкоголіки».²⁰ Але мова Андруховича вирівняна. У ній відсутня будь-яка диференційованість. Ця мова переконує: в українському суспільстві не маси орієнтуються на добірне, а, навпаки, добірне опускається й розчиняється в масі.

Стосовно другого моменту—моменту поррахунків із системою, то він у «Московіаді» лише заторкнутий. Розпад імперії у романі показано веселим, легким. За позірною грою й несерйозністю прозаїк не виявляє глибших підтекстів—рушіїв розпаду системи, місця особи й мас як у колоніальній, так і в постколоніальній дійсності. Андрухович не ставить проблему ґрунтовно. Тому й вимагати від нього ґрунтовності марно. «Московіада» обмежує соціальну, політичну, психологічну, побутову реальність ідеєю «солодкого життя»—безтурботного, радісного існування. Існування в алкоголі, еротичі, віршах, які ні до чого не зобов'язують. Таке існування не намагається збагнути дійсне. Воно дійсного не аналізує. Досить подивитися, як показує Андрухович російсько-українську проблему. Найкращими прототипами образів

19 Див. St. Chwin, «Dlaczego upadek komunizmu zaskoczył literaturę polską», *Teksty drugie*, 1994, ч. 1, стор. 6.

20 Микола Сулима, «Роман-учта», *Слово і час*, 1993, ч. 10, стор. 53.

України й Росії в «Московіаді» можуть послужити відомі казкові герої—дідова й бабина дочка. Росія, конкретно Москва, потопає в загальному маразмі. Її територія—це брудна, запльована пивничка, її населення: п'янички, перекупки, спекулянти, сифілітики. На іншому полюсі—Україна. Цікаво, що дистанція (Андрухович пише про Україну з точки зору свого перебування у Москві) не повернула авторові свободи бачення власної батьківщини. Україна з'являється як іділія. Це рай, в якому існують невеличкі проблеми. Безхребетність, селянськість українців подаються як чесноти. Збунтовані маси виглядають покірними. Якщо вони й сплять принижено по московських вокзалах, то це наслідок неєвропейськості— нещасливої нашої географії. Якби між нами і Московією гори, все виглядало б інакше. Інакшою була б історія. Юрій Андрухович—гуманіст. Він проти територіальних претензій, проти націоналізмів й екстремізмів, за міжнародний мир. Геніальний винахід Отто фон Ф.—перефразоване гасло польського повстання: «За ваше й наше пиво!» примирює непримиренне, об'єднує непоєднувальне. Фінал щасливий.

Розв'язок проблеми поррахунків із Системою, як і проблеми декоронації Поета, виявляється у «Московіаді» косметичною. Андруховичем рухає бажання літературного успіху за будь-яку ціну. Саме тому він виправдовує як збунтовану масу, так і нікчемну добірну меншину. Саме на них орієнтує й до них пристосовує прозаїк постмодерністичну мистецьку ідею. Андрухович, здається, не помічає, що постколоніальна проблематика, на відміну від постмодернізму, вимагає не так сміху, легкої іронії, як сатири, сарказму. Здається, його не турбує, що за сміхом у «Московіаді» речі втрачають свій сенс: драматичний досвід постколоніалізму залишається невикористаним, а осмислення постколоніальної проблематики зводиться до банального рівня. Факт, що такий результат прикриває постмодерна маска не змінює суті: вона не універсалізує, а обмежує спосіб мовлення прозаїка.

Сутність внутрішньої цензури, на мою думку, полягає у свідомому й добровільному підпорядкуванні таланту певній ідеї. Ця ідея може бути соціальною, національною, навіть мистецькою. Важить не сфера ідеї, а факт, що вона силувана. Силуваною є ідея, спрямована на літературний успіх. Силувана ідея, по-перше, домінує над життям, обмежуючи його. По-друге, силувана ідея деформує життя тією мірою, якою цього вимагає успіх. В результаті як першого, так і другого чинника витворюється сфальшоване життя. Про фальш свідчать не низькі мімезисні спроможності твору, а незначущість мистецької реальності. Фальш виявляється також в тому, що автор одну й ту ж засадничу проблему трактує по-різному, одному й тому ж явищу надає протилежних сенсів. Така роздвоєність авторського погляду пояснює-

ся не природною еволюцією (для неї потрібний часовий і творчий простір; у випадку Андруховича його ще немає, бо письменник по суті тільки починає), а підпорядкованістю автора публіці. Сфальшоване життя прямо впливає на естетику— воно втілюється у фальшивій формі. Як наслідок цих рівнобіжних, взаємозалежних процесів проходить фальшування таланту.

Напевно, таке трактування Юрія Андруховича не є остаточним. Він, як і всі вісімдесятники загалом, ще не все сказав у літературі. Хочеться, щоб сказане ним було значущим, а сам він не опенився в ролі лідера «генерації-дезертира».

Russian Nationalism and Ukraine

The Nationality Policy of the
Volunteer Army
During the Civil War


Anna M. Procyk

In the historiography of the Russian revolution and the civil war, the origins of the White movement and its ideology appear to be a reaction to the Bolshevik seizure of power. But the movement's slogan, "Russia One and Indivisible," reveals a different ideological agenda. The principal task of this monograph is to unravel the meaning behind this well-known yet never seriously investigated objective by focusing on the nationality program of the White cause. The study examines the rights and privileges that were envisaged for the nationalities within the framework of an "indivisible" Russia and attempts to explain why a movement the White leaders founded on the periphery of the empire, where the support of the nationalities was crucial, adhered so tenaciously to the idea of an undivided Russia.

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Imagining the Imaginary: Nostalgia and the Ukrainian-Australian Text

Sonia Mycak

Ukrainians immigrated to Australia during the period immediately after the Second World War. They arrived in a single wave as Displaced Persons under the auspices of International Refugee Organization resettlement. Whilst Australian Department of Immigration statistics show that 14,464 Ukrainians arrived during the years 1947–54¹, the total has been estimated as somewhat higher;² confusion of birthplace and nationality is now known to have resulted in an artificially low official figure. Despite the harsh conditions they faced upon their arrival,³ the Ukrainians immediately established a community infrastructure and became an active and visible presence within a growing Australian society. With the organization of their own cultural groups, newspapers, and presses, a literary life also flourished, generating a body of Ukrainian-Australian writing

1 Egon F. Kunz, *Displaced Persons: Calwell's New Australians* ([Canberra]: Australian National University Press, 1988), 43. Most of the Ukrainians arrived in 1949 and 1950; smaller numbers arrived in 1948 and 1951. Almost none arrived during the final years, 1952–4, of the Australian government's Displaced Persons Scheme.

2 Eugene Seneta gives the figure of 21,000. See his "Ukrainians in Australia's Censuses," in *Ukrainian Settlement in Australia: Second Conference, Melbourne, 5–7 April 1985*, ed. Marko Pavlyshyn (Melbourne: Department of Slavic Languages, Monash University, 1986), 15–27.

3 While many other countries participated in the IRO's Mass Resettlement Scheme, the conditions in Australia were notoriously harsh. Australia was the only country that stipulated a two-year work contract as a requirement for immigration. Thus, while having to deal with the traumatic experiences they had suffered in Europe, the so-called DPs were forced to perform jobs that many Australians regarded as undesirable. Their conditions were undeniably difficult: they were sent to work in remote rural or desert areas and endured extended separation from their families and spouses; their professional qualifications were completely disregarded; they had limited choices in the jobs they were given; and they had no institutional support.

that is "small in absolute terms, but not insignificant relative to the size of its audience."⁴

The Ukrainian text written in Australia is marked by an overriding feature: nostalgia. Admittedly, such a statement is often made in derision, as Sneja Gunew has pointed out: "Anyone working in this area in Australia will undoubtedly have experienced the repeated and often dismissive response that migrant writing 'simply' deals with nostalgia, that its mode is elegiac. This usually entails accusations of a ghetto mentality, or else justifications for the quaint preservation of anachronistic social rituals ranging from embroidery to marriage customs. The logic appears to be that migrant writing inhabits a landscape of the mind, of memory, offering little to the here and now, something to be outgrown."⁵

I would actively distance myself from those who use the term "nostalgic" in qualitative judgement or as a label that dismisses the literature as being of inferior quality. Instead, the argument in this paper presupposes that nostalgia is a construct of both narrative and effect and a highly successful stylistic device.

In the diasporic text, nostalgia appears to take one of two forms, depending on who is writing and the nature of their relationship to Ukraine. A literal longing for Ukraine characterizes the texts written in Ukrainian (by those who were born in Ukraine or emigrated at a very early age). For those authors whose Ukrainian ancestry is now generations old (as is sometimes the case in Canada), nostalgia takes the form of a more general desire for return that is sublimated into textual production.⁶ In this paper I will argue a particular hypothesis: that nostalgic discourse in Ukrainian-Australian literary works is a form of what is known in psychoanalysis as the Imaginary.

The Imaginary is one of three interrelated orders by which the subject is constituted through Borromean entanglement.⁷ It is one of the more difficult Lacanian terms to understand, because, unlike other developmental stages, there is no definitive physiological or chronological date that necessarily marks its beginnings.⁸ It does not predate the individual and does not exist before his or

4 Marko Pavlyshyn, "The Dislocated Muse: Ukrainian Poetry in Australia, 1948-1985," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 28 (1986), no. 2: 187.

5 Sneja Gunew, "Home and Away: Nostalgia in Australian (Migrant) Writing," in *Island in the Stream: Myths of Place in Australian Culture*, ed. Paul Foss (Sydney: Pluto Press, 1988), 36.

6 I examined the functions and use of nostalgia in the Ukrainian-Canadian text in a paper presented at a conference of the Association for Canadian Studies in Australia and New Zealand, Melbourne, February 1995.

7 Lacan uses the metaphor of the Borromean knot to describe how the Symbolic, Real, and Imaginary are connected. As Ellie Ragland-Sullivan explains, if one ring of the Borromean knot is broken, the other two are loosened as well, so that a shift in one order also affects the other two. See her *Jacques Lacan and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 131.

8 The closest Jacques Lacan comes to specifying a time is to say that it "begins with the

her development; it is generally more difficult to isolate than either of its counterparts (the Real and the Symbolic); and it has a sublimated (though no less important) role in the ongoing development of the ego. As Anika Lemaire so succinctly put it, "the Imaginary is an infinitely supple conceptual category."⁹ It is often paid rather perfunctory attention in psychoanalytic and critical accounts; and whilst it is an integral concept within accounts of subjectivity and the formation of selfhood, to my knowledge it has not been readily employed in literary analysis in a way that would accord it the significance it deserves.¹⁰

The Imaginary is a cognitive register characterized by a relationship with the image. In this it resembles the imaginary in the conventional meaning of that term: it deals with the formation of concepts or objects that lack immediacy in that they are no longer (or perhaps never have been) present to the senses. Psychoanalytic use of the term differs from customary usage in that, within theoretical discourse, the Imaginary names a relation that is dual: identification with the counterpart by way of introjection, and projection with, and of, the other.

The Imaginary order is thought to begin alongside the mirror-stage, that developmental phase instrumental in the formation of the ego in which the infant introjects an imago of the self in an act of specular recognition.¹¹ Thus, being a dynamic of the mirror, it involves the narcissistic formation of a self-image and the development of subjective identity whereby the newly emerging subject will be dependent upon semblance and image for the representation of self.

The inter- and intra-subjective aspects of the Imaginary, the fact that it involves the "narcissistic relation of the subject to his ego"¹² by way of a dyadic relation to the image of a counterpart means that the Imaginary operates by an "identificatory, fusional logic."¹³ It is precisely this kind of logic that is evident in the "first generation" of Ukrainian diasporic texts.

specular image," which presumably means the mirror-stage. But in the same breath he states that it "goes on to the constitution of the ego by way of subjectification by the signifier, which dates the entire process in a rather indeterminate way." See "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious," in Lacan's *Écrits: A Selection*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977), 292–325, here 307.

9 Anika Lemaire, *Jacques Lacan*, trans. David Macey (London: Routledge, 1970), 60.

10 I note as an exception James M. Mellard's work on *The Scarlet Letter* and *To The Lighthouse* in his *Using Lacan Reading Fiction* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991). But his thematic analysis of these texts as exemplifying the interplay between the Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real is very different from the approach adopted in this paper.

11 Ironically, this is an act of misrecognition—"meconnaissance" in Lacanian terms—since the image of the self that the infant sees in the mirror has the form of a gestalt, and this is discordant with the actual lived experience of bodily unco-ordination and fragmentation.

12 Jean Laplanche and J. B. Pontalis, *The Language of Psycho-Analysis*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Norton, 1973), 210.

13 Ragland-Sullivan, 131.

Marko Pavlyshyn has identified the nostalgic aspect of Ukrainian poetry in Australia, pointing out that the poetry was "in large part dominated by the fact of emigration."¹⁴ In that poetry, the "poet and audience share the historical experience of traumatic departure from the homeland and an often equally traumatic adaptation to the conditions of a new country, and the poets have generally aimed at articulating the feelings and beliefs of a community that is united by these shared experiences."¹⁵ Pavlyshyn sees the elegiac mode as being one of three classes of Ukrainian-Australian poetry in which the texts reflect "the sadness associated with the loss of the homeland."¹⁶ This is a useful and necessary categorization for a body of works that, even at first glance, shows itself to be dominated by mourning and lamentation: a longing for home, the grief of separation, anger at what is considered exile, dislocation from family and friends, broken relationships, and alienation in the face of Australian society. While recounting these various facets of longing in their role as theme or motif would be one way of accounting for the manifestation of nostalgic intent, I wish to take another approach and chart the dynamics by which the nostalgic discourse may be seen to reflect the Imaginary captation of the developing subject.

Anthony Wilden has written that from the point of view of intersubjectivity, the Imaginary is "the capture of the *moi* [or self] by another, in an erotic or aggressive relationship."¹⁷ Significant here is the fact that relations are of the order of relativity and based on an image, be they of rivalrous intent or a libidinal investment in the other. Both of these are evident in the earliest diasporic texts, as Ukraine is either imaged in direct opposition to the host country (a Ukrainian identity is now measured against an Anglo-Saxon society) or, as the homeland now lost and forever longed for, becomes an object of desire.

Textual examples of aggressive relativity abound. I have in mind not the conventional meaning of aggression, but Lacan's notion of aggressivity as "the correlative tendency of a mode of identification that we call narcissistic, and which determines the formal structure of man's ego and of the register of entities characteristic of his world."¹⁸ The dynamic of the authorial "I" measuring his or her own sense of (Ukrainian) self against an other that is Australian takes a number of different forms, and each of these exhibits the rivalrous intent of Imaginary captation: comparison and competition, self-imaging, and the construction and exclusion of the alterity. Most often images of the Australian landscape are used to symbolize the difference as nature is drawn upon to play

14 Pavlyshyn, 188.

15 Ibid., 189.

16 Ibid., 189. The other two classes are the proclamatory and the satirical.

17 Quoted in Mellard, 142.

18 Jacques Lacan, "Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis," in his *Ecrits*, 16.

out the dichotomy between the host country and home.¹⁹ Eucalyptus trees, kookaburras, and the Southern Cross are pitted against the Carpathian Mountains, the northern stars, and cuckoos, with the author undeniably positioned within an Australian countryside but dreaming relentlessly of a Ukrainian one.²⁰ Meanwhile, language becomes both an emblematic and a functional representation of this antithesis, as poems bemoan the infiltration of English words into the Ukrainian language,²¹ call for the retention of Ukrainian language and culture in the face of what is seen to be rapid assimilation,²² and express the estrangement of having to assume an alien language.²³ These thematic aspects are, of course, heightened by the fact that the poems themselves are never in English, although they have been published and, for the most part, written in Australia.

As is the case with aggressive relativity, the ego's relations with the object or the other are paramount. In the Ukrainian-Australian text this is expressed as a preoccupation with foreignness²⁴ and object relations of mutual exclusivity (the host society is not welcoming, but neither does the immigrant wish to be included). The original organization of the ego is retained, perhaps even restrained, as the self that existed prior to arrival in Australia is held onto and continually affirmed. It is striking that in some forty years of literature being published in the irregular miscellany *Novyi obrii* (Melbourne, 9 issues, 1954–93), whose editors set themselves the task of chronicling Ukrainian culture in Australia, Ukrainian identity as formulated there has remained fairly static. Very little attention—none, to my knowledge—has been paid to a developing Ukrainian-Australian persona or to the incorporation of aspects of Australian culture into the immigrant self. Indeed, the most recent issue (1993) shows no significant change in this respect. On the contrary, it seems to express a heightening of allegiance to Ukraine: there is a significant number of patriotic pieces that pay homage to nationalist heroes, and a noticeable increase in references to contemporary Ukraine (reflecting the collapse of the USSR, and

19 See Pylyp Vakulenko, "Viktor Harbor," *Novyi obrii* (Melbourne: Lastivka)—hereafter *NO*—no. 8 (1988): 135–6; Ivan Smal-Stotsky, "Dalekii druzhyni," *NO*, no. 5 (1974): 75; Bozhenna Kovalenko, "Zamist kvitiv," *NO*, no. 6 (1980): 14–15; and Vasyl Onufriienko's untitled poem dated 4 March 1959, *NO*, no. 2 (1960): 36.

20 See Klavdiia Folts, "Tuha," *NO*, no. 6: 87; Tetiana Voloshka, "Moia Ukraino," *NO*, no. 5: 92–3; Dmytro Chub, "Pershyi lyst," *NO*, no. 5: 38; and Pylyp Vakulenko's untitled poem dated 1988, *NO*, no. 8: 137.

21 See Khrystyna Soroka, "Movo ridna! Slovo ridne!" *NO*, no. 6: 122.

22 See Bozhenna Kovalenko, "Zamist kvitiv"; Dmytro Chub, "Tryvoha," *NO*, no. 4 (1971): 53; and Ostap Zirchasty, "Dekomu z molodi," *NO*, no. 5: 145.

23 See Hryhorii Vyshnev, "Moia mova," *NO*, no. 9 (1993): 39–40.

24 See Kost Himmelreich's untitled poem dated 1968, *NO*, no. 4: 60; Zoia Kohut, "Chuzhe," *NO*, no. 9: 78; the first of Vasyl Onufriienko's untitled poems in *NO*, no. 3 (1967): 28; Kost Himmelreich, "Zazdrist," *NO*, no. 3: 67; and Mykhailo Pidriz, "Vidkryttia pam'iatnyka," *NO*, no. 6: 74.

Ukraine's independence)—not to mention the fact that the miscellany itself is now published in Ukraine.

It is my contention that exclusion as the model of Imaginary identification is the intent upon which the diasporic text is based. In this rivalry and relativity are the forms of entrapment in the image that protect the ego-identity and effect a continuance of self. With this we touch upon what Lacan describes as "the notion of aggressivity as a correlative tension of the narcissistic structure in the coming-into-being (*devenir*) of the subject."²⁵ That Lacan goes on to say that this notion "enables us to understand in a very simply formulated function all sorts of accidents and atypicalities in that coming-into-being"²⁶ may well indicate that it can accommodate what is arguably one of the most traumatic and significant experiences capable of arresting subjective development: immigration and exile from one's home.

In the same breath as he speaks of a notion of aggressivity linked to both objectification and narcissism, Lacan speaks of aggressivity as being connected to "the structures of systematic *meconnaissance* ... that characterize the formation of the ego."²⁷ This concept of specular misrecognition is as pertinent to the diasporic text as are object relations and a developing self-image, for the mirror that the Ukrainian immigrant looked into was one similarly based on semblance and untruth. Lacan's use of the term "mirror" quite literally refers to a reflected image of the self. Using his term as a metaphor for a more extended specularization, it may be said that the *imago* that appeared and was reflected to Ukrainians once they arrived in Australia (the image against which they were forced to measure themselves) was discordant with an actual lived experience of the new world. Cultural and ideological construction of selfhood in Australian society was totally at odds with the identity of the new arrival; and the immigrants' actual experience of this country did not look at all like the "Australia" they saw in various cultural constructions. Nonetheless, this false image went on to mediate in any apprehension of self-image or identity and would have alienated by presenting images of what could or should have been. Needless to say, these images were destined to be forevermore unattainable, for the postwar "new Australians" would always be marked by the origins of their arrival.

Unlike Lacan's account of the mirror-phase in which the infant does at least see an image of his or her own body, the *imago* of being Australian that was held up to the Ukrainian did not even appear to resemble his or her own self. This, one would suspect, amounted to an even further and intensified form of

25 Lacan, "Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis," 22.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid., 21.

specular misrecognition. The result must surely have been that Ukrainians turned to other Ukrainians for a reflection of image, so that whatever recognition or Imaginary triumph (no matter how short-lived) was experienced by Ukrainians, it was the result of their addressing others whom they perceived to be identical to themselves. It is for this reason, I believe, that the implied audience became (and still is) so strong an element within the Ukrainian-Australian text that poems or short pieces could actually be addressed to particular people,²⁸ and community leaders could feature as characters.²⁹ In short, authors spoke and still speak to each other, or speak to a target audience with which they are well acquainted.³⁰ In connection with this, there is a heavy reliance upon motif and convention and little, if any, attempt at reaching a wider Australian readership.

If Lacan's notion of aggressivity is one that relies upon the specific form of misrecognition for which his account of the mirror-stage has become known, it is equally reliant upon "an identificatory reshaping of the subject"³¹ in libidinal terms. I speak here of the oedipal complex, or, in Lacan's words, of "a secondary identification by introjection of the imago of the parent of the same sex."³² This will have followed the infant's initial desire for the mother, a longing for union with the maternal, and denial of the father's rightful place. It is here that we are brought to the oedipal connotations of Imaginary projection, or, to be more precise, its pre-oedipal nature.

Laplanche and Pontalis name "erotic attraction" for the image of the counterpart as one of the defining characteristics of the Imaginary.³³ With this, the Imaginary becomes a realm of desire. As Mellard states, "in the Imaginary, all identificatory others (persons, things, sensory impressions) become objects of desire in the field of the subject consciousness—that is, in the subject who relates through desire to those others."³⁴ The voice of this "desiring subject" is clearly heard in the diasporic text, where Ukraine and signifiers of the homeland become impassioned symbols of longing and torment. Descriptions of hearts torn with pain at the grief of separation³⁵ accompany a more indeterminate sense of longing in which the speaker searches aimlessly for some thing, some place that

28 See Kost Himmelreich, "Hanni Kolesnyk," *NO*, no. 5: 66–7; and Ostap Zirchasty, "Hanni Chubach," *NO*, no. 4: 115.

29 See Ostap Zirchasty, "Nashi znaïomi," *NO*, no. 2: 119–23; and Zoia Kohut, "Telefonna rozmova," *NO*, no. 2: 128–9.

30 See Zoia Kohut, "Kulturni arabesky III," *NO*, no. 9: 12; Tetiana Voloshka, "Druziam na chuzhyni" *NO*, no. 4: 99; and Olena Riabchenko, "Zustrinete vy ikh povsiudy ..." *NO*, no. 5: 136–7.

31 Lacan, "Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis," 22.

32 Ibid.

33 Laplanche and Pontalis, 210.

34 Mellard, 82.

35 See Klavdiia Folts, "Moi Odesi," *NO*, no. 6: 86; Olha Ilkiv, "Batko-mandrivnyk," *NO*, no. 8: 115; and Ivan Smal-Stotsky, "Znov letiat zhuravli," *NO*, no. 6: 96.

remains unnamed.³⁶ A vocative farewell with a promise that Ukraine will never be forgotten features in the early years,³⁷ later to be replaced by the melancholy claim that regardless of the number of years spent in other countries or the distance traversed across the world, Ukraine cannot be forgotten and the speaker's thoughts are continually drawn back there.³⁸ Immigrant existence is characterized as an endless wandering through foreign lands;³⁹ broken relationships feature often;⁴⁰ and life in the diaspora is regarded as a kind of exile or punishment.⁴¹ An underlying use of the pastoral and recurrent reference to certain motifs (green fields, spring days, flowering gardens, and the like)⁴² creates the sense of an idyllic past now lost forever; this sense is heightened by a contiguity between these symbols and the speaker's own youth.⁴³

The thematic preoccupation with the desire for return is a distinctive feature of the writing and is arguably a kind of narrative fixation—I use the term with the intention of activating its psychoanalytic connotations—that marks the texts. This may be seen to be yet another manifestation of Imaginary dynamics underwriting the text. As Lemaire points out, “the imaginary object will either repeat itself indefinitely, remaining identical to itself—in which case consciousness clouds over and sinks into the automatism of repetition—or it will submit to a discontinuity of aspect through continuous qualitative changes—in this sense imagination really is our faculty of creation.”⁴⁴ Both of these aspects of Imaginary captation—the tendency toward repetition and the creative recreation of convention—are evident in these texts as authors repeat and rewrite motifs within the protocol of audience expectations.

The idea of fixation is a way of accounting for the fact that the individual is marked by early life experiences and retains an attachment to archaic relationships and modes of satisfaction.⁴⁵ Given that the thematic being fixated

36 See the third of Vasyl Onufrienko's untitled poems in *NO*, no. 3: 29; and a poem that is ostensibly about sadness, Dmytro Chub's “Elehiine,” *NO*, no. 5: 40.

37 See Bozhenna Kovalenko, “Proshchannia,” *NO*, no. 4: 112.

38 See Bozhenna Kovalenko, “Moi zemli,” *NO*, no. 5: 63.

39 See *Ibid.*

40 See Dmytro Chub, “Mrii,” *NO*, no. 5: 39; Pavlo Dubiv, “Zolota osin,” *NO*, no. 3: 46; Ivan Smal-Stotsky, “Dalekii druzhyni”; Olia Terletska, “Son,” *NO*, no. 7: 129-30; and Vasyl Onufrienko's untitled poem dated 6 March 1959, *NO*, no. 2: 39.

41 See Zoia Kohut, “Otche nash,” *NO*, no. 7: 16-17; Kost Himmelreich's untitled poem dated 1968; and Olha Ilkiv, “Batko-mandrivnyk.”

42 See Bozhenna Kovalenko, “Moi zemli”; Olia Terletska, “Son”; Pavlo Oliynyk, “Toti Shuri,” *NO*, no. 4: 85; and Klavdiia Folts, “Tuha.”

43 See Ivan Smal-Stotsky, “Znov letiat zhuravli”; Bozhenna Kovalenko, “Moi zemli”; Pylyp Vakulenko, “Prymkhlyva dolia,” *NO*, no. 5: 73; and Klava Roshko, “Moia zemlia,” *NO*, no. 7: 133.

44 Lemaire, 60.

45 Laplanche and Pontalis, 162.

upon is a nostalgic longing for home, it is at this point that a more general notion of desire, as it traverses the diasporic text, may be replaced with a more familial, namely oedipal, configuration. Certainly the metonymic displacement of Ukraine onto lost youth⁴⁶ and the loss of family⁴⁷ (notably of the mother)⁴⁸ bespeaks early infantile experience as a metaphor for the grief of separation. But where the trauma of departure from one's country lies side by side with oedipal departure from the mother, a more specific dynamic is evident.

Imaginary captation, having the form of the dyadic relation, is a drive towards fusion and union with the maternal. Nostalgic discourse in the diasporic text is the drive towards union—or, rather, re-union—with Ukraine. It is my belief that this makes the representation of immigration an oedipal configuration, whereby the “mother” from whom the subject is torn becomes synonymous with Ukraine, while the paternal symbolic order that interrupts the relation and into which the subject is thrown is Australia or the host society. This being the case, the Ukrainian immigrant self as it is constructed textually will forevermore be longing for Ukraine and turning the gaze of desire back towards the homeland.

Having previously discussed this oedipal dynamic,⁴⁹ I shall not consider this point in detail here. Suffice it to say that, in what may be termed the “unconscious” of the text, the desire to return to Ukraine takes on significance as a representation of the subject's desire for reunion with the maternal. This is effected through a specific juxtaposition of motifs and symbols and the interplay of signifiatory desire by which they are connected. In short, desire for the maternal becomes associated with what once was the referent—Ukraine—and this, or rather the affect associated with it, is displaced onto certain other signifiers. These then bear the brunt of the desire in a more acceptable way: the longing may be freely expressed and no longer need be repressed. I refer here, firstly, to the variety of diminutive terms meaning “Mother Ukraine,”⁵⁰ whose use results in the homeland and the mother becoming interchangeable as the privileged signifiers of lack of differentiation in spatial and temporal terms. Secondly, there is the then further displacement or redirection of desire in

46 See Bozhenna Kovalenko, “Moi zemli”; and the second of her untitled poems in *NO*, no. 9: 26.

47 See Tetiana Voloshka, “Pryvit moii babusi,” *NO*, no. 2: 60.

48 See Vasyl Onufriienko's untitled poem dated 12 June 1959, *NO*, no. 2: 38.

49 In “The Voice of Immigration and the Play of Desire: A Psychoanalytic Reading of the Ukrainian-Australian Poem,” a paper presented at the conference of the International Comparative Literature Association, Edmonton, August 1994.

50 See Bozhenna Kovalenko, “Vidrodzhennia,” *NO*, no. 9: 5; O. Butko, “Plemynnykovi v Ukrainu,” *NO*, no. 6: 111–12; and Ievhen Zoze, “Hutsuliia,” *NO*, no. 7: 92. In Klavdiia Folts's “Moi Odesi” the city of Odesa becomes “Odesa-mother.” See also a poem that juxtaposes the mother to Ukraine and Ukrainian culture so that they become interchangeable: Pavlo Dubiv's “Baliada pro prapor,” *NO*, no. 2: 54.

exogamous terms, so that what emerges in the place of "Ukraine-as-mother" (or at least alongside her) is "Ukraine-as-girl." This may take the form of the motif of a romance—a young girl bids farewell to her lover on the eve of battle or blesses the heroic stance of the nationalist soldier leaving the village.⁵¹ Or the girl may attain mythic status as the chaste maiden of a fairy-tale or pastoral world.⁵² The displacement of maternal desire may also be seen to be reinforced by a thematic focus upon what in this context could be interpreted as the consequences of oedipal resolution: a shift from "mother-Ukraine" to the more symbolic term "fatherland,"⁵³ an overt concern for the construction of a Ukrainian culture and protection of Ukrainian society,⁵⁴ and a focus upon language as the vehicle for the maintenance of personal and social identity.⁵⁵

Elizabeth Grosz has made the point that the Imaginary returns throughout adult life in certain privileged moments.⁵⁶ It is my contention that the renegotiation of the oedipal bond through textual process evident in the Ukrainian-Australian text is one of the ways in which the Imaginary resurfaces. Through the displacement of desires that effect the interplay of the signifier, the author may be seen to be reactivating pre-oedipal desire through the poetic process. However, the dyadic pre-oedipal nature of the Imaginary means that it has the potential to lock the infant into a relation of duality from which he or she will be unable to participate in wider symbolic exchange. Therefore the question may be asked: is there a danger for the author or audience here?

An enunciative position is important if the subject is to escape inundation by, or collapse into, the Imaginary. As Mellard states, "language and the Symbolic arrest the play of reflections in the register of the Imaginary, for the Imaginary is stabilized only by the accession in the subject of the Symbolic register."⁵⁷ Later he notes the dangers of immersion within the Imaginary: "never to be assimilated into the Symbolic is to remain neurotically enmeshed in the images of the Imaginary."⁵⁸ Having ascertained the significance of nostalgic discourse as a manifestation of the Imaginary in the diasporic text, we

51 See Pavlo Dubiv, "Baliada pro prapor"; idem, "Zolota osin," *NO*, no. 3: 46; Olena Riabchenko, "Za selom," *NO*, no. 5: 37; and Mykhailo Pidriz, "Pokrova."

52 See Ievhen Zoze, "Hutsuliia"; idem, "Takyi sobi tsvirkun," *NO*, no. 7, 93; Ivan Smal-Stotsky, "Znov letiat zhuravli"; and Klavdiia Folts, "Tuha."

53 See Klavdiia Folts, "Ne zazdriui," *NO*, no. 7: 108; and Pavlo Dubiv, "Baliada pro prapor."

54 See Bozhenna Kovalenko, "Zamist kvitiv"; Tetiana Voloshka, "Druziam na chuzhyni"; and Ievhen Zoze, "Tobi," *NO*, no. 9: 152.

55 See Ievhen Zoze, "Hlukhonimyi," *NO*, no. 9: 153; Hryhorii Vyshnevyy, "Moia mova"; Dmytro Chub, "Tryvoha"; and Zoia Kohut, "Shevchenkovi," *NO*, no. 7: 13.

56 Elizabeth Grosz, *Sexual Subversions: Three French Feminists* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1989), xviii.

57 Mellard, 16.

58 Ibid., 86.

need to ask whether there is evidence of what Mellard calls the “potentially neurotic entrapment of the Imaginary.”⁵⁹ At this point it should be noted that “neurotic” here has no connotations of disease. In psychoanalytic usage “neurotic” may refer to what is quite normal—to the psychopathology of everyday life. In this context, what neuroses, if any, were discovered would surely shed light upon identity-formation and the mechanisms of self-imaging once immigration has taken place.

For Freud the notion of fixation was invaluable for understanding the role that the subject’s history plays in the formation of neurosis.⁶⁰ Given its nostalgic construction in the Ukrainian-Australian text, one could quite rightly wonder whether there is any danger of author or reader being locked in the dyadic realm of identification with Ukraine. If there is, this could translate into the danger of not entering Australian society—and perhaps could explain the fact that the Ukrainian-Australian author appears not to have taken a rightful place in the Australian literary scene. As Pavlyshyn has noted, in the early 1970s the work of a number of Ukrainian poets who were living or had lived in Australia was translated into English, but the volume attracted little attention and did not initiate any dialogue between the Ukrainian authors and those of Australia’s other cultures. “Ukrainian poetry remained as dislocated as ever: its poets were still, in large part, reflecting on their dislodgement from the homeland, and they continued to write without any significant evolution, in isolation from developments in poetry in Australia, largely uninfluenced by innovations in Ukrainian émigré poetry elsewhere, and on the basis of an aesthetic canon belonging to the nineteenth century, or, in some cases, the 1920s and 30s.”⁶¹

This may explain the literary status of the Ukrainian-Australian author and factors such as institutional affiliation and recognition within a wider Australian society (or lack thereof). More difficult to chart are the personal consequences, the repercussions upon the immigrant psyche. Here the most the critic may offer is hypothesis, although what can be said with certainty is that on arrival in Australia each immigrant had already undergone the processes of establishing a subjective identity, a sense of self. What, then, are the consequences of having undergone them “in Ukrainian,” only to find oneself then immersed in a language, culture, and society that is, quite literally, on the other side of the world?

Being the realm of images of otherness or of the counterpart, the Imaginary introduces alterity into what is until that point a narcissistic relation. In this sense, the Imaginary is a negotiation of otherness, an admitting of the other in

59 Ibid.

60 Laplanche and Pontalis, 162–5, give a good account of how Freud developed the concept of fixation and the role it played in his theories of the psyche.

61 Pavlyshyn, 204.

a representation of the self. As Mellard states, "the play here is the play of desire, the desire of the subject for itself in its mirror other."⁶² Of course, this gives the Imaginary subjective and specular significance that, in the light of its earlier characterization as pre-oedipal, produces a certain ambiguity of function. I refer here to the paradoxical nature of the role of the Imaginary in mapping the ego whilst also having the potential to entrap the subject within the dyadic stance.

This coexistence of constructive and destructive forces is reflected in the diasporic text. For, by evoking the Imaginary through nostalgic discourse, the Ukrainian subject is negotiating a self; by longing for Ukraine, authors (and readers) are creating an identity for themselves. Yet this identity—by its very nature, by the fact that it identifies through fusion—is an identity that traps the subject in a non-Australian, alienated, or incomplete stance. It places the immigrant in a position of always arriving, never of having arrived. And while this may, in fact, be the destiny of each and every subject, given our contemporary post-structuralist awareness of the inherently decentred nature of subjectivity, in this case it is what happens when a dislocated or disbarred identity is not a theoretical, existential question but a practical consideration able to taint day-to-day life with dysfunctionality.

The Imaginary invocation of, and identification with, Ukraine is responsible for the formation or positioning of an identity, yet this position potentially precludes access to representation in the immediate (Australian) discursive, symbolic realm. Thus the Imaginary captation of the Ukrainian immigrant is a simultaneously generative and degenerative stance. In this it may be seen to reflect what Lemaire has said of the Imaginary: "Each image is ... a blind alley in which subjective intention drowns in its own creation, collapsing into its object and failing to keep its distance from its own internal vision.... In its quest for itself, consciousness thus believes that it has found itself in the mirror of its creatures and loses itself in something which is not consciousness."⁶³

This ambiguity of function may be seen to be reflected in other anomalies—the fact, for example, that it is absence from Ukraine that, for the immigrant, inscribes Ukraine. I allude to the "double rupture" with the Real, whereby the signification or representation of Ukraine takes the form that it does (is as laden with subjective intention as it is) precisely because it involves a further displacement or deferral than is otherwise evident in the signification of the referent. Similarly, we are faced with the paradoxical situation that, through the separation of immigration, Ukraine is positioned as the mother or the maternal Real from whom the subject is torn; and yet in that subject's earlier

62 Mellard, 16.

63 Lemaire, 60.

development Ukraine (that is, a Ukrainian cultural, symbolic order) functioned as the exact opposite: as the paternal element, the law of the father that allowed for the subject's assumption of a position within society.⁶⁴

If, by imagining Ukraine, the Ukrainian-Australian author is reactivating the Imaginary, then what is, in fact, being posited is a psychological, psychoanalytic model to account for the significance of the diasporic text. The text is no longer a manifestation of rational, intellectual thought that is distinct from the inner workings of the mind, but a psychic configuration and negotiation of identity. Just as the Imaginary plays a role in the development of the subject, so this literature plays a role in the development of a Ukrainian self. This refers not just to the development of the author but equally to that of the reader, as the consciousness effected is shared by either or both. This involves the dynamics of desire—the sublimation of desire into signification. The longing for maternal union with Ukraine is sublimated into symbolic representations of Ukraine. It accords significant status both to the text and to nostalgia, and is therefore very unlike accounts that would see nostalgia as trite or quaint.

What, then, is the significance of reading nostalgic discourse through the Lacanian Imaginary, and what can such an analysis add to critical accounts of the literature? First, it gives an account of nostalgia as an important structural and functional aspect of the text. This is significant, for it paves the way for nostalgia to be seen as a matter of inscription rather than purely in terms of affect or emotion. In this the Imaginary function of nostalgia is not the only rationale worthy of attention.⁶⁵ Secondly, a psychoanalytic account of nostalgia signals an attempt to grapple with the psychological or psychical aspects of the works, in a move away from a purely thematic slant. In this attempt, textual process may be shown to be akin to the subject-in-process; textuality can be shown to affect those dynamics that lie at the very heart of identity formation and are instrumental in the creation of the self. This is important, for it is often assumed that migrant writing is less significant than other art forms, and that in the immigrant experience literature has less importance than life's practicalities. If there is a move away from seeing the migrant text as doing little more than documenting socio-historical reality, and, instead, towards seeing the works as effecting actual structures of the mind, the reading and writing of literature may take its place alongside other formative experiences, and may be acknowledged for the role that it plays in the creation and negotiation of a sense of self. In this way the Ukrainian-Australian text stands to gain: it may come to be seen both

64 This ambiguity of function is, I believe, reflected in the fact that Ukraine is referred to as both the motherland and the fatherland.

65 My own work on the Ukrainian-Canadian text has tried to show nostalgia as discursive, ideological, and intertextual, and as a writing strategy with identifiable consequences for both the kinds of text being produced and the construction and portrayal of Ukrainian-Canadian identity.

as part of a minority literature that reflects the specificity of the Ukrainian experience in Australia, and as part of a migrant canon that is instrumental in the creation of an ever-expanding Australian national identity.

Towards a Systematic Account of Nominal Word-Transformation through Suffixation in Ukrainian*

J. E. M. Clarke

1.1 Aspects of the process of word-formation in Ukrainian have been discussed in numerous studies. Yet, in most of these studies scant attention has been paid to the theoretical principles underlying the account presented. So far there has been no *systematic* and *comprehensive* description of the way in which the vocabulary of the language is organized and the means by which words are derived from related lexical items that contains an explicit analysis of the structural principles on which it is based.¹ The proposed study will focus on the formation of nouns through suffixation.

2.1 In approaching the subject of nominal word-formation through suffixation, one should be aware of the existence of various possible lines of inquiry. While these lines offer different perspectives and different insights, all of which have some value, a failure to follow consistently a single line of inquiry can lead to a confused and disjointed account. At the most elementary level of description

* I wish to acknowledge the financial assistance given to this investigation by the Australian Research Council and the research assistance provided by Dr. L. Sydor Petkovic in preparing the inventory of suffixes.

1 A possible exception to this generalization is the brilliant investigation of the structure of the elements of Ukrainian vocabulary by N. F. Klymenko, *Systema afiksál'noho slovotvorennya sučasnoji ukrajins'koji movy* (1973). The scope and rigour of the work are dazzling, but the systematic application of a generative model to word-formation does not entail a full description of the semantic aspects of the derivational process. Nevertheless, Klymenko's text remains an exemplary study and a landmark in the literature on Ukrainian word-formation.

Less brilliant but significant contributions to the subject have been made in the second volume of the series *Sučasna ukrajins'ka literaturna mova* (1969) and in the monograph *Slovotvir sučasnoji ukrajins'koji literaturnoji movy* (1979). (The latter owes much to the outstanding grammar of Russian edited by N. Ju. Švedova, *Grammatika sovremennogo russkogo literaturnogo jazyka* (1970). Both works are notable for the transparent framework of their exposition.)

it is possible merely to define the suffixes involved in nominal word-formation and present them in a simple alphabetical list, taking account of positional variants and extended forms. As a more complex alternative one might adopt a semantic approach, identifying various semantic categories and subcategories of nouns (personal nouns, nouns of agent, attributive nouns, et cetera) and relating each to particular suffixes. Or one might follow a morphological approach and describe the patterns of suffixation in terms of the word-classes that each involves (denominal, deadjectival, et cetera). To all these accounts can be added a statistical investigation that attempts to determine the frequency of each suffix within the system of nominal word-formation and to rank the suffixes on a scale from most productive to unproductive.

3.1 The following remarks represent the first step towards an account of nominal word-formation through suffixation that will be both systematic and comprehensive. It will not pretend to be exhaustive in the sense of offering all possible perspectives. Nor will it aim to include a complete register of all suffixed nouns. Such a register belongs more properly to a derivational dictionary.

3.1.1 In passing it should be noted that the complex and difficult question of defining precisely what constitutes the lexicon of standard Ukrainian is not addressed in these remarks. The limits of the vocabulary under investigation are set by the eleven-volume *Slovnyk ukrajins'koji movy* (1970–80) with the exclusion of items marked dialectal. At the same time it needs to be stated that there are many discrepancies among dictionaries of Ukrainian in their categorization of lexical items and in their selection of vocabulary for inclusion.²

3.2 In this study the material will be presented largely in the form of an inventory of suffixes that contains both semantic and morphological information. Such a form will allow the material to be rearranged easily so that either semantic or morphological criteria may become the primary focus of the account. (A description that relies on morphological criteria alone does not yield particularly illuminating results and can be considered adequate only when

2 One need only compare the nouns derived from бід-а in different dictionaries to see the extent of this variability. In Volume I of the eleven-volume *Slovnyk* we find the following derivatives: *бід-аг-а, *бід-ах-а, *бід-ак, бід-ар, бід-ар-к-а₁, бід-ар-к-а₂, бід-ар-ств-о, *бід-ац-тв-о, бід-ач-иськ-о, бід-ач-к-а, *бід-к-а, *бід-н-ість, *бід-н-от-а₂, *бід-н-яга, *бід-н-як-а, бід-н-яж-к-а, бід-н-яж-еч-к-а, *бід-н-як, бід-н-ят-к-о, бід-н-ят-оч-к-о, бід-н-яц-тв-о, *бід-н-яч-к-а, *бід-олаг-а, *бід-олах-а, *бід-олах, *бід-олак-а, *бід-олаш-еч-к-а, *бід-олаш-к-а, *бід-оньк-а, *бід-от-а, *бід-оч-к-а. Of these derivatives, those marked with the symbol * are also found in the first volume of Hrinchenko's famous *Slovar' ukrajins'koji movy*, while those that are unmarked are absent. Furthermore, Hrinchenko includes the following additional nouns that do not appear in *Slovnyk ukrajins'koji movy*: бід-ак-а, бід-аш-еч-к-а, бід-аш-к-а, бід-н-ик, бід-н-иц-я, бід-н-івств-о, бід-н-оч-і-я, бід-н-я, бід-н-я-ств-о, бід-олак, бід-олайчик, бід-орак-а, бід-орак-а, бід-яг-а.

complemented with semantic observations. This is hardly surprising, since word-formation relates directly to vocabulary.)

3.3 Throughout the investigation the aim will be descriptive accuracy and completeness. The intention will not be to provide a bold new theory of word-formation, but to offer a systematic account of the characteristic features of an important aspect of the Ukrainian vocabulary: the formation of nouns by suffixation. If the investigation can be said to owe something to modern theories of language, then it stands closer to the European tradition of structuralism than it does to the American school of generative grammar. It is concerned more with a rigorous methodology than it is with the formulation of a complex set of rules.

4.1 At the same time, questions of theory remain critically important. Indeed, the semantic approach adopted in this study raises profound theoretical problems that must be stated, even though their solution lies beyond the scope of the present discussion. The various semantic categories of nouns identified (personal, abstract, et cetera) cannot be presented as homogeneous and mutually exclusive. In the case of two categories, diminutive and augmentative, it can be argued that their elements lack fully independent meanings and are merely modified forms of existing lexical items. While it is obvious that the semantic relationship between, let us say, книжечка and книга is very different from that between книжник and книга, this difference is not often explicitly acknowledged.

4.1.1 In view of the absence of mutually exclusive categories, it is clear that some nouns may well be classified as elements of more than one category. To avoid such overlapping (as semantic approaches tend to do) a hierarchical arrangement is imposed (usually implicitly). And so the categories of diminutive, augmentative, singulative and collective, which contain almost entirely denominal elements, take precedence over the more derivationally diverse categories of personal, animal, concrete and abstract. As a consequence, a noun like квіт-оч-к-а, for example, is classified primarily as diminutive, only secondarily as concrete. This reflects the idea that in a string of suffixes the determining suffix is the last suffix on the right. Similarly, if a suffix is extended, it will be extended to the left. (See 5.1.1 below.)

4.1.2 When the categories and subcategories are defined in terms of their relationship to the set of suffixes, it becomes apparent that distinct categories do not always correspond to suffixes that are formally distinct. In some cases they may correspond to suffixes that have the same (orthographic) form. These so-called homonymous suffixes will be distinguished in the text by numerical subscripts. Thus the suffix -ак₁, for example, refers to personal nouns (спів-ак, сибір-як), while the suffix -ак₂ refers to animals (гус-ак, біл-як) and the suffix -ак₃ to concrete nouns (літ-ак, би-як).

4.2 From the examples already given it is evident that an orthographic rather than a phonetic representation of lexical items will be preferred for this study. This can be justified on theoretical grounds that assert the morphological primacy of the written form over the spoken, even if it entails the inclusion of numerous variants in the inventory of suffixes. Such variants will usually be given in parentheses after the initial entry. Their presence should not obscure the fact that nouns like слов-ак-ф, мор-як-ф, прост-ак-ф, бід-н-як-ф, for example, share the same suffix. Where it is necessary to specify stem and suffix more precisely, this will be done using the symbols ' and j, as in the following examples: бід-н'-ак-ф, воj-ак-ф. The symbol ' should not be confused with the apostrophe (') of conventional Ukrainian orthography.

4.3 At a more basic level it needs to be borne in mind that any representation of a word in terms of stem and suffix presupposes their exact identification. What may be concealed is the difficulty in determining the boundary between stem and formative and in showing consistency in segmentation. In some instances differing segmentations may be possible. For example, a word like читач can be segmented as either чит-а-ч-ф or чит-ач-ф, though the undisputed existence of the suffix -ач- in скрип-ач-ф suggests the second segmentation to avoid the unnecessary proliferation of suffixes. Perhaps the underlying assumption that words are composed of *discrete* linear segments requires re-examination—could it not be that segments may overlap in some cases? Is it reasonable to maintain, for example, that the noun обман and the verb обманути have distinct (presuffixal) stems?

4.3.1 Of less interest are other morphemic boundaries within a word, which are more the concern of morphemics as such. Usually they will not be indicated in this account, so that extended suffixes of the type -овиськ- (as in збіг-овиськ-) will remain unsegmented.

4.4 In describing the various patterns of suffixation with reference to the word-classes involved in each (denominal, deverbal, etc.), a problem arises with those cases where more than one pattern can be identified because of the existence of a related adjective. Which word-class should be specified if a noun is derived from an adjective that is, in turn, derived from another noun (at least formally)? In this study the practice will be to define the pattern of suffixation in terms of the nominal antecedent, so that a noun of the type чай-н-ик-ф will be described as denominal (from чай-ф), and not as deadjectival (from чай-н-ий). At the same time the noun will be segmented in a way that shows both the nominal and adjectival suffixes. This is a formal procedure that is independent of any argument about how a speaker of the language would tend to classify the pattern of suffixation. It has the advantage of bringing together nouns of the same basic structure that would otherwise be associated with different word-classes,


depending on the existence or non-existence of a related adjective. It conforms to the notion that word-formation should be autonomous and distinct from etymology. An attempt to incorporate historical insights into a description of word-formational patterns may lead to a distorted picture of the way in which the vocabulary functions as a system. Finally, it should be noted that in many cases it is difficult to determine even diachronically whether a related adjective appeared before the noun or whether both were derived independently from the nominal antecedent. In the last analysis a conclusive statement may well be problematic—the most realistic approach may be to derive both from the nominal antecedent without specifying an intermediary.

4.5 A problem also arises in defining the direction of derivation in the case of a noun with a zero suffix that can be related to a verb. Should the verb be derived from the noun, or the noun from the verb? What is the relationship, for example, between *хід-ф-ф* and *ход-и-ти*? In this study it will be the custom to take the verbal noun as the derivative regardless of the fact that it lacks a suffix. Again this is a formal procedure. On the other hand, if the noun cannot be considered verbal in the sense of referring to an action, then the verb will generally be taken as the derivative. And so, for example, *дим-ф-ф* will derive *дим-и-ти*, while *дзвін-ф-ф* will be derived from *дзвон-и-ти*. Such an approach, while superficially straightforward and useful in practice, still raises difficult theoretical questions. The possibility of differing interpretations is not entirely eliminated.

5.1 Since one of the weaknesses of many accounts of nominal word-formation is a tendency to conflate semantic and morphological criteria, the information presented in this study in the inventory of suffixes will be given in a well-defined order. Each suffix will first be related to one of the eight semantic categories of nouns (mentioned above in 4.11), with a distinct category defining a distinct suffix. The suffix will then be further analysed in terms of the subcategories belonging to that particular category and in terms of the word-classes involved. For each subcategory and word-class an example will be provided. The complete set of semantic categories and subcategories is as follows:

Category and abbreviation			Subcategory
1	Nouns denoting persons	P	1.1 Nouns of agent 1.2 Nouns of occupation 1.3 Attributive nouns 1.4 Nouns of origin 1.5 Nouns denoting females
2	Nouns denoting animals	An	2.1 Animals in general 2.2 Nouns denoting offspring 2.3 Nouns denoting female animals
3	Concrete nouns	C	3.1 Nouns of agent 3.2 Nouns denoting objects 3.3 Nouns denoting places 3.4 Nouns denoting plants 3.5 Nouns denoting aggregates
4	Abstract nouns	A	4.1 Nouns of action (verbal nouns) 4.2 Abstract nouns proper
5	Collective nouns	Coll	
6	Singulative nouns	S	
7	Diminutive nouns	D	
8	Augmentative nouns	Aug	

5.1.1 While it may be argued that these eight categories are neither homogeneous nor mutually exclusive, as indicated in 4.1, it should be observed that they do possess a well-defined binary structure. Not only do categories 1–4 stand in opposition to categories 5–8, but both sets of four may also be subdivided naturally into pairs. Within this subdivision, categories 1–2 denote *animate* nouns, while categories 3–4 denote *inanimate* nouns. (In this way the two pairs correspond exactly to the morphological distinction between masculine nouns that have identical accusative and genitive forms and those that have identical nominative and accusative forms.) Such a structure lends itself readily to representation in the following tree-diagram.



5.1.2 Within the inventory of suffixes the suffixes themselves will be arranged alphabetically, while the extended forms of each suffix will be listed in reverse alphabetical order. This reflects the principle that suffixal extension takes place from right to left, and not in the opposite direction. Thus -ов-ик represents an extended form of the suffix -ик and functions semantically in the same way, and not as an extended form of the suffix -ов-. The zero suffix, denoted by -φ-, will appear after the other suffixes, as convention demands. Its inclusion is critical for a systematic description of nominal word-formation through suffixation.

5.1.3 At the same time suffixes of non-Slavic origin will be listed separately. While this may detract from the uniformity of the account, it will have the effect of grouping together borrowed nouns that have both non-Slavic stems and non-Slavic suffixes. There are few examples of Slavic stems combined with borrowed suffixes.

6.1 To illustrate the structure and composition of the inventory of suffixes the entries for the first five letters of the alphabet are given below. Even though these entries constitute only a sample, they show clearly the systematic arrangement of the material in the inventory on the basis of semantic and morphological criteria that allow each suffixed noun (with few exceptions) to be associated with a particular semantic category and a related word-class.

INVENTORY OF SUFFIXES

Suffix	Cate- gory	Subcategory	Noun type	Example	Derived from
-ав	C	object	denom	бур-ав 'auger'	бур
-аг-а	P	attributive	denom	бід-аг-а 'pauper'	бід-а
-олаг-а		"	"	бід-олаг-а 'pauper'	бід-а
-ад-я	P	feminine	denom	пол-ад-я 'priest's wife'	піп
-ай ₁	P	agent	deverb	глит-ай 'rich peasant'	глит-а-ти
		attributive	denom	бород-ай 'bearded man'	бород-а
		"	deadj	корот-ай 'dumpy person'	корот-кий
-ай ₂	C	plant	denom	молоч-ай 'spurge'	молок-о
-ак ₁ (-як ₁)	P	agent	deverb	спів-ак 'singer'	спі-ва-ти
		"	"	во-як 'warrior'	во-юва-ти
		attributive	deadj	прост-ак 'simpleton'	прост-ий
-няк ₁		"	denom	бід-н-як 'pauper'	бід-а
		origin	denom	сибір-як 'Siberian'	Сибір
-ак ₂ (-як ₂)	An	animal	denom	гус-ак 'gander'	гус-и
		"	deadj	біл-як 'hare with white fur'	біл-ий

-ак ₃ (-як ₃)	C	object	deverb	літ-ак 'aeroplane'	літ-а-ти
		"	denom	вітр-як 'windmill'	вітер
		"	deverb	би-як 'beater'	би-ти
-няк ₃		plant	deadj	біл-як 'white mushroom'	біл-ий
-ак ₄ -чак ₄	D	"	denom	жит-н-як 'wheat-grass'	жит-о
-ак-а ₁	P	diminutive	denom	дуб-чак 'small young oak'	дуб
(-як-а ₁)		agent	deverb	пис-ак-а 'scribbler'	пис-а-ти
		occupation	"	гул-як-а 'idler'	гул-я-ти
		attributive	"	руб-ак-а 'swordsmen'	руб-а-ти
-ак-а ₂	Aug	augmentative	denom	нож-ак-а 'large knife'	ніж
(-ак-а ₂)		"	"	хвост-як-а 'large tail'	хвіст
-аль ₁	P	agent	deverb	ков-аль 'blacksmith'	к-ува-ти
-аль ₂	An	animal	denom	рог-аль 'horned ox'	ріг
-аль ₃	C	object	deverb	пищ-аль 'musket'	пищ-а-ти
-ан ₁	P	attributive	denom	пуз-ан 'big-bellied man'	пуз-о
-иган ₁		"	deadj	стар-иган 'old man'	стар-ий
-ан ₂	An	animal	denom	орл-ан 'sea eagle'	орел
-ан ₃	C	plant	denom	молок-ан 'prickly lettuce'	молок-о
-ан ₄	A	action	deverb	стус-ан 'punch'	стус-а-ти
-анин	P	origin	denom	міщ-анин 'petty bourgeois'	міст-о
(-янин)		"	"	єгипт-янин 'Egyptian'	Єгипет

-ань ₁	P	attributive	denom	горб-ань 'hunchback'	горб
-игань ₁		"	deadj	глух-ань 'deaf person'	глух-ий
-ань ₂	An	"	"	стар-игань 'old man'	стар-ий
		animal	denom	кудл-ань 'shaggy-haired dog'	кудл-а
-ар ₁	P	agent	deverb	лік-ар 'physician'	лік-ува-ти
(gen. -ар-я)		occupation	denom	кобз-ар 'minstrel'	кобз-а
		attributive	deadj	глух-ар 'deaf person'	глух-ий
-ар ₂	An	animal	deadj	глух-ар 'woodcock'	глух-ий
(gen. -ар-я)					
-ар ₃	C	object	denom	букв-ар 'primer'	букв-а
(gen. -ар-я)					
-ас	A	abstract	deverb	викрут-ас 'whirl'	викрут-и-ти
-ась	D	diminutive	denom	кум-ась 'little godfather'	кум
-ас-я	D	diminutive	denom	кум-ас-я 'little godmother'	кум-а
-атар	P	occupation	denom	плуг-атар 'ploughman'	плуг
-ах-а ₂	P	attributive	denom	бід-ах-а 'poor person'	бід-а
-олах-а ₁		"	"	бід-олах-а 'poor person'	бід-а
		agent	deverb	дб-ах-а 'assiduous career'	дб-а-ти
-ах-а ₂	Aug	augmentative	denom	риб-ах-а 'large fish'	риб-а
-ач ₁ (-яч ₁)	P	agent	deverb	чит-ач 'reader'	чит-а-ти
		"	"	сі-яч 'sower'	сі-я-ти
		"	"	розраховув-ач 'estimator'	розрахов-ува-ти
		attributive	denom	бород-ач 'bearded man'	бород-а

-ач ₂	An	animal	denom	por-ач 'stag-beetle'	pir
-ач ₃	C	"	deverb	сік-ач 'wild boar'	сік-ти
-ч ₃		agent	deverb	сік-ач 'cleaver'	сік-ти
		"	"	би-ч 'whip'	би-ти
		"	"	підкопув-ач 'digger'	підкоп-ува-ти
-аш ₁	P	occupation	denom	торг-аш 'haggler'	торг
-аш ₂	An	animal	deadj	сив-аш 'grey horse'	сив-ий
-аш-о	P	attributive	deadj	лед-ашо 'lazy person'	лед-ач-ий
-б-а	A	action	deverb	стріль-б-а 'shooting'	стріл-я-ти
-об-а		"	"	жал-об-а 'complaint'	жал-і-ти-ся
		abstract	deadj	зл-об-а 'malice'	зл-ий
-в-а	C	place	deverb	драг-в-а 'marsh'	драг-л-і-ти
-в-о	A	abstract	deverb	Різд-в-о 'Christmas'	род-и-ти
-г-а	A	abstract	deverb	нудь-г-а 'boredom'	нуд-и-ти
-д-а	A	abstract	deadj	прав-д-а 'truth'	прав-ий

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Prefixation in the Ukrainian Verbal System

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1.1 Prefixation in the Ukrainian verbal system is a productive and vital part of the process of word-formation. Its importance has been given due acknowledgment in the literature, where some attempt has been made to analyse verbal prefixes. The studies in the main are fragmented because of the restrictive approaches imposed on the analysis. The most common approaches are either semantic or derivational, both of which are important and interdependent. Very few studies attempt to synthesize the two approaches, which, in fact, complement each other. In this study I will attempt to synthesize the semantic, derivational, and grammatical properties of verbal prefixes in relation to prefixal aspectivization.

1.2 Prefixation is one of three possible affixational processes used in verbal derivation. Suffixation and simultaneous prefixation-suffixation fulfil functions similar to those of prefixation, but with the additional capacity to generate verbs from other word-classes. Prefixation on its own can generate only verbs from verbs. Despite this restriction, prefixation is more productive and widespread in verbs than it is in adjectives and nouns.

2.1 Over thirty prefixes are affixed to verbs in Ukrainian. But not all of them can be described as verbal, since, by definition, verbal prefixes generate verbs. Therefore a prefix that has been affixed in another word-class or in a foreign word before verbal formation must be considered, in the strictest sense, a non-verbal prefix. Examples of such prefixes are the nominal prefixes не-, без- and спів- and the foreign prefixes а- and анти-. This consideration restricts the number of prefixes affixed to verbs that can be defined as verbal.

2.2 A total of twenty-five verbal prefixes are used in the prefixational process of verbal derivation. Four of these are compound prefixes (попо-, недо-, зне-, обез-). Of the remaining twenty-one prefixes, five are foreign, two (воз-, пред-) represent Old Church Slavonic borrowings, and three (де-/дез-, дис-, ре-) are of Latin origin.

2.3 The remaining sixteen prefixes, on which this study focuses, are basic or simple Ukrainian verbal prefixes. As a group, these prefixes are more widespread, productive and versatile at the semantic and non-semantic levels than the nine prefixes mentioned above. The sixteen verbal prefixes are as follows: в-, ви-, від-, до-, з-, за-, на-, над-, о-, пере-, перед-, під-, по-, при-, про-, and роз-.

2.4 The numerous features of Ukrainian verbal prefixes add complexity to the task of isolating the role of any specific prefix in a derived verb. Every verbal prefix is capable of a number of functions. At the semantic level, most of the prefixes convey more than one meaning. At the non-semantic level, all prefixes can perfectivize a verb, but not all prefixes automatically generate a perfective partner. All sixteen prefixes can be used in the prefixational process generating verbs from verbs. A number of these prefixes play a part in the simultaneous prefixation-suffixation process that generates verbs from other word-classes as well as from verbs. A large number of prefixes also play a part in the generation of reflexive verbs. In both of the above processes, a given prefix may acquire a new lexical meaning. Generally speaking, a verbal prefix may be found in either a perfective or imperfective form in transitive, intransitive, or reflexive verbs.

3.1 At the synchronic level, the role of verbal prefixes can be isolated and analysed in prefixational or prefixation-suffixational processes, provided the parent stem still exists in Ukrainian. According to traditional analysis, prefixation can be established as the affixational process involved in the generation of a prefixed verb, if the derived prefixed verb minus the verbal prefix produces a verbal form that exists in Ukrainian, e.g., *пере/читати* < *читати*. If the omission of the prefix produces a non-existent form, then other derivational processes may have been involved. For example, *пере/читувати* minus the prefix produces *читувати*, which does not exist in Ukrainian. So it is clear that suffixation as well as prefixation has taken place, i.e., *пере/чит/ува/ти*.

3.2 At the synchronic level, the study of verbal prefixation involves the analysis of prefixes as independent, meaningful units of the verbal stem. At this level prefixes that cannot be defined as independent or meaningful or both are usually excluded from the study of prefixation and are more appropriately included in diachronic linguistics. This involves two types of visibly prefixed verbs, where either (a) the unprefixed form of the derived verb no longer exists in Ukrainian, and the independence of the prefix can be established only through etymological analysis, for example, *привикати* 'to become accustomed' and *одягати* 'to dress'; or (b) the unprefixed form exists in Ukrainian, but the semantic link between the unprefixed form and the prefixed form has been severed, for example, *бути* 'to be' — *за/бути* 'to forget,' *дати* 'to give' — *про/дати* 'to sell,' and *могти* 'to be able' — *пере/могти* 'to overcome.' Therefore there are

large numbers of prefixed verbs that are not worth analysing at the synchronic level.

4.1 Prefixation in Ukrainian verbs involves the affixation of a verbal prefix, of which there are sixteen basic forms and over twenty variants. Seven prefixes (ви-, за-, на-, пере-, перед-, при-, про-) have only one form. The remaining nine have one or more phonetic variants: в- (вви-, у-, уви-), від- (віді-, відо-, од-, оді-), до- (ді-), з- (із-, зі-, ізі-, зо-, с-, іс-), над- (наді-, надо-), о- (об-, обі-, обо-), під- (піді-, підо-), по- (пі-), роз- (рози-). Some also have stylistic and semantic variants.

4.2 Phonetic variants

There are two types of phonetic variants: fixed and mobile. Fixed phonetic variants of prefixes are the outcome of internal euphonic adaptation that has occurred during affixation. The addition (or substitution) of a vowel in the prefix usually precedes the initial *й* or group of consonants in the stem from which the prefixed verb has been derived. For example: *вви-*, *уви-*, *віді-*, *відо-*, *оді-*, *ді-*, *зі-*, *ізі-*, *наді-*, *надо-*, *обі-*, *обо-*, *піді-*, *підо-*, *пі-*, and *рози-*. The phonetic variants *с-*, *іс-*, and *з-* usually precede the voiceless consonants *к*, *п*, *т*, *х*, and *ф*. Only one prefix—*в*—has a mobile phonetic variant, namely, *у*, which occurs at the beginning of the prefixed verb. The alternation of *в* and *у* is a specifically Ukrainian euphonic rule that is dependent on the last grapheme of the preceding word. The *в* form is preceded by a vowel, e.g., *вона вкинула* (she threw into), *вона ввійшла* (she walked in). The *у* variant is preceded by a consonant, e.g., *він укинув* (he threw into), *він увійшов* (he walked in). In all phonetic variants there is no semantic distinction between the different phonetic forms.

4.3 Stylistic variants

There are certain variants that are merely stylistic variants of literary forms. They are usually vernacular or dialectal in nature, and may be expressed in colloquial speech or literary works. For example: *од/від*, *оді/віді*, *відо/віді*, *із/з*, *ізі/з*, *зо/зі*, *іс/с*, *надо/наді*, *обо/обі*, *підо/піді*. Not all examples are cited in dictionaries, where often only the literary forms are entered, so examples of these stylistic variants are insignificant in number.

4.4 Semantic variants

Only two prefixes (*в/у* and *о/об*) can convey semantic distinctiveness, and in such cases there is no phonetic alternation. The prefixes *в* (in) and *об* (around, with its phonetic variants *обі* and *обо*) usually convey a more physical, spatial notion than *у* and *о*, which are conceptually more abstract and are usually related to the notion of transformation in an object. When there is no semantic distinctiveness, the prefixes alternate with their phonetic variants because of euphonic considerations, as already discussed for *в* and *у*. The phonetic variant *об* is often used before vowels.

4.5 Despite the presence of euphonic rules for prefixes, numerous examples of prefixed verbs defy these rules, and phonetic variants are not applied where appropriate. Thus the euphonic rules given above for variants of prefixes are merely a basic guide and are not definitive in their distribution.

5.1 Verbal prefixes perform two vital functions, one at the semantic level, the other at the non-semantic level. The latter involves a change in the grammatical category of the verb, which must involve aspect. Henceforth, the non-semantic function will be called the grammatical function.

5.2 The semantic function of verbal prefixes expresses the maximum potential in the development of lexical meanings. A prefix can add a new lexical meaning to an unprefixed verb or merely add a new shade of meaning. Most of the sixteen verbal prefixes convey more than one meaning. To a certain degree the meaning of a prefix is dependent on the physical or abstract nature of the lexical content of the verb to which the prefix is affixed.

5.3 Most verbal prefixes are etymologically derived from prepositions. The link between prefix and preposition is exemplified by the use of corresponding prepositions in conjunction with certain prefixed verbs. For example:

- в/бігти в 'to run into'
- до/їхати до 'to drive or ride as far as'
- з/лізти з 'to climb off or down from'
- від/летіти від 'to fly away from'
- під/кинути під 'to throw under'
- на/клеїти на 'to glue on'

Like prepositions, prefixes can convey meanings in relation to space and time. The meanings of prefixes can be divided into three main categories: spatial, temporal, and quantitative. Most verbal prefixes convey a meaning from one or more of these categories and sometimes from two categories simultaneously.

5.3.1 The *spatial* category expresses an action (physical or abstract in nature) involving a direction in relation to a place or object. This category involves the largest number of prefixes and expresses the largest number of meanings. Some of the meanings are:

- | | |
|-------------|--|
| In to, to | [в-] влетіти 'to fly in(to)' |
| | [за-] зайти 'to walk or go into, drop in on' |
| Out (of) | [ви-] винести 'to carry out of' |
| To, up to | [до-] довести 'to lead to, result in' |
| | [під-] підійти 'to walk up to, approach' |
| | [при-] прибігти 'to run (up) to' |
| From, away, | |
| off | [від-] відплисти 'to swim away, sail off' |
| | [по-] піти 'to walk or go away' |

Away, apart	[роз-] розігнати 'to drive away, dispel'
Together	[з-] зліпити 'to paste together'
Up	[під-] підлетіти 'to fly up'
Down, off	[з-] злізти 'to crawl down or off of'
Under	[під-] підсунути 'to push under'
Back	[від-] віддати 'to give back'
On	[на-] наклеїти 'to glue on'
Through	[про-] пробити 'to break through'
Over,	
across	[пере-] перелізти 'to climb over or across'
Over,	
above	[над-] надбудувати 'to build over or above'
Around	[об-] обійти 'to walk around, circumvent'
Round trip	[с-] сходити 'to go and return'

5.3.2 The *temporal* category expresses an action in relation to time and involves about half of the verbal prefixes. Some of the meanings are:

Before	[перед-] передбачити 'to foresee'
Beginning	[за-] заплакати 'to start crying'
	[по-] побігти 'to start running'
End	[до-] допити 'to finish drinking'
	[від-] відробити 'to finish work or a task'
A short time	[по-] поспати 'to sleep a while'
A specific	
time	[про-] пролежати 'to lie (at rest) for some time'
	[ви-] вистояти 'to stand for some time'
	[пере-] пересидіти 'to remain sitting (for too long)'

5.3.3 The *quantitative* category describes an action and/or objects involved in terms of quantity (countable and uncountable) and intensity. Some of the meanings are:

A little	[під-] підлити 'to water a little, sprinkle'
	[при-] прикупити 'to buy (a little) more'
	[по-] погріти 'to warm (up) a little'
Supplemen-	
tary	[до-] досипати 'to fill (up)'
Enough,	
adequately	[на-] нагодувати 'to feed adequately'
	[у-/в-] уварити 'to boil through, cook thoroughly'
A lot	[на-] насушити 'to dry (much, many)'
A number of	
objects	[по-] поламати 'to break into pieces'

	[роз-] розламати 'to break into two pieces'
In sequence	[пере-] перестрілити 'to shoot all (one after another)'
Again, anew	[пере-] переробити 'to do again, remake'
Thoroughly, completely	[ви-] вибілити 'to bleach, whitewash, whiten'
	[про-] просмалити 'to singe thoroughly'
Excessively	[пере-] переварити 'to overboil, overcook'
	[об-] обгодувати 'to overfeed'

5.4 Depending on the nature of the verb, a prefix may simultaneously express two types of meaning; for example:

- побігти 1. 'to start running' (temporal)
2. 'to run off in some direction' (spatial)

In some cases, depending on the context, a verb may express any one of a number of meanings; for example:

- перечитати 1. 'to read over, through' (spatial)
2. 'to read again, reread' (quantitative)
3. 'to read many (e.g., books)' (quantitative)

5.5 The task of isolating the precise meaning of any given prefix is not easy, given the fact that each prefix has numerous meanings and belongs to different categories. The task is further complicated by the need to determine the role of the prefix at the grammatical level and its interaction at the semantic level.

6.1 The grammatical function of a verbal prefix is expressed by its ability to change the aspect of a verb. Prefixation may or may not change the aspect. However, this study will concentrate on prefixation and its role in aspectivization that involves all sixteen verbal prefixes.

6.2 According to traditional analysis, the first stage of prefixation (henceforth called *primary prefixation*) occurs when a verbal prefix is affixed to an unprefixed imperfective verb. Primary prefixation produces three combinations of functions at the semantic and grammatical levels.

- In the first combination, the grammatical function is active, while the semantic function has been neutralized. Henceforth this will be called *aspectual prefixation*.
- In the second combination, the grammatical and semantic functions are simultaneously active. Henceforth this will be called *lexical prefixation*.
- In the third combination, the semantic function is active, while the grammatical function has been neutralized. Henceforth this will be called *secondary imperfectivization*.

6.2.1 Primary prefixation produces two types of perfectives and thereby two different types of aspectual oppositions. The imperfective-perfective oppositions are either aspectual or lexical. The former (type 1) produces aspectual pairs, the latter (type 2) does not.

6.3 Aspectual Prefixation (Active Grammatical Function)

This category represents a maximum level for the grammatical function and a neutralization of the semantic function. Prefixation generates a perfective partner for the unprefixed imperfective if both forms produce lexical identity with aspectual distinctiveness. This perfectivizing process is traditionally distinguished from word-formation proper and considered as “form” formation, i.e., as the generation of a new verbal form rather than an independent new word.

6.3.1 No specific group of verbal prefixes is used exclusively to generate perfective partners. Neutralization of the lexical meaning is the sole criterion required to transform a given prefix into an aspectual (grammatical, neutral) prefix. For example:

- [по-] чорнити > почорнити ‘to blacken, make black’
- [з-] робити > зробити ‘to do, make’
- [с-] питати > спитати ‘to ask’
- [за-] програмувати > запрограмувати ‘to program’
- [на-] малювати > намалювати ‘to paint’
- [про-] читати > прочитати ‘to read’

6.3.2 The number of prefixes and prefixed perfective partners is substantially larger in grammar books than in dictionaries. For pedagogical purposes an unprefixed imperfective is often paired with a synonymous prefixed perfective, especially from the temporal category. Most textbooks cite, for example, читати and прочитати as aspectual pairs despite the existence of the derived secondary imperfective прочитувати. It appears that in many cases popular usage defies linguistic theory, and in many instances “popular” aspectual pairs, such as читати and прочитати, do express lexical identity in a given context.

6.3.3 Some linguists argue that perfectivizing prefixes cannot generate true aspectual partners and that only imperfectivizing suffixes perform this function without altering the lexical meaning. This may be claimed with some justification. In most cases prefixation adds either a new lexical meaning, or a modification (or even minor nuance) of meaning. Sometimes the nuance is more implicit than explicit, for example, прочитати ‘to read (through).’ However, no matter how subtle the nuance, there is a tendency to produce a derived imperfective partner, in which case the two prefixed forms are automatically paired and the unprefixed imperfective is retained in an *imperfectiva tantum* state. In its extreme form this process produces a list of duplicate or alternative examples of unprefixed and prefixed variants. Despite many considerations, verbs such as прочитати and прочитувати are listed in dictionaries as aspectual pairs. In the final analysis, the list of prefixed aspectual pairs far outnumbers the list of unprefixed/prefixed oppositions.

6.4 Lexical Prefixation (Active Semantic and Grammatical Functions)

This category represents simultaneous functions at the grammatical and semantic levels. The presence of the semantic function automatically prohibits the generation of a perfective partner. In fact, the very presence of the semantic function creates the potential for the derived verb to generate its own aspectual partner, namely, a secondary imperfective.

6.4.1 Any of the sixteen verbal prefixes (with their numerous meanings) can belong to this category. Linguists distinguish two roles that the prefix can perform. One role is considered to be genuinely lexical, in that the prefix introduces a new lexical element into the derived perfective and generates an independent word. The other role is considered to be sublexical, in that the prefix merely modifies the meaning of the derived perfective, generally with respect to time and intensity. For example, it expresses an action's duration, beginning, end, or result. This involves numerous prefixes with meanings related mostly to the temporal and, to some extent, the quantitative and spatial categories.

6.4.2 All of the examples below of the prefixed forms of the imperfective співати are perfective and have different meanings or nuances. Yet, they can all be classified as sublexical.

To begin singing—заспівати

To sing for a while—поспівати

To finish singing—відспівати or доспівати

In the final analysis, the sublexical category gives a specific classification to a given verb in addition to its different modified or restricted lexical meanings.

6.4.3 No specific prefixes are set aside for the sublexical category and the determination of the role of a given prefix is often arbitrary. Some dictionaries and grammar textbooks place sublexical verbs as perfective partners of the unprefixed imperfectives. Strictly speaking, this should not be done, because the sublexical prefix produces lexical distinctiveness, even if only to a small degree. On the other hand, the sublexical perfective is not considered to have a sufficiently independent lexical meaning to place it in a lexical category. In the final analysis, the sublexical category vacillates between the aspectual and lexical categories, producing a grey area on either side.

6.5 Secondary Imperfectivization (Active Semantic Function)

In contrast to the aspectual category, the lexical/sublexical category creates the greatest potential for imperfectivization. The derived perfective in its (primary) prefixed form can generate an imperfective partner. The grammatical function of the prefix is neutralized, leaving the prefix with only the semantic function, while the grammatical function of imperfectivization is taken over by suffixes.

6.5.1 This process of imperfectivization results in what is known as the secondary imperfective, which needs to be distinguished from the primary

imperfective. For pedagogical reasons, no distinction is made between these two types of imperfectives. In grammar books and vocabularies the imperfective form traditionally appears before its perfective partner.

6.6 Through the analysis of distinguishing features (e.g., prefix, suffix) of an aspectual pair, the grammatical marker of aspectivization can usually be established. For example:

(imperf.) варити > (perf.) зварити (=prefix) 'to boil, cook'

(imperf.) продавати < (perf.) продати (=suffix) 'to sell'

This type of analysis may suffice for pedagogical purposes, but only the study of derivational processes can reveal the order of aspectual derivation.

7.1 In traditional analysis it is accepted that the imperfective form marks the first stage in the process of aspectivization (henceforth called *primary imperfective*.) As a prerequisite for perfectivization through primary prefixation, the imperfective form needs to be an unprefixated verb. Exceptions to the rule are certain verbs that are no longer considered to be prefixed and are treated at the synchronic level as unprefixated verbs, for example, *с/пів/а/ти* 'to sing.' It should be noted that a large number of primary imperfectives do not produce perfective partners (e.g., *спати* 'to sleep'), and in turn prefixation produces a *perfectiva tantum* form (e.g., *поспати* 'to sleep for a while').

7.2 The second stage in the process of aspectivization is the generation of a perfective partner (henceforth called *primary perfective*.) In the strictest sense, the perfectivizing agent (be it a prefix, suffix, etc.) must not produce any shift in the lexical meaning of the derived form. Aspectual distinctiveness expresses only the incomplete, unaccomplished action of the imperfective and the completed, accomplished action of the perfective. Only the aspectual category of primary prefixation produces perfective partners for primary imperfectives, for example, *казати* > *сказати* 'to tell, say.'

7.3 The third stage in the process of aspectivization is the generation of an imperfective partner (*secondary imperfective*) for the derived prefixed perfective. This is usually accomplished through imperfectivizing suffixes. The role of the prefix in the secondary imperfective is the opposite to its role in the primary perfective. The prefix functions only at the semantic level in the secondary imperfective, (and only at the grammatical level in the primary perfective) because the imperfectivizing suffix has taken over the grammatical function.

7.3.1 The most productive category in generating secondary imperfectives is lexical prefixation. The more independent a derived prefixed perfective is in its lexical meaning, the greater is the likelihood that it will generate a secondary imperfective. In some cases the sublexical category produces secondary imperfectives—also through imperfectivizing suffixes. The derivational pattern for secondary imperfectives may be illustrated as follows:

лити 'to pour' > [в-] влити > вливати 'to pour in'
 клеїти 'to glue' > [ви-] виклеїти > виклеювати 'to glue all, completely'
 працювати 'to work' > [від-] відпрацювати > відпрацьовувати 'to clear a debt by working'
 варити 'to cook' > [до-] доварити > доварювати 'to cook enough, to finish cooking'
 різати 'to cut' > [з-] зрізати > зрізувати 'to cut off, away'
 співати 'to sing' > [за-] заспівати > заспівувати 'to begin singing'
 мазати 'to anoint, grease' > [на-] намазати > намазувати 'to anoint, grease thoroughly'
 довбати 'to hollow' > [над-] наддовбати > наддовбувати 'to hollow out a little'
 мити 'to wash' > [об-] обмити > обмивати 'to wash all over'
 дати 'to give' > [пере-] передати > передавати 'to give, hand over, pass on'
 бачити 'to see' > [перед-] передбачити > передбачати 'to foresee'
 копати 'to dig' > [під-] підкопати > підкопувати 'to dig under'
 вчити 'to teach' > [по-] повчити > повчати 'to preach'
 шити 'to sew' > [при-] пришити > пришивати 'to sew onto'
 говорити 'to speak' > [про-] проговорити > проговорювати 'to speak for some time'
 бити 'to hit' > [роз-] розбити > розбивати 'to break, smash'

7.3.2 As a rule, the aspectual category does not produce secondary imperfectives. In fact, it has no need to generate an aspectual partner when it already has one. There are, however, exceptions. For example: ріднити > зріднити > зріднювати 'to bring together, make kindred' and путати > спутати > спутувати 'to fetter, immobilize.' In such cases the primary perfective and secondary imperfective are often the outcome of one of the meanings of the polysemous primary imperfective.

7.4 There is a fourth stage in the process of aspectivization, when a perfective form is derived from the secondary imperfective. This process, however, belongs to secondary prefixation, which involves the prefixation of prefixed verbs.

7.5 In the final analysis, aspectual pairs are the outcome of two different processes:

- a. Unprefixed primary imperfective > prefixed (grammatical) primary perfective.
- b. Prefixed (lexical/sublexical) perfective > secondary imperfective.

7.6 In relation to derivational processes and aspectivization, the role of the verbal prefix can be summarized as in the following table, where + = active, – = inactive, and 0 = absent.

	Pre- prefixation	Primary prefixation		Post- prefixation
Perfectivization	0	Type 1	Type 2	0
Aspect	Primary Imper- fective	Primary Perfective	Derived Perfective	Secondary Imperfective
Aspect / stage	1	2	2	3
Semantic func- tion	0	–	+	+
Grammatical function	0	+	+	–
Prefixational category	0	Aspectual	Lexical/ sublexical	Lexical/ sublexical
	Aspectual Pair		Aspectual Pair	

7.7 The imperfectives писати, сидіти, and біліти express potential maximum to minimum levels in the distribution of prefixes and functions. They have the following characteristics.

7.7.1 The prefix перед- (the least productive of all verbal prefixes) is the only prefix omitted in any derived form of писати.

7.7.2 The imperfective сидіти 'to sit' has no perfective partner and joins with only half as many prefixes for derived perfectives and imperfectives as писати does.

7.7.3 The intransitive verb біліти 'to become white' has two perfective partners generated by two different meanings in the imperfective. Approximately the same number of prefixes are used in the derived perfectives as in сидіти, but they do not generate any secondary imperfectives. (By contrast, the transitive verb білити 'to whiten, bleach' is more productive in the number of derived perfectives and secondary imperfectives.)

7.8.1 Писати 'to write' and its derivatives provide the following illustration of the distribution of prefixes.

Primary Prefixation Type 1.

Primary imperfective: писати 'to write'

Primary perfective: написати 'to write'

Primary Prefixation Type 2.

Primary imperfective: писати 'to write'

Derived perfective > Secondary imperfective

вписати	вписувати 'to insert in writing'
виписати	виписувати 'to write / copy out, order / discharge in writing'
відписати	відписувати 'to copy in writing, write back (a letter), bequeath'
дописати	дописувати 'to finish writing, add in writing'
записати	записувати 'to write in / down, note down'
надписати	надписувати 'to inscribe, superscribe, write over (something)'
описати	описувати 'to describe'
обписати	обписувати 'to cover all over with writing, vilify in writing'
переписати	переписувати 'to rewrite, copy in writing'
підписати	підписувати 'to sign'
пописати	пописувати 'to write down a lot / all over / for some time'
приписати	приписувати 'to add in writing, prescribe, ascribe'
прописати	прописувати 'to write down in a letter, register someone's domicile'
розписати	розписувати 'to copy / apportion / embellish in writing, adorn with painted designs, sketch out'
списати	списувати 'to copy / plagiarize / use up / enumerate in writing, register as obsolete'

7.8.2 The derivatives of сидіти may be shown as follows.

Primary Prefixation Type 1.

Primary imperfective: сидіти 'to sit'

Primary perfective: non-existent

Primary Prefixation Type 2.

Primary imperfective: сидіти 'to sit'

Derived perfective > Secondary imperfective

висидіти	висиджувати 'to remain seated for a longtime, incubate by sitting'
відсидіти	відсиджувати 'to remain seated for a long time to the point of numbness, serve a sentence of incarceration'
досидіти	досиджувати 'to sit for up to a certain time'
засидіти	засиджувати 'to remain seated for a long time to the point of numbness'

пересидіти	пересиджувати 'to remain seated for too long / longer than necessary, sit out, outsit'
посидіти	non-existent 'to sit for a while'
просидіти	просиджувати 'to spend a certain time sitting, waste time in just sitting'

7.8.3 Біліти has the following derivatives.

Primary Prefixation Type 1.

Primary imperfective: біліти 'to become white, pale'

Primary perfective: 1. збіліти 'to become white'
2. побіліти 'to go grey, turn white, become bleached'

Primary Prefixation Type 2.

Primary imperfective: біліти 'to become white, pale'

Derived perfective > Secondary imperfective

відбіліти non-existent 'to stop / finish being white'

забіліти non-existent 'to start becoming white'

8.1 Primary imperfectives that have two forms, indeterminate and determinate, follow a different pattern in aspectual derivation. First, neither of the imperfective forms produces a perfective partner, although in grammar books the prefixed determinate form is often cited as the perfective partner; e.g., *йти*—*піти*, *бігти*—*побігти*. Secondly, the stems of the imperfective determinate and the corresponding nondeterminate are used for perfective and imperfective derivation respectively. In most cases they produce aspectual pairs. The exceptions are a few derived forms that remain without a partner.

8.2 The following example of *їхати/їздити* provides a model for derivational processes of other determinate and nondeterminate imperfectives.

Primary Prefixation Type 2.

Primary imperfective:

Determinate	Indeterminate
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їхати	їздити 'to ride / travel / drive'
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Derived perfective > Secondary imperfective

в'їхати	в'їжджати / в'їздити 'to ride / drive in (to), enter (by vehicle)'
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виїхати	виїжджати / виїздити 'to ride / drive out of'
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від'їхати	від'їжджати / від'їздити 'to ride / drive away from, leave (by vehicle)'
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доїхати	доїжджати / доїздити 'to ride / drive to, reach (by vehicle)'
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з'їхати	з'їжджати / з'їздити 'to ride / drive down (off)'
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заїхати	заїжджати / заїздити 'to ride / drive in, drop in (by vehicle)'
наїхати	наїжджати / наїздити 'to ride / drive (unexpectedly) into (something), arrive (many times or in large numbers)'
над'їхати	над'їжджати / над'їздити 'to ride / drive up, arrive (by vehicle)'
об'їхати	об'їжджати / об'їздити 'to ride / drive around (something), circumvent (by vehicle)'
переїхати	переїжджати / переїздити 'to ride / drive over or across, run over something'
під'їхати	під'їжджати / під'їздити 'to ride / drive up to (something)'
поїхати	non-existent 'to leave / set out (by vehicle) in some direction'
приїхати	приїжджати / приїздити 'to arrive (by vehicle)'
проїхати	проїжджати / проїздити 'to ride / drive through, cover a (certain) distance (by vehicle)'
роз'їхати	non-existent 'to run over, crush (by vehicle)'
non-existent	роз'їжджати / роз'їздити 'to ride / drive everywhere / around'

8.2.1 The following prefixed perfectives (*perfectiva tantum*) are derived from the imperfective indeterminate form.

з'їздити	'to ride / drive to and from somewhere (round trip)'
поїздити	'to ride / drive for a while'
переїздити	'to ride / drive all around, a lot'

9.1 There is a large number of Ukrainian verbs whose aspect does not change through prefixation. The processes involved are slightly different from perfectivizing prefixation, although certain categories at the semantic level still apply. One group of verbs is nevertheless worth mentioning.

9.2 Aspectual partners (at the primary level) that are the result of a derivational process other than prefixation use the respective stems for prefixation. For example: *сідати* < *сісти* 'to sit down' provide the stems for the prefixed derived imperfective and perfective pairs. This can be shown as follows.

Imperfective < Perfective

в/сідати	в/сісти 'to sit / settle down in something'
ви/сідати	ви/сісти 'to get out of / down off (a vehicle)'
від/сідати	від/сісти 'to sit aside / away (from someone)'
за/сідати	за/сісти 'to take a seat for a long time'
на/сідати	на/сісти 'to sit down upon (in large numbers)'

над/сідати	над/сісти 'to settle down gradually under one's own weight'
о/сідати	о/сісти 'to settle down from above / under pressure, cover over'
пере/сідати	пере/сісти 'to change seats / places, transfer (vehicles)'
по/сідати	по/сісти 'to sit down (i.e., of many), occupy'
при/сідати	при/сісти 'to squat, crouch, curtsy, rest while sitting, sit on or near something / somebody for a spell'
про/сідати	про/сісти 'while settling, to crack / descend / collapse / bend down'

Aspectivizational processes such as these must not be confused with the aspectivizational process as summarized in the table provided. Prefixation that interacts at a semantic or grammatical level has its own distinct features and processes.

10.1 In defining the role and meaning of a verbal prefix there are further observations to be made.

a. Primary imperfectives with more than one meaning may or may not produce perfectives (aspectual or lexical) for each of the meanings.

b. Various meanings of primary imperfectives may be perfectivized by different prefixes. For example:

1. рвати > порвати 'to tear'

2. рвати > зірвати 'to pluck'

c. Certain prefixed perfectives may express two different meanings of the same prefix.

For example: заговорити 'to start speaking'

заговорити 'to tire out (somebody) by talking'

d. A prefixed perfective may be homonymous with another verb.

For example:

1. доспівати (perf.), доспівувати (imperf.) 'to finish singing (to the end)'

2. доспівати (imperf.), доспіти (perf.) 'to ripen completely, finish ripening'

e. One of the numerous meanings of a prefix may be synonymous with one of the meanings of another prefix.

10.2 There are two approaches to the analysis of the role and meaning of a prefix. The derivational approach concentrates on the formation and sequence of derived forms (including aspectivization), and the categorization of processes sometimes takes precedence over the distinguishing semantic features. The semantic approach, on the other hand, concentrates on the numerous meanings

and often disregards derivation and the sequence of processes, especially in the case of aspectivization. In the final analysis, whatever approach (individual or combined) is used to define the role and meaning of a prefix in a derived verb, the determining factor is ultimately a question of semantics.

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Ukrainian “External Affairs” in Australia, 1966–95: Coming out of the “Ghetto”

Michael L. Lawriwsky

At the 1988 conference of the Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organizations (AFUO) on “Russian Imperialism and the Soviet Union” held at Melbourne’s Regent Hotel, I heard a first-generation Ukrainian immigrant woman say, “It is about time we emerged from the ghetto.” I had never thought of Ukrainian Australians as living in a ghetto, since there is no physical concentration of the community in any Australian city that might be regarded as a ghetto in the medieval sense of the word.

With Robert Conquest as the keynote speaker, attendance by parliamentarians, government bureaucrats, more than thirty Australian and overseas academics, and over 230 representatives of numerous Australian community, media, church, and ethnic groups, the 1988 AFUO conference was, at the time, probably the most visible “coming out” of the community.¹ But it was by no means the first time that the community had emerged from the psychological Ukrainian “ghetto.”

The Ukrainian immigrants who arrived in Australia during the years 1948–52 did not know what to expect when they arrived; few had any experience of living in the diaspora. There was no organized Ukrainian community life in Australia at that time, and an isolated Sydney veterinarian, Dr. Stepan Barchynsky, who had migrated there some time before World War II, warned the new arrivals that Ukrainian organizations would not be tolerated in this country.² Unperturbed by

1 “Robert Conquest Addresses Melbourne Ukrainian Conference,” *News Weekly*, 29 June 1988, 3.

2 Michael L. Lawriwsky, “Ukrainians,” in *The Australian People: An Encyclopedia of the Nation, Its People and Their Origins*, ed. James Jupp (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1988), 825–30.

such pessimism, and with exceptional energy, the Ukrainian pioneers set about creating a community structure.

Sociological studies of migrant settlers in the La Trobe Valley³ and Adelaide⁴ rated Ukrainians as the group least likely to assimilate, because they had developed highly structured community organizations and close kinship groups. Furthermore, they were motivated by a self-perception as political émigrés. This resulted in a paradoxical situation in which the community could remain internally strong if it stayed within its “ghetto,” but could only hope to influence the Australian government and public opinion to support an independent Ukraine if it came out of the ghetto, investing heavily in public relations, or “external affairs,” as they were known. Nonetheless, Australian writers have expressed the view that the community had some success in generating publicity and public sympathy for its cause in the years prior to Ukrainian independence.

This paper proposes that the Ukrainian community chose internal strength over “external affairs” by an overwhelming vote of community dollars. In some ways, the dilemma was similar to that which the community faces today—having to choose whether to give priority to its own maintenance and survival, or to the provision of assistance for Ukraine in its early, critical years of independence.

The 1950s and 1960s: The Prelude

The Ukrainian community of the 1950s was a hive of activity, not least in the area of “external affairs”—which to many newly arrived migrants had the connotation of diplomatic relations with a foreign country (i.e., Australia). Like the community from which he came, the external-affairs director of the Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organizations, Oleksander Prestashevsky, was remarkably energetic. A lawyer by training, he had to content himself with being a law clerk for a Collins Street law firm in Melbourne. His community efforts must have provided an outlet for talents that, no doubt, far exceeded the requirements of his employment.

For a brief period during the 1950s, an English-language community newspaper, *The Flag*, was published in Adelaide under the editorship of Iaroslav Lohyn; it received some financial assistance from the AFUO. The 1956 Olympics focused world attention on Melbourne and provided significant opportunities for activities promoting Ukrainian culture and drawing attention to the subjugated status of Ukraine within the USSR. But the AFUO was not satisfied with restricting its activities to Australia: its 1956–7 annual report states that twenty-four pounds, sixteen shillings, and one penny were spent on activities

3 Jerzy Zubrzycki, *Settlers of the La Trobe Valley: A Sociological Study of Immigrants in the Brown Coal Industry in Australia* (Canberra: Australian National University Press (1964).

4 Jean Martin, *Refugee Settlers: A Study of Displaced Persons in Australia* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1965).

protesting against the visit of the Soviet leaders Bulganin and Khrushchev to London.⁵ (This was equivalent to the entire AFUO contribution to *The Flag's* budget.)

After much negotiating between the Ukrainian émigré political parties and the community centres (*hromady*), an "Information Centre" was established; Dr. Taras Jaskewych was appointed its executive secretary. As anti-Communist conservatives, the Australian Liberal party was seen as a natural ally, as was the Democratic Labor party (DLP), on whose executive Jaskewych served from 1957 to the 1970s. Mr. Prestashevsky joined the Liberal party and became a member of the Sunshine branch's executive committee. Since this branch lay within a "blue ribbon" Labor electorate, Prestashevsky would never be burdened by the prospect of some influence over a sitting member. Nevertheless, he could galvanize votes for the Senate and drew upon his contacts within the party to organize such functions as a "Liberal Party Evening for Ukrainians," which was attended by fifteen senators and members of Parliament, including Sen. John Gorton, a future prime minister.

In the AFUO's 1959 annual report, Prestashevsky set out his "mission statement": "(1) to defend the interests of 'Australians of Ukrainian origin'; (2) to inform the Australian public about the Ukrainian nation's struggle for independence; and (3) to fight Communism as the enemy of the Ukrainian people." But a degree of frustration was already evident in the major problems facing "external affairs." As Prestashevsky saw them, these problems were: "(1) forced rapid assimilation; (2) intelligent Australians are not educated about Ukraine; (3) the Australian press is totally closed to us; (4) the community lacks professionals; and (5) a lack of funds."⁶ A similar set of problems was later identified by Roman Pavlyshyn, who added that there was a need for a central and authoritative organization that could co-ordinate such efforts.⁷

Perhaps surprisingly for the time, in 1961 Sen. Frank P. McManus of the DLP, which had recently split from the Australian Labor party (ALP) over Communist influence in the trade unions, raised in the Senate the issue of Australia establishing diplomatic relations with Soviet Ukraine. At the very least, such a matter could have made Ukraine and "the Ukrainian question" an issue of Australian politics, just as the Labor government's *de jure* recognition of the Soviet annexation of the Baltic states made Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia a public issue twelve years later. Yet, Prestashevsky and the AFUO leadership

5 *Zvit Soiuzu ukrainskykh orhanizatsii Avstralii za 1956–1957 roky* (1957).

6 *Soiuz ukrainskykh orhanizatsii Avstralii: Zvit diialnosti za 1958–1959 roky* (1959).

7 Roman Pavlyshyn, "Vidnoshennia do avstraliiskoho seredovyshcha v svitli suchasnoho i mynuloho," in *Ukraintsi v Avstralii: Materialy do istorii poselennia ukrainsiv v Avstralii* (Melbourne: Soiuz ukrainskykh orhanizatsii Avstralii, 1966), 282–90.

were so horrified by the prospect of official recognition of Soviet Ukraine that a special effort was made to lobby Sen. Gorton to stop this initiative at all costs.

It did not take long for the Ukrainian migrants to discover that, in the cold-war climate of the times, Ukraine was considered completely expendable by most Western politicians. Thus, in 1963 the AFUO found it necessary to lodge a memorandum of protest at the United States embassy in Canberra regarding US Secretary of State Dean Rusk's comment that "Ukraine has traditionally been part of the Soviet Union." While anti-Communism was the order of the day, protests against Soviet/Russian imperialism were often seen not to be politically correct. Prestashevsky resigned his Liberal party membership in 1964 in protest over what he interpreted as the government's non-recognition of the AFUO—manifested in particular by not inviting the AFUO to participate in the government's annual citizenship conferences in Canberra. He also resigned from the AFUO executive and soon afterwards left for Papua New Guinea, where he obtained a position in the administration.

Prestashevsky's successor, Wasyl Lytwyn, reported the 1964 Canberra concert commemorating the 150th anniversary of Taras Shevchenko's birth as an unqualified success. Distinguished guests included the Italian and French ambassadors and the Indian high commissioner. But this was negated by another matter of more substance. Lytwyn wrote to the interior minister for permission to build a monument to Shevchenko in Canberra (as had been done in Winnipeg and Washington). He received no official response, but was told by the Prime Minister's Department that the request would be viewed negatively.

In the 1960s Ukraine's cultural elite experienced a "rebirth." Soon, however, many of Ukraine's younger, activist poets, writers, and critics were repressed or intimidated by the Soviet regime, as were the more overtly political dissidents in the second half of the decade. Because the oppression of these individuals had been ignored by the Australian media, in 1968 the AFUO published a sixty-page booklet containing articles on the incarceration of V'iacheslav Chornovil, Iurii Shukhevych, Ivan Dziuba, and other Ukrainian dissidents that had appeared in British and North American newspapers.⁸

The 1970s: A Decade of Dissent

In 1972 a "general pogrom" in Ukraine saw the arrest of hundreds of Ukrainian intellectuals and human-rights activists. This so incensed the Ukrainian community in Australia that numerous demonstrations were organized throughout the decade. They were held regularly each year on 10 December, the anniversary of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. Every touring cultural

⁸ *Human Courage and Dignity: World Press on Current Events in Ukraine* (Melbourne: Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organizations, 1968).

ensemble or sporting team from the USSR was greeted with mandatory protests, during which anti-Soviet leaflets were distributed to patrons and passers-by.⁹ While some Soviet-flag burning and theatrics were often a feature of such demonstrations, they were generally peaceful. Only one arrest was ever made, when a hedge in front of the Soviet embassy in Canberra was burned by some students.

The demonstrations created some tensions within the community. The strategy of using them was clearly supported by the "Revolutionary" Bandera wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and, as a consequence, by aligned organizations such as the League for the Liberation of Ukraine (LVU) and Ukrainian Youth Association (SUM). Other Ukrainian political groups and the Ukrainian scouting organization, Plast, were divided on the efficacy of such demonstrations, which often received limited media coverage and did not appear to result in any tangible actions on the part of the Australian government.

In the meantime disenchantment had grown among university-educated youth, many of whom had moved politically decidedly to the left of their parents. A most articulate expression of this viewpoint was published in *Student*, the organ of the Ukrainian Canadian University Students' Union. It attacked what was seen as the "anti-intellectual, intolerant, hypocritical and primitive émigré establishment" for being "on the side of reaction in every case except the Ukraine," and denounced its "failure to raise the Ukrainian struggle at an international level."¹⁰ Ukrainian student groups at some Australian universities were deeply divided on this issue, and spent hours debating whether they should participate in demonstrations in defence of Ukrainian political prisoners and in political activism. As a rule, the students who advocated such participation remained activists within the community, and many contributed to "external affairs" during the 1970s and 1980s. It is also fair to say that the "activists" often played a greater role in broader Australian politics than did the "pacifists."

The next stage of dissident political activism in Ukraine had as its focus the establishment of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group (UHG) in November 1976. On 5 February 1977, just months after its formation, the group's leader—the writer Mykola Rudenko—and a co-founding member, Oleksii Tykhy, were arrested for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." By November 1980 the KGB had an impressive scorecard: of the UHG's thirty-seven members, twenty-five had been imprisoned, two had been exiled to Siberia, six had been banished to the West, one had been incarcerated in a psychiatric hospital, and one, hounded by the KGB, had taken his own life.

9 See Geoff de Luca, "The Red Flag Goes Up in Flames: Security Boost on Russian Dancers," *The News*, 18 October 1979.

10 M. Vynnychuk [Myroslav Shkandrij], "The Decay of a Tradition: Emigré Nationalism and Today's Youth," *Student* (Toronto), no. 28 (1974).

In 1977 the Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence was lobbied by Jewish groups to prepare a report on the status of Soviet Jewry. Jewish youth groups also organized demonstrations in defence of their brethren within the USSR, furnishing an example of how a community's "external affairs" could be conducted so as to make a community concern an Australian political issue. In a stroke of luck for the Ukrainian cause, some parliamentarians, in particular the Labor MP Ralph Jacobi, felt that the terms of reference of the report should be widened to incorporate all human rights issues within the USSR.¹¹

It was also fortunate that the Ukrainian dissident Leonid Pliushch had recently been expelled from the Soviet Union and could provide authoritative testimony before the committee. He was brought to Australia by the Committee for the Defence of Human and National Rights in Ukraine, chaired by Myroslaw Boluch. Melbourne's Ukrainian Catholic bishop, Ivan Prasko, also gave evidence on religious persecution. Pliushch relayed to the committee how use of the Ukrainian language in academic institutions was regarded as "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism," and how in 1977 and 1978 alone, eight Ukrainian scientific journals were converted into Russian-language publications. While describing himself as a "communist with a human face," Pliushch expressed his firm conviction that "the attainment of human rights in Ukraine would be possible only on the basis of national self-determination and the abolition of the imperial structure of the Soviet state." This was a powerful statement in support of Ukrainian statehood, and was reprinted at length in Australia's leading conservative magazine.¹²

The 1980s: The Soviet Union in Decline

"We Want Yuri Shukhevych in Australia." During the early 1980s a very successful campaign was pursued by the Sydney-based "We Want Yuri Shukhevych in Australia" Committee. Shukhevych had joined the Ukrainian Helsinki Group while in prison. He was one of the longest-serving prisoners in the Gulag, having been arrested at the age of fourteen. The campaign involved an Australian connection: Shukhevych's cousin was Dr. Stephanie Stokon, a resident of Sydney who was willing to sponsor him as a migrant to Australia. The AFUO was located in Sydney at the time, and its "external affairs" portfolio was directed by George Mencinsky.

The campaign was sustained over several years. It included demonstrations at the Soviet embassy in Canberra, at the Soviet consulate in Sydney, and in Melbourne; questions in Parliament; a "Yuri Shukhevych freedom run"; hunger

11 "Labor's USSR Policy: Interview with Ralph Jacobi, MP," *Australian Ukrainian Review*, Spring 1983: 6-8.

12 *Quadrant* (Melbourne), 1978, no. 8 (133): 4-11.

strikes at the USSR Trade Centre; and a petition by Australian academics. On 18 September 1980 Valentyn Moroz, a Ukrainian dissident who had just been released, raised the Shukhevych case during his meeting with the Australian foreign minister, Andrew Peacock.

As a consequence of this activism, Shukhevych's case achieved a considerable "recognition factor" among Australians,¹³ and in 1982 the minister for foreign affairs, Tony Street, instructed the Australian embassy in Moscow to inquire about the state of Shukhevych's health.¹⁴ The Fraser government also offered Shukhevych an entry visa to Australia. While all the effort did not result in his early release, it did raise awareness among Australian politicians, opinion-makers, and the general public concerning not only Shukhevych, but also the plight of hundreds of dissidents, and the Ukrainian population as a whole, under Soviet tyranny. It also put the Soviet authorities on notice that a Western democracy was monitoring the treatment of a specific human-rights activist.

Ukrainian Issues Raised in the Australian Parliament. The Shukhevych campaign signalled a watershed in relations between the Ukrainian-Australian community and the government and Parliament. Ukrainian issues began to be raised in Parliament (often by Labor members, such as Jacobi and Dr. Dick Klugman, in questions to Liberal ministers), and this process was greatly assisted by the physical presence of recently-released Ukrainian political prisoners. This period coincided with the coming to power of the Hawke Labor government, which, with a few notable exceptions on its back-bench, could never be accused of being pro-Ukrainian. It also coincided with the 1984 move of the AFUO executive to Melbourne, where I became its director of public affairs.

The Labor foreign minister, Bill Hayden, opened the account for the new government. In a question on notice, the Liberal member for Curtin, Allan C. Rocher, asked the minister whether Australia's representatives at the UN would be asked to call for "recognition of the colonial status of the Ukraine within the Soviet Russian empire." In his reply Hayden rejected the term "colonial status" as applicable to Ukraine; he added, however, that this did not mean that the government condoned "repressive actions of the Soviet authorities towards assertions of nationalist identity in the Soviet Union," and that the government recognized that "Ukrainian dissidents have suffered particularly severely."¹⁵

On 25 August 1983 Sen. Brian Harradine (Independent, Tasmania) presented a motion "That the Senate requests the Australian Government to convey to the

13 "Khochemo maty Iuriia Shukhevycha v Avstralii," *Tserkva i zhyttia* (Melbourne), 11–18 April 1982.

14 George Mencinsky, "Moscow's 'Nyet' to Australian Embassy Plea," *Australian Ukrainian Review* 1, no. 1 (Spring 1982): 1–2.

15 Andrew Pyrcz, "Ukraine's Colonial Status: A Question in Parliament," *Australian Ukrainian Review*, Spring 1983: 4–5.

Government of the USSR its deep concern at the repeated harassment of the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords.” Shortly afterwards an exiled UHG member, Nina Strokata, arrived in Australia and raised Shukhevych’s situation with the new Labor foreign affairs minister. At a press conference in Parliament House she was joined by Sen. Harradine, Dick Klugman (Labor, New South Wales), and Rod Lawry, chief of the East European Affairs branch of the Department of Foreign Affairs.¹⁶

In 1983 Sen. Alan Missen (Liberal, Victoria), chairman of the Parliamentary Amnesty Group, raised the issue of the 1932–3 Ukrainian famine in a lengthy speech in the Senate during the adjournment debate on 1 November. Missen was one of six Liberal and National Party parliamentarians who joined the “Austrian Honorary Committee Commemorating the Ukrainian Famine Holocaust.” Not a single Labor MP joined, and Sen. Olive Zahkarov (Labor, Victoria) went to the trouble of informing the community in writing that such a commemoration was “irrelevant to Australians.” By contrast, Sen. Missen argued in the Senate that Australian parliamentarians were obliged to commemorate Stalin’s genocidal decimation of Ukraine and to “bring it to the notice of the world as best we can ... because at present there is a continuing suffering of the Ukrainian people.”¹⁷

During 1984 a film made in the USSR by the Australian Film Commission (AFC), *The Human Face of Russia*, was broadcast on commercial television and was greeted with a wave of protest from Ukrainian community groups around Australia. The program bristled with historical inaccuracies about Ukraine and generally presented a rosy picture of the life of the average Soviet citizen. Once again, on 1 April 1984, Sen. Missen rose in parliament in defence of the Ukrainian cause with a question to the minister for home affairs and the environment, Barry Cohen: “Is the Minister aware that this Australian production contains monstrous distortions of the true position by confusing Ukrainian and Russian cultures, and giving false information about collectivization and the Moscow-induced famine under which at least seven million Ukrainians died of starvation ...? Will the Minister take action to ensure that this propaganda exercise is not distributed abroad to the shame and disgrace of Australian citizens?” The issue ballooned with the publication of a number of newspaper articles and no fewer than twenty-five letters to newspaper editors that debated whether the suppression of an inaccurate film constituted unwarranted censorship. To resolve the issue, the AFC considered holding an independent inquiry headed by a retired judge, but the inquiry was thwarted by the threat of industrial action from the Actors’ Union.¹⁸

16 “Nina Strokata-Karavanska,” *Australian Ukrainian Review*, Summer 1983: 5–10.

17 “Senator Missen Highlights Ukrainian Predicament,” *Australian Ukrainian Review*, Summer 1983: 4. A large extract from this speech was published in *The Ukrainian Weekly* (Jersey City, N.J.).

18 See Lyndall Crisp, “Film Commission Bows to Ukraine Protests,” *The National Times*, 15–21

The issue of Ukraine's colonial status re-emerged on 26 February 1985, when Sen. Gareth Evans (Labor), then the minister assisting the minister for foreign affairs, responded that a question from Sen. David Hamer (Liberal, Victoria) was simply "Captive Nations rhetoric."¹⁹ After receiving hundreds of letters from irate Australians of Ukrainian origin sent as part of a campaign organized by the AFUO, Evans expressed regret in a letter explaining that his remark was "in no way intended to downplay the suffering of the Ukrainian people of which [he was] acutely aware" and that the word "rhetoric" was used "to describe Sen. Hamer's style of delivery rather than the substance of the issue he was raising."²⁰

Another altercation between the government and the Ukrainian community arose out of the new Australia-USSR cultural agreement that was signed on 19 December 1984. Once again, Sen. Missen put a number of questions to Sen. Evans, who represented Minister Hayden in the Senate. In these questions concern was expressed at the Russocentric nature of the agreement and the fact that Australians with non-Russian roots and cultural links to countries occupied by the USSR were ignored in the whole process. Dr. Marko Pavlyshyn, a lecturer in Ukrainian at Monash University, was quoted as saying that "aside from the total concentration on the study of Russian, few Australian scholars would put up with 'the extreme, almost grotesque' degree of control required if they visited the Soviet Union under the program."²¹

After the lodgement of a 1985 report by the Melbourne-based Committee for the Defence of National and Human Rights in Ukraine, Minister Hayden did instruct the Australian embassy in Moscow to "report on what is known about conditions in Camp 36-1," where several Ukrainian political prisoners, including the poet and Helsinki accords monitor Vasyl Stus, had died.

In November 1987 the AFUO prepared a detailed submission to the prime minister, Robert J. Hawke, on the occasion of his visit to the Soviet Union. These requests provide an overview of issues that were seen to be important at the time:

- recognition of the Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches;
- the closure of Perm Camp 36-1, which had claimed the lives of Helsinki accords monitors;
- the establishment of an Australian consulate in Kyiv;

June 1984.

19 "Hamer Raises Colonial Status of Ukraine, Baltic States in Senate: 'Captive Nations Rhetoric'—Senator Gareth Evans," *Australian Ukrainian Review*, Autumn 1985: 2.

20 "Evans, Foreign Affairs Explain Captive Nations and Decolonization Positions," *Australian Ukrainian Review*, Winter 1985: 4.

21 Alan Fewster, "New Cultural Exchange Plan with Soviets under Attack," *The Australian* (Canberra), 6 March 1985.

- that the right to emigrate from the USSR be non-discriminatory;
- that the forced Russification of Ukraine be halted;
- that the USSR-Australia Cultural Agreement reflect the true balance of cultures within the USSR;
- that channels be opened for Australian aid to the victims of the Chornobyl nuclear accident; and
- that Soviet interference with mail and parcels sent from abroad be halted.

Although in earlier statements by Minister Hayden and Sen. Evans there appeared to be recognition of the plight of Ukrainians (as observed by historian Geoffrey Blainey),²² the Hawke government's delegations to the USSR during the 1980s conspicuously appeared to ignore Ukraine and Ukrainian issues. Neither Mr. Hawke nor any members of his delegation ever responded to the AFUO submission.

The high point of the discussion of Ukrainian issues in the Australian Parliament was reached on 17 March 1988. On that day, the eighty-three-year-old Helsinki accords monitor Oksana Meshko, a veteran of ten years' imprisonment in the Gulag, five years' exile in Siberia, and almost two years in a Soviet psychiatric institution, sat in the visitors' gallery of the House of Representatives. Philip Ruddock (Liberal, Dundas) described the day as "historic" when he introduced a motion in defence of "Ukrainian and other Helsinki Monitoring Groups."²³ He made a special plea for Lev Lukianenko and tabled a document about the imprisoned UHG member produced by the Committee for Defence of National and Human Rights in Ukraine.²⁴ Supporting speeches were made by Roger Shipton (Liberal, Higgins), Peter Cleeland (Labor, McEwan), and the chairman of the Caucus Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, David Charles (Labor, Isaacs). Charles recognized the "tremendous amount of work done for human rights" by the AFUO and other Ukrainian community organizations and concluded, "I welcome Mrs. Meshko and thank her for putting the case of the Ukrainian people to us."

Chornobyl. On 26 April 1986 a reactor at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Station exploded, propelling a deadly plume of radioactive matter into the atmosphere. There was never a moment when the Ukrainian-Australian community was more united in its support for the people of Ukraine. In Melbourne some 1,500 people attended a mass at St Patrick's Cathedral and a vigil outside Parliament House. Anger mounted as it became clear that the Soviets were rejecting

22 Reported in Jeremy Jones, "Media Watch," *Australian Jewish Times* (Melbourne), 24 December 1987.

23 "Ukrainian and Other Helsinki Monitoring Groups," *Weekly Hansard* (Canberra), 1988, no. 3 (17 March), 997-1003.

24 *Lev Lukyanenko—Lawyer: Case # 39*, trans. Roman Chamula (Melbourne: Committee for the Defence of Human and National Rights in Ukraine, 1987).

assistance from the International Red Cross and Ukrainian Australians found that they were barred from sending their relatives even vitamins through the mail.

On 31 May a large demonstration was held in Canberra to protest the Soviet cover-up and urge the Australian government to launch an appeal to help the victims. It could not be said that the Hawke government was responsive to the community's requests for assistance. The Victoria Liberal senator Jim Short pursued the issue of aid with some vigour, making representations to the Prime Minister's Office and the Department of Foreign Affairs.²⁵

It was disappointing that the government chose to ignore the community's pleas. Subsequently a Chernobyl Children's Relief Committee was formed in the community, and considerable privately donated aid, some from various hospitals and businesses, was channelled to the victims of this tragedy. The nuclear-power issue associated with Chernobyl brought sympathy from various quarters, such as the Rotary Group, which traditionally were not active supporters of the Ukrainian cause.²⁶

The Millennium of Christianity in Ukraine. Preparations for the millennium began well before 1988. In August 1987 more than 150 people attended a symposium on "One Thousand Years of Christianity in Ukraine" at the Australian National University. The keynote speaker was the Reverend Edward J. Stormon, S. J., professor emeritus of systematic theology at the Jesuit Theological College in Melbourne.²⁷

An Australian Committee for the Millennium of Christianity in Ukraine was established under the chairmanship of Andrew Mandyczewsky. This was a very important event for the community, and no less important in its "external affairs" dimension because of attempts at usurping the jubilee celebrations by the Russian Orthodox Church. For Australia's Ukrainians, 1988 was a very intensive year of activities, many of which reached out to the wider community.

The Ukrainian community received substantial support from Australian church circles, particularly from the Roman Catholic Church. Patrons of the millennium celebrations included eleven bishops and six archbishops of the Roman Catholic Church, twelve bishops and two archbishops of the Anglican Church of Australia, five general superintendents of the Baptist Union of Australia, four state moderators of the Presbyterian Church of Australia, four state moderators of the Uniting Church in Australia, two conference presidents of the Churches of Christ in Australia, and Bishop Peter Bankerovich of the Free

25 Jim Short, "The Lessons of Chernobyl," *Australian Ukrainian Review*, Winter 1986: 5-6.

26 Sonia Harford, "A Clean Break for Chernobyl's Heirs," *The Sunday Herald* (Melbourne), 21 October 1990.

27 The proceedings were published as *One Thousand Years of Christianity in Ukraine: Papers from a Symposium at the Australian National University, Canberra, 15 August, 1987*, ed. Marko Pavlyshyn (Melbourne: Monash University, Department of Slavic Languages, 1988).

Serbian Orthodox Church. Many of these leaders promoted the millennium within their own church organizations. But one or two substantial church organizations in Australia excluded themselves from participating as patrons for political reasons.

In May 1988 an ecumenical mass, attended by 1,200 people, was held in Melbourne's St. Patrick's Cathedral.²⁸ The Roman Catholic archbishop, Sir Frank Little, read the Gospel, and Anglican Bishop John Stewart delivered the homily. Also in attendance were representatives of the Church of Christ, the Uniting and Presbyterian Churches, and the Macedonian, Romanian, and Bulgarian Orthodox Churches.

The millennium provided numerous opportunities to raise the plight of Ukrainian Christians suffering persecution by the Soviet regime in Ukraine.²⁹ The *Australian Ukrainian Review* published a special colour souvenir edition devoted exclusively to the millennium, which was circulated among six thousand subscribers and opinion leaders around Australia. An education kit was produced for the Catholic schools on the aspects of the Uniate rite and the millennium. Another publication that appeared during the celebrations dealt with the role of the Ukrainian churches in the community.³⁰

Soviet Propaganda and the War Crimes Hunt. Some of the Soviet propaganda that appeared in Australia and was designed to undermine the community was extremely naive and capable of influencing only the least sophisticated leftist stalwarts. One such publication claimed that "Ukrainian nationalist organizations in the USA, Canada, West Germany, Great Britain, Australia and other Western countries ... [in league with Zionist organizations, had during 1985 and 1986] carried out a total of some 3,000 different insidious missions ordered by Western clandestine agencies (explosions, arson, shootings, abductions, etc.)."³¹

Obviously, such bizarre scribbles were not destined for the mainstream of Australia's media. But a more sophisticated version of "black propaganda," in the guise of the hunt for war criminals, did get through and caused much anguish among Ukrainian and other Eastern European migrants in Australia. The "Nazi hunt" there began with an Australian Broadcasting Corporation radio program

28 Mark Brolly, "Ukrainians Celebrate Their Faith," *The Age* (Melbourne), 30 May 1988.

29 See, for example, Tony Robertson, "Prayer of Hope for Church's Second Millennium," *The Australian*, 31 December 1987; and Mark Brolly, "Glasnost Has Not Helped Soviet Christians, Says Bishop," *The Age*, 12 January 1988.

30 Michael L. Lawriwsky, "Role of the Ukrainian Churches in the Ukrainian Community in Australia," in *Religion and Ethnic Identity: An Australian Study*, ed. Abe (I.) Wade Ata (Melbourne: Spectrum Publications), 72-89.

31 Bogdan Kostenko, *Cultural Exchanges: The Cornerstone of Understanding* (Uzhhorod: Karpaty Publishers, 1987), 35-6.

researched by Mark Aarons and John Loftus, which claimed that many "war criminals" of Baltic, Croatian, and Ukrainian backgrounds had fled to Australia under the protection of British and Australian intelligence organizations.

Both of these propositions suited Soviet propagandists. This is not to deny that there were many people in the Jewish and wider community who were motivated by a genuine sense of justice rather than the promotion of Soviet propaganda. But it was not clear that justice could be done fifty years after the event, and the issue had potential to create divisions among and within ethnic communities. There were clearly divisions among people of Jewish background, as evidenced by the (separately argued) stances adopted by Dr. Robert Manne and Dr. Frank Knopfelmacher in opposition to proposed legislation that would make it possible for Australian courts to deal with alleged war crimes committed in Europe.³²

The Ukrainian community in Adelaide suffered most as a result of media articles surrounding the Ivan Poliukhovich case. Poliukhovich was not an ethnic Ukrainian. His alleged crimes, however, took place in Ukraine, and he was described as "Ukrainian" by the media. Ukrainians were characterized as persecutors, rather than victims, during World War II. One article written in connection with the case blamed the "German and Ukrainian war machine" for the murder of Jews in World War II.³³ As a result of such uneducated hysteria, Ukrainian churches in Adelaide were vandalized.³⁴

After several years of operation and millions of dollars spent at taxpayers' expense, the Australian Special Investigation Unit charged with bringing Nazi war criminals to justice was disbanded. Three people were charged, none of whom were part of the Ukrainian community. No convictions were achieved, however, owing to insufficient evidence or to the medical condition of the accused.

Co-operation and Opposition. As in other democracies, in Australia ethnic groups have political power if they have fund-raising ability, very good access to the media, or can produce votes in marginal electorates. Unlike its counterpart in Canada, the Ukrainian community in Australia exhibited none of these characteristics. The best prospects for co-operation were with conservatives (e.g., the Liberal party) and anti-communists (e.g., the Democratic Labor party), as the "Ukrainian story," including the famine and Ukrainian dissidents languishing in

32 See Padraic McGuinness, "Old Hatred Best Left to Die," *The Australian*, 1 August 1990; and Peter Coster, "Hawke Blamed for Ethnic Strife: Revenge Is a Mistake, Academic Tells Fellow Jews," *The Australian*, 31 July 1990.

33 Martin Daly, "Cries of Nazi Victims Echo Down the Years," *The Sunday Herald*, 4 February 1990.

34 Nestor Jaworski, "Distorted View of Part Played by Ukrainians," letter to the editor, *The Sunday Herald*, 11 February 1990.

the Gulag, reflected the ugly side of the Marxist experiment. To dwell upon such matters was probably seen by the Australian Labor party as contrary to its interests. Furthermore, the ALP would have (rightly) viewed the vast majority of Ukrainian Australians as being hostile to their soft position on Communism. On the other hand, there were obvious prospects for co-operation with other community groups originating from countries under Communist domination.

In 1985 it was the leader of the Opposition, John Howard, who opened the Ukrainian Famine Memorial in Canberra; no Labor Party representative accepted an invitation to attend the unveiling. During thirteen years of Labor government under Hawke and Keating, the prime minister has never attended a Ukrainian community function or received a Ukrainian delegation. This contrasts with the government's treatment of the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian groups represented by the Baltic Council of Australia. The Baltic States had become an issue in Australian politics after the Whitlam Labor government gave de jure recognition of Soviet control in the early 1970s.

Many Australian academics of all political persuasions have been sympathetic to the Ukrainian community's campaign for human rights and Ukrainian independence. The noted Marxist scholar Dr. Agnes Heller, who was expelled from Hungary for dissident views, became a member of the Honorary Committee Commemorating the Ukrainian Famine in 1983 and was a supporter of Iurii Shukhevych, as were thirty-seven other academics who signed a petition to the Soviet ambassador calling for Shukhevych's release. Some of these academics signed not only as Australians, but as individuals with Ukrainian, Polish, Jewish, or Belarusian ancestry.

In 1985 the AFUO organized a conference on "Ukrainians in a Multicultural Australia" in which Prof. Jerzy Zubrzycki, the "father" of Australian multiculturalism and a consistent supporter of Polish-Ukrainian co-operation, participated. Similar co-operation was evidenced by the attendance of Australian academics such as Dr. James Jupp, editor of the *Encyclopedia of the Australian People*, at the Ukrainian Settlement conferences organized by the Australian chapter of the Shevchenko Scientific Society. Interaction between academics and the community was facilitated by the establishment of endowed lectureships in Ukrainian studies at Monash and Macquarie universities during the 1980s. In addition, the AFUO Education Committee, chaired by Dr. Lev Havryliv, was active in disseminating literature, such as Robert Conquest's *Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine* (1986), among Australian academics.

In 1987 a number of academics and politicians, as well as church and community leaders, signed a "Chornobyl Statement" that called on the Soviet government to open up lines of communication so that Australian aid could be channelled to the victims of the Chornobyl accident. In 1988 some twenty-five (generally highly sympathetic) Australian academics attended the AFUO seminar on "Russian Imperialism and the Soviet Union." There were, however, some

obvious "abstainers," who were probably concerned about the impression that their participation might make on the KGB when their next research visa to the USSR came under consideration. One of the Australian academics who did attend was Max Teichmann, a political scientist at Monash University, whose own bias could not be overcome by a single seminar. In a subsequent article he did acknowledge that the conference was "very civilized and low key—very different from the émigré papers [he had] received over the years." But, he continued, "one conference does not make a summer." As for the theme of the conference, which envisaged an eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, Mr. Teichmann warned that "it is of course always a trap to assume the nationalities in the Soviets feel as strongly as the émigrés here."³⁵

Because of the appearance of numerous Ukrainophobic reports in the media, Ukrainian community leaders made special efforts to improve relations with Australia's Jewish community during the build-up of the "Nazi hunt."³⁶ Iakiv Suslensky, head of the Israel-based Committee for Jewish-Ukrainian Co-operation, was brought to Australia by the AFUO in 1987. He delivered lectures and seminars at Sydney University, the Australian National University, the University of Adelaide and Monash University, as well as providing new insights at meetings with the Ukrainian and Jewish communities.³⁷ From the Jewish community's side, Dr. Colin Rubenstein, a senior lecturer in politics at Monash University and chairman of Australia-Israel Publications, was perhaps the most consistent supporter of Jewish-Ukrainian co-operation. He participated in the 1988 seminar on "Russian Imperialism and the Soviet Union" and also spoke in support of Australia's recognition of Ukraine at a rally in Melbourne's City Square on 8 September 1991.

The Captive Nations Council could have provided a powerful lobby group if it had received the full support of its nominal members—communities originating from countries under Communist control. Unfortunately, most groups (including the Ukrainian community) provided only token support to the council, as they considered it largely ineffective in promoting their individual causes. The Victorian chapter was most effective in the later years under the leadership of Terezia Kral, a representative of the Slovak-Australian community. A successful seminar on "Soviet Expansion into the South Pacific" was held in 1988 as part of Captive Nations Week. The speakers included Michael O'Connor of the

35 Max Teichmann, "The Old Empire under Pressure," *The Herald* (Melbourne), 30 June 1988.

36 Liana Levin, "Australian Trials Will Increase Ethnic Tensions: Ukrainian View," *Australian Jewish Times*, 17 September 1987.

37 William Rubinstein, "Seeking for Jewish-Ukrainian Relations Improve?" *Australian Jewish Times*, 14 August 1987.

Australian Defence Association, Dr. Colin Rubenstein, Sen. Jim Short, and me.³⁸

There have been numerous examples of ethnic community co-operation that could be cited. For example, in 1986 Ukrainian, Polish, and Jewish concerns were co-ordinated in a protest to Channel 9 about the screening of Peter Ustinov's film *My Russia*, which contained historical inaccuracies and offensive statements. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, upon the initiative of Prof. Andrew Ehrenkreutz of the Australian Institute of Polish Affairs, the AFUO, the Melbourne Lithuanian Community, and the Department of Politics at La Trobe University jointly sponsored a conference on "The Demise of Communism: The Role of the Diasporas" held at La Trobe in September 1992.

Sport was often used as a propaganda weapon by the Soviet Union, and we have already mentioned how this was countered at the Melbourne Olympics in 1956. For four decades Ukrainian community members consistently protested against the description of Ukrainian athletes from the Soviet Union as "Russian" in the Australian media. When statistics about the early deaths of many Soviet athletes reached the West, they were made public during the Australian Games held in Melbourne.³⁹ Once Glasnost began to take hold, Nestor Jaworski, director of public affairs of the Association of Ukrainians in Victoria, worked with the Australian Football League to promote the Australian game in Ukraine. The association now sponsors a footballer at the Essendon Club, and Bishop Peter Stasiuk, the eparch for Ukrainian Catholics in Australia and Oceania, is a leading card-holder of the club.

Ukrainian Independence and the Collapse of the USSR. Ukraine's isolation from Australian parliamentarians was finally broken when Sen. Jim Short (Liberal, Victoria) visited Kyiv and Lviv in July 1989 as part of his study tour, which also encompassed Russia and the Baltic states. While in Kyiv he met with Ivan Drach, the leader of Rukh. In Lviv he met with Ivan Hel, who was spearheading the movement to legalize the Ukrainian Catholic Church, and with the UHG activists and future Ukrainian parliamentarians V'iacheslav Chornovil and Mykhailo Horyn. Upon his return to Australia, Short wrote: "in many respects Ukraine is the key to the future of the Soviet Empire.... Developments in Ukraine over the next few years will warrant the closest scrutiny."⁴⁰ His observation was soon vindicated by events.

On 1 August 1991 the American president, George Bush, delivered an address to the Ukrainian parliament. But, as Ivan Drach put it, Bush came as a messenger from Moscow, declaring that "Americans will not support those who

38 The proceedings were published under the editorship of the journalist Anthony McAdam as *Soviet Influence in the South Pacific* (Melbourne: Captive Nations Council of Victoria, 1988).

39 See Marshall Wilson, "Soviets' Early Deaths Blamed on Drugs," *The Age*, 29 January 1985.

40 Jim Short, "Independence Movements," *Australian Ukrainian Review*, Summer 1989-90, 10.

seek independence in order to replace far-off tyranny with a local despotism; they will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred."⁴¹ This was the famous "Chicken Kiev" speech, which earned the president much criticism from commentators in the United States and was described as "condescending" by the *Australian Financial Review* in its editorial of 12 August.

On 24 August Ukraine declared its independence. The issue was debated in Australia's House of Representatives on 17 October, after a motion proposed by Philip Ruddock. Following in Bush's path and acting as a messenger for the Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, Australia's foreign minister arrived in Kyiv only one week before the crucial referendum on Ukraine's independence. If ever there was an occasion when an Australian foreign minister could have arrived in Ukraine and made a statement that might have made some difference, this was it. Instead, Sen. Evans said at his press conference: "My own feeling, for what it is worth, and this is based on many conversations, including nearly two hours with Edward Shevardnadze yesterday—very fascinating conversation—is that there is some point in maintaining or creating a confederal structure to perform functions in the area of defence and security and in some important areas of the economy."⁴²

Only three days later it became obvious that the messenger had been mistaken: the Bush administration had turned around 180 degrees by indicating an intention to "salute Ukrainian independence" and "move forward" on formal diplomatic recognition. On 1 December 1991 a national referendum in Ukraine overwhelmingly endorsed Ukrainian independence, and on the next day Sen. Robert Hill (Liberal, South Australia), the shadow minister for foreign affairs, called on the Australian government to recognize Ukraine promptly. Once it became clear that Australia was vacillating on recognition, the Ukrainian-Australian community organized several rallies in major cities. Among the noted Australians who supported Ukraine at those rallies was the former Carlton Football Club captain, Alex Jesaulenko.

Australia eventually recognized Ukraine, along with the eleven co-founding members of the CIS, on 26 December 1991. At the same time, the minister for foreign affairs issued a press release that noted that "Australia is pleased to be taking these steps, which acknowledge that Russia is the successor state to the Soviet Union." In other words, there was full acquiescence in the Russian seizure of the foreign embassies, trade missions, and assets of the USSR that had been

41 Nicolas Rothwell, "Bush Sides with Old Order in Fear of the Unknown," *The Australian*, 7 August 1991.

42 Transcript of the press conference with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Kyiv, 22 November 1991.

contributed by the member republics. In fairness, however, it should be stressed that this policy did not differ materially from that of most other countries.

“External Affairs” since Independence

It was already apparent in 1990 and 1991 that the prospect of Ukraine's independence, or at least of greatly enhanced autonomy, had changed the Australian government's views on the value of contact with ethnic groups that had Soviet links. Thus, before leaving for Moscow, the last Australian ambassador to the USSR, Cavan Hogue, held meetings with the AFUO, the Executive Council of Australian Jewry, and the Baltic Council. After independence, both Australia and Ukraine established an honorary consulate in each other's country, and an Australian-Ukrainian Parliamentary Group was formed under the chairmanship of Laurie Ferguson (Labor, Reid), who in April 1992 led a parliamentary delegation to Ukraine.

As the status of Ukraine normalized, so the relationship with Australia came to focus on economic links, immigration issues, and cultural and academic exchanges. In October 1991 seminars on investment in Ukraine were held in Melbourne, Sydney, and Canberra by the future Australian honorary consul in Kyiv, Prof. Serhii Berezovenko.⁴³ During the first year of independence a highly cautious and negative view appeared to be exhibited towards Ukraine by Australian trade officials and some journalists who had had a traditional orientation towards Moscow.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, business links began to develop. Australian companies provided consulting services to Ukraine's coal- and manganese-mining industries, and there is a developing potential for wool sales.⁴⁵ Within the community, Ukraine's independence was the catalyst for the establishment of a Ukrainian Australian Lawyers' Association, whose newsletter, *Stop Press* (founded in 1994), promotes business links between Australia and Ukraine. Some Australian law firms have been recommending investment opportunities in Ukraine.⁴⁶

In Melbourne on 23 August 1992, the eve of the first anniversary of Ukrainian independence, Sen. Evans addressed the Association of Ukrainians in Victoria on “Australia and Ukraine: New Country, New Partnership.” His speech hailed Ukraine's restraint on nuclear weapons, Crimea, and the Black Sea Fleet and acknowledged the local community's efforts in helping alleviate the problems caused by Chornobyl. He saw the Ukrainian-Australian community as playing a role in fostering business links, noting that the Australian wool industry

43 John Masanauskas, “Invest in Us, Ukraine Urges,” *The Age*, 25 October 1991.

44 John Helmer, “Ukraine Post to Open,” *Australian Financial Review* (Sydney), 2 November 1992.

45 Nicole Brady, “Flexibility the Key to Wool Sales: CIS Men,” *The Age*, 30 April 1994.

46 Bill Pheasant, “Openings in CIS Nations: Lawyer,” *Australian Financial Review*, 8 June 1994.

was keen to recapture its market in Ukraine, estimated at \$200 million in 1989. He concluded with the hope that Ukraine might become strong and economically independent and take its place as a regional and global power.

August 1994 saw the arrival in Canberra of a high-level delegation led by Ukraine's deputy foreign minister, Oleksandr Makarenko, who met with Sen. Evans and other senior Australian officials. During the visit, the text of a bilateral trade and economic co-operation agreement was initialled. Evans urged Ukraine to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon state while acknowledging Ukraine's concern about security guarantees and financial assistance. Other issues included prospects for co-operation in the sphere of education and training and in the United Nations. Subsequently Evans contended that resource constraints prevented the establishment of an Australian embassy in Kyiv and that there was no need for Ukrainian visitors to Australia to travel to Moscow, where the Australian ambassador to Ukraine resides. In early 1995 the government officially invited President Leonid Kuchma to visit Australia.

It would appear that the complete normalization of relations between Ukraine and Australia will require the establishment of full embassies. But Australia seems unlikely to take such a step until a significant amount of trade and investment eventuates. If a Ukrainian embassy is established in Canberra, as appears more likely (perhaps with some Ukrainian-Australian community assistance), and possibly a trade mission in Sydney, this could help to stimulate the critical level of trade and communications that seem to be necessary before an Australian embassy is established in Ukraine.

Perspectives

The dilemma facing the Ukrainian community throughout the Soviet period was that it felt it could not perform in "external affairs" unless it was strong internally. Most of its resources were directed at developing churches, community halls, schools, university foundations, and youth and cultural groups. The main aim of this strategy was cultural maintenance. Yet, in spite of many individual Herculean efforts, linguistic and cultural assimilation has nevertheless proceeded (although at a slower pace than is the case with most comparable groups).

A very small proportion of Ukrainian-Australian community funds was spent on "external affairs"—a fact that has been lamented by directors of "external affairs" from the days of Mr. Prestashevsky in the 1950s and 1960s. In many ways the need for the community to act as an "embassy" of the Ukrainian cause will cease when an actual Ukrainian embassy is opened in Canberra. The traditional focus of the community on "internal affairs" and on events in Ukraine, at the expense of "external affairs," was demonstrated on numerous occasions in the Ukrainian-language press. The opening in 1985 of the famine memorial in

Canberra by the Australian leader of the opposition was featured on the front page of the *Ukrainian Weekly* in the United States,⁴⁷ but was buried on page 6 of Melbourne's Ukrainian newspaper.⁴⁸ Similarly, an article dealing with the Australian Parliament's motion in defence of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group was positioned on page 13 of Sydney's Ukrainian paper.⁴⁹

A consistent feature of the "external affairs" has been the ad hoc nature of its reactions to a series of "crises"—the war-crimes legislation, various films and media reports, and anniversaries of various events in Ukrainian history. A good example is provided by the activities surrounding commemorations of the Ukrainian famine of 1932–3. In 1983 and 1993 materials were prepared for dissemination in schools, but subsequently everything was dropped and ad hoc committees were disbanded in anticipation of the next commemoration ten years later. Exactly the same approach was adopted for materials prepared for the millennium of Ukrainian Christianity in 1988. Such an approach ignores the need for repetition and consistency in any public relations campaign.

Another problem of "external affairs," raised already by Mr. Prestashevsky in the 1950s, was the lack of well-educated professionals who could relate to the wider community. In the intervening years, almost two generations of Ukrainian Australians have passed through Australian universities with a participation rate that probably exceeds that of the wider community. As a noted Canadian Supreme Court justice, the late Walter Tarnopolsky, put it a decade ago, "We can't absorb all the talents ... in our own organizations."⁵⁰ Justice Tarnopolsky made some further observations about the Ukrainian community in Canada that are even more applicable to Australia. First, he questioned the level of ambition of many Ukrainian Canadians, who were satisfied with only a first degree and did not pursue second or higher degrees. In Australia there are proportionally too few people of Ukrainian descent entering professions such as law, journalism, and academia, or engaging in writing and publishing in such areas as sociology, history, fiction, and ideas. Iakiv Suslensky, head of the Committee for Jewish-Ukrainian Co-operation, once remarked that Ukrainians do not write enough and that, as a consequence, their story is told by others. One exception among the first generation is Dmytro Nytczenko (pseud. Chub), who has written several books on Ukrainian subjects, but has reached a relatively limited audience.⁵¹

47 "Australians Unveil Monument to Famine Victims," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 3 November 1985.

48 OBE, "Posviachennia pam'iatnyka zherltvam holodu v Kanberri," *Tserkva i zhyttia*, 10 November 1985.

49 Mykhailo Lavrivsky, "Avstraliiskyi parlament skhvalyv spravu UHH v prysutnosti Oksany Meshko," *Vilna dumka*, 24 April 1988.

50 Walter S. Tarnopolsky, "International Year of Youth: The Challenge Facing Ukrainian Canadian Youth," address delivered at the "Youth: Hidden or Known Ukrainians" Conference, 16 February 1985, Saskatoon. Excerpts were published in *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 24 March 24 1985.

51 See, e.g., Chub's *West of Moscow: Memories of World War II and German Prisoner of War*

These books were translated by his grandson, Yuri Tkach, who also translated and published several books by Soviet Ukrainian authors⁵² and was vilified in the Soviet Ukrainian press for his efforts. Another exception is Peter Kardash, who has produced two well-illustrated books on Ukraine and the Ukrainians.⁵³

Ukrainians achieved an unprecedented public profile during the Demidenko/Darville affair in June, July, and August 1995. Helen Darville is a young writer of English extraction who, masquerading as a Ukrainian-Australian, wrote a controversial, award-winning novel.⁵⁴ Her book, which describes Jewish participation in the Ukrainian famine of 1932–3 and Ukrainian collaboration in the murder of Jews during World War II, was labelled as anti-Semitic by the Jewish community and was questioned by a number of political commentators. The Australian literary community appeared divided on the affair, some authors believing that freedom of expression was at issue. It was curious that the Ukrainian community leadership did not take a clear stand, viewing the book as a contribution to a debate that could improve relations with the Jewish community.

The debate that ensued was very one-sided. Once again Ukrainians were stereotypically represented as Nazi collaborators. Very few contributors to the debate saw the book as anti-Ukrainian, but one of those who did was Jewish.⁵⁵ On the other hand, there were several bigoted, anti-Ukrainian tirades.⁵⁶ Fuel was added to the media bonfire when it was revealed that Darville had lied about her Ukrainian background and it was alleged that she had plagiarized numerous sources.

While this writer is firmly of the opinion that the Darville affair was damaging to the Ukrainian-Australian community, it did provide an opportunity for the community to express itself. For months there was a media "window," the likes of which had never existed before and may never come again. The opportunity was largely missed because of the lack of clear direction and of people with both the ability and the will to take part. An exception was the powerful article by Dr. Marko Pavlyshyn, which countered allegations of

Camps (Melbourne: Lastivka Press, 1983) and *Shevchenko: The Man* (Melbourne: Bayda Books, 1985).

52 E.g., Vasyl Shevchuk, *Blood Brothers: The Adventures of Two Cossacks on Land, Sea and under Water* (Melbourne: Bayda Books, 1980).

53 *Ukraine and Ukrainians* (Melbourne: Fortuna, 1988) and *Ukraine: Its History and Its Arts* (Melbourne: Fortuna, 1991).

54 Helen Demidenko, *The Hand that Signed the Paper* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1994).

55 See Ivor Indyk's comments in "Literature, Lies and History," *The Weekend Australian* (Canberra), 26–7 August 1995, 21.

56 E.g., Jacques Adler, "The Hand that Hides an Ugly History," *The Age*, 22 June 1995; and Alan Dershowitz, "The Ultimate Abuse Excuse," *The Age*, 29 June 1995.

contemporary Ukrainian anti-Semitism that had been advanced in one of the contributions to the debate.⁵⁷

The continuing need to combat offensive and uninformed interpretations of Ukraine's experiences during World War II was highlighted when *Time* magazine published an offensive caption relating to Ukrainians. A well-prepared submission by Mr. Andrii Havryliv, which was supported by the AFUO, was adjudicated and upheld by the Australian Press Council (1994) and is currently before a full hearing of the New South Wales Equal Opportunity Tribunal.

In order to build credibility for the Ukrainian community in Canadian society, Justice Tarnopolsky, as an ex-president of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, suggested that Ukrainian Canadians need to make a much greater input into that wider society: "I don't know a single person of Ukrainian descent—maybe there are a few who have paid their membership—in things like the Canadian Civil Liberties Association." This statement is even more applicable to Australia. While, relative to Australian society in general, the Ukrainian-Australian community may have a large number of people involved in voluntary community work, the input of community members into the wider society is not high. There are relatively few Ukrainian-Australian members of Australia's major political parties, and relatively few activists in its professional, social, or intellectual interest groups. Community members who participate in this way are enriched by such experiences, and through these experiences and the networks they develop they are able to contribute more to the community. In the final analysis, "external affairs" should be "internalized" by every community member.

57 Marko Pavlyshyn, "Ukrainians Reject Stereotype Image," *The Weekend Australian*, 16–17 September 1995, 12.

The State of Civil Society in Independent Ukraine

Oxana Prisiajniouk

Analyses of the development of civil society in Soviet-type regimes began during the 1980–1 Solidarity period in Poland, as scholars attempted to explain patterns of autonomous social participation in the face of a state-directed society.¹ After 1985, as tens of thousands of unofficial groups and political parties emerged in the USSR in response to Gorbachev's Glasnost and Perestroika policies, the same concept of civil society was applied there to characterize independent social activism.² The definition of civil society used in this paper has been widely accepted in recent literature on Central Europe: civil society exists where there is an independent self-organization in society, the constituent parts of which voluntarily engage in public activity to pursue individual, group, or national interests within the context of a legally defined state-society relationship.³ Civil society has two significant features. The first is a legal framework that permits social self-organization and defines the terms of the state-society relationship that provides for the autonomy of social groups. The second is the orientation of civil society as determined by the identity of the social actors and their goals.⁴

According to Weigle and Butterfield, the experience of Central Europe suggests that there are four stages in the development of a post-Communist civil society: a defensive stage, in which private individuals and independent groups

1 Andrew Arato, "Civil Society against the State: Poland 1980–1981," *Telos* 47 (1981): 23–47; Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen, "Social Movements, Civil Society, and the Problem of Sovereignty," *Praxis International*, 1984, no. 4: 246–83; Zbigniew Rau, "Some Thoughts on Civil Society in Eastern Europe," *Political Studies* 35 (1987): 573–92.

2 See, for example, Moshe Lewin, *The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Perspective* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

3 See Z. A. Pelczynski, "Solidarity and the Rebirth of 'Civil Society,'" in *Civil Society and the State*, ed. John Kean (London: Verso, 1988); and Robert F. Miller, *Civil Society in Communist Systems* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1992).

4 Krishan Kumar, "Civil Society: An Inquiry into the Usefulness of an Historical Term," *British Journal of Sociology* 44 (1993), no. 3: 379.

actively or passively defend their autonomy vis-à-vis the Party-state; an emergent stage, in which independent social groups or movements seek limited goals in a widened public sphere that is sanctioned or conceded by the reforming party-state; a mobilizational stage, in which independent groups or movements undermine the legitimacy of the party-state by offering alternative forms of governance to a politicized society; and an institutional stage, in which publicly supported leaders enact laws guaranteeing autonomy of social action, leading to a contractual relationship between the state and society regulated eventually by free elections.⁵

I shall analyse how this scheme works in relation to Ukraine, as this country is quite typical for the emergence and development of civil society in Soviet-style regimes. The main thesis of this paper is that even if Ukraine possesses an embryonic civil society at this stage (as is clearly the case), it is still very weak and atomized. Civil society exists only in Galicia in western Ukraine, and in the capital city, Kyiv. Still absent are the right to private property, and a middle class with business interests that are separate from those of the state. The twin legacies of external domination and Soviet totalitarianism have played a major role in the slow development of civil society in Ukraine. To demonstrate this I shall analyse the underground dissident movement, the appearance of a mass movement during the period of Gorbachev's reforms, the creation of a multiparty system, and national identity.

The appearance of an independent Ukraine was one of the unexpected consequences of Perestroika in the USSR and of antitotalitarian trends in Ukrainian political life. The fact that Ukrainian independence was the joint work of two elite groups (the cultural intelligentsia and the "national-Communists") very much predetermined the further development of civil society in Ukraine. In Ukraine the mobilizational ability of both groups was in simultaneous decline. The final act in this drama was the referendum on Ukrainian independence of 1 December 1991. Nobody could predict such overwhelming support for the idea of sovereignty; many were afraid of a possible vote against independence, especially amongst the Russians and Ukraine's other ethnic minorities. A pre-referendum poll predicted that only 55 percent of the ethnic Russians and 48 percent of other ethnic minorities would vote for independence, compared with 68 percent of ethnic Ukrainians.⁶ The final results of the referendum, however, showed much more support for independence than expected in all regions except Crimea.⁷

5 Marcia Weigle and Jim Butterfield, "Civil Society in Reforming Communist Regimes: The Logic of Emergence," *Comparative Politics* 25 (1992), no. 1: 1.

6 See Jaroslaw Martyniuk, "Public Opinion: Ukrainian Independence and Territorial Integrity," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report* 1 (1992), no. 13: 64–8.

7 Jaroslaw Bilinsky, "Ukraine: The Multiple Challenges to Independence," *Forum* (The

Like all other successor states, independent Ukraine emerged from the wreckage of a totalitarian empire, the USSR. The collapse of totalitarianism left an institutional vacuum within the society and the economy, while the collapse of the empire left an institutional vacuum within the polity.⁸ Inheriting many negative features from the ex-metropoly, Ukraine lacked a civil society, a market, and a state, which were the necessary preconditions for a genuine national identity, democracy, and the rule of law. The newly born state seemed to be a bizarre combination of a highly educated population, numerous formal and informal organizations, extensive black marketeering and organized crime, functionaries, ex-dissidents, and would-be elites. None of them had been transformed into institutions—none had established behavioural procedures and rules of the game. As Huntington has pointed out, to succeed in the painful process of state-building some social and economic transformations are vital—urbanization, industrialization, and the spiritual and cultural awakening that leads to a broader political participation in social life.⁹ These changes need to accent the role of traditional sources of political authority and institutions. In Ukraine crucial differences from this model influenced the course of events: the rates of social mobilization and the expansion of political participation were high, while the rates of political organization and institutionalization were low.¹⁰ The immediate results were political instability and economic disorder. The most serious problem was a lag in the development of political institutions behind socio-economic changes.

That Ukrainian independence came so abruptly and so unexpectedly has had enormous consequences for the future of the country. Neither the governing spheres nor the opposition were ready for independence. Ukraine's incompetent and ill-prepared new rulers had to learn how to cope with the necessity of transforming a post-colonial republic into a truly sovereign state as well as with the need to create everything that had been destroyed or distorted during the seven decades of Soviet dominance: a civil society, a market, and the rule of law. As a result, in their state-building project the new elites have not had the advantage of appropriate political, social, and economic institutions and resources, while the population has been sentenced to suffer the "shock therapy" of economic reforms without which further progress is impossible. It is interesting to compare this situation with the situation in other post-colonial countries. After the British, French, and Portuguese colonial systems crumbled, most of their former colonies suffered from a lack of institutions and resources,

Harriman Institute, Columbia University) 7 (1993–4), no. 1–2: 37.

8 Alexander J. Motyl, "Will Ukraine Survive 1994?," *Forum* (The Harriman Institute) 7 (1993–4), no. 5: 3.

9 Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 158.

10 *Ibid.*, 193.

while inheriting many national and tribal problems. At the same time, none of these countries had to face the task of creating a market economy and civil society from scratch.

As we have already observed, every country must pass through the following stages—civil society, democracy, a well-ordered state, the rule of law, and a market. It is impossible to go through all of these stages simultaneously, so it is necessary to find a logical sequencing of the steps involved. In my view the first of these steps is the creation of a civil society that represents a coherent set of autonomous social institutions positioned between people as individuals and the state and its own institutions. These autonomous institutions include religious associations, political organizations, social movements and clubs. The characteristics of post-totalitarian systems, of which Ukraine is an example, include the predominance of the state over social processes and its refusal to allow for independent social activity. Autonomous social values and activism, and thus the seeds of a civil society, have developed in post-totalitarian regimes as the result of a systemic crisis that had its roots in the failure of the regimes to perform adequately the self-defined functions of value formation and interest representation.¹¹

Signs of a civil society appeared in Ukraine, much as they had in other parts of the USSR and in Central Europe, through dissent and attempts to defend the moral and legal autonomy of the individual against the state's penetration into all forms of social life. The outstanding event in the intellectual life of Ukraine in the 1960s was the emergence of a group of vocal dissidents. The writings of Ivan Dziuba, Sviatoslav Karavansky, V'iacheslav Chornovil, Valentyn Moroz, and other Soviet-era dissidents attracted wide attention. The ideas formulated by these spokespersons of Ukrainian dissent fall into two groups. The first group addresses issues of a general libertarian nature and gives rise, in particular, to protests against the denial of intellectual freedom. The second group is concerned with matters of a specifically national character: the curtailment of the constitutional state rights of the Ukrainian SSR, the diluting and perversion of the nation's cultural heritage, discrimination against the Ukrainian language in education and public life, and the cultural rights of Ukrainian minorities residing in other parts of the USSR.¹²

If we try to locate Soviet Ukrainian dissent within one of four political traditions—national-Communism, integral nationalism, populism, and conservatism—we must conclude that it most plausibly belongs to the tradition of national-Communism. Ukrainian dissidents did not, as a rule, attack the premises

11 Giuseppe DiPalma, "Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society: Politico-Cultural Change in Eastern Europe," *World Politics* 44 (1991), no. 1: 54.

12 Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "Political Thought of Soviet Ukrainian Dissidents," in his *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1987), 477–89.

of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, nor did they reject socialist economics, the Soviet political system, or even membership of the Ukrainian republic in the USSR. They criticized only the distortion of the system and demanded that Soviet practice be brought into line with true Leninist principles, especially in nationality policy.¹³ Because of official restraints and manipulations, the movement assumed primarily non-political, cultural forms. Their manifestations included a drive for the preservation and restoration of historical monuments and a revival of folk customs and arts. In other countries, where the continuity of national life had never been disrupted, such activities might have been considered routine. In the case of Ukraine, however, with its tragically fragmented development, such cultivation of the nation's cultural identity was bound to have political implications. By their struggle with an oppressive regime for a future national revival, Ukrainian dissidents, together with underground organizations and associations such as the Helsinki Accords Monitoring Group and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, prepared a solid ground for the second stage of civil society—the emergent stage.

An embryonic civil society began to emerge in Ukraine only during the period of Perestroika, after the totalitarian state had started crumbling under the impact of Gorbachev's reforms and their unintended consequences. As early as 1985, reformers from the Party and intelligentsia encouraged the independent activity of ordinary people. Many hundreds of informal groupings appeared on Ukraine's political and social horizon. One of the first of them, Memorial, reflected Ukrainian society's interest in the recent past. The victims of Stalinism and the rehabilitation of those who had been oppressed by the Communist regime were among Memorial's main concerns. The dual themes of the Chornobyl nuclear accident and the Ukrainian language figured prominently in the address given at the USSR writers' congress in Moscow in 1986 by the poet Borys Oliynyk, who used the occasion to extend the limits of public discussion to include the national question.¹⁴ The effects of the long-standing official but unwritten policy of linguistic Russification continued to engage the Ukrainian intelligentsia. An important turning point was the founding of the Ukrainian Language Society in February 1989. Although the law "On Languages in the Ukrainian SSR" adopted in November 1989 designated Ukrainian as the state language of the republic, the language question has remained a serious problem.¹⁵

The early years of Glasnost and Perestroika also witnessed the first attempts at "rehabilitating" entire periods and specific aspects of Ukrainian history and

13 Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 368–75.

14 *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 2 July 1986.

15 See *Literaturna Ukraina*, 3 January 1991; and *Slovo* (Kyiv), 1993, no. 9.

culture. An important role in this cultural renaissance was played by various unofficial groups (*neformaly*), such as the Ukrainian Culturological Club in Kyiv and the Lion Society in Lviv; the *samvydav* publication *Ukrainskyi visnyk*, the Ukrainian Association of Independent Creative Intelligentsia, and student groups such as the Student Hromada at Kyiv University and the Student Brotherhood in Lviv.¹⁶ Unlike in Moscow and Leningrad, however, in Ukraine the process of filling in the "blank spots" of history began later and proved more difficult because of stiff resistance from the local Communist authorities. In this emergent stage of a Ukrainian civil society most reformers in the Party and among the intelligentsia assumed that independent social activism would remain within the confines of the goals articulated by the Party, but now would be influenced by freely expressed public input. While the majority of the groups focused on problems of "everyday life,"¹⁷ not on fundamental political change, it was the phenomenon of independent organization itself that played a significant role in undermining the legitimacy and authority of the Communist party. But it was only with the establishment of other political parties, with the freeing of the churches and other forms of religious activity, and with the transformation of some unofficial groups into functioning organizations that one could legitimately say that something resembling civil society had emerged in the Soviet Union.

In Ukraine 1989 was a pivotal year: it witnessed the emergence of Rukh—the pro-independence popular movement for Perestroika—and the re-emergence of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church after forty years of underground existence. Short-lived "popular fronts" had appeared earlier (in 1988) in several Ukrainian cities. In Lviv, for example, a democratic front was formed in the course of a mass demonstration in the summer of 1988. It was Rukh, however, that ultimately proved capable of mobilizing broad support for the democratic reform movement throughout Ukraine. One of the first calls for the formation of a mass public organization to promote Perestroika that reached a wide audience was made by the poet Dmytro Pavlychko at a meeting on ecological issues organized in Kyiv by several *neformaly* on 13 November 1988.¹⁸ A draft program for Rukh was proposed and discussed at a meeting of the Kyiv branch of the Writers' Union of Ukraine on 31 January 1989, and on 16 February it was published in *Literaturna Ukraina*. Even before the draft program had been published, however, the Party-controlled press made clear its opposition to the writers' initiative. It was not until February 1990 that the authorities officially

16 Taras Kuzio, "Unofficial Groups and Publications in Ukraine," *Report on the USSR*, 1989, no. 47: 10–12.

17 Alexander J. Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), 34.

18 See David Marples, "Mass Demonstration in Kiev Focuses on Ecological Issues in Ukraine," *Radio Liberty Research Report*, no. 525/88, 5 December 1988.

registered Rukh as a legal organization, thereby effectively precluding its direct participation in the first relatively free election to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet the following month. Initially Rukh pursued a moderate policy that included co-operation with the Communist party, but the radicalization of society brought about the radicalization of Rukh itself. A clear indication of shifting political attitudes was the collective statement "To Members of Rukh and to All Citizens of Ukraine" published in *Literaturna Ukraina* on 8 March 1990. It argued that Rukh should be transformed into a political party and called for "the building of real and definitive independence for Ukraine." At the time Rukh claimed to have 633,000 members and another four million sympathizers.

It is not my intention to analyse Rukh as a political force, but to consider why it was unable to involve the masses in political participation. For this purpose it is necessary to examine the composition of Rukh's founding congress in September 1989 and the attitude of the population towards Rukh.

According to a survey conducted by Vladimir Paniotto and the Central Ukrainian branch of the All-Union Centre for Public Opinion Research, almost half the delegates to Rukh's founding congress came from western Ukraine—approximately twice the percentage of the republic's population living in that region. Less than six percent came from Left-Bank Ukraine, which has 25 percent of the republic's population.¹⁹ The data also demonstrated that the delegates were well educated. It should also be noted that the proportion of Communist party members among delegates was twice as high as that among the population of Ukraine. As we can see, the delegates were the representatives of the intelligentsia and of national-Communism. The same survey showed that the delegates' priorities were first of all to solve political problems and problems associated with the development of the national language and culture. The main concern of Ukraine's population at the time, however, was the economy (according to 44 percent of the respondents), followed by the environment and ecological issues (26 percent), with political and cultural-linguistic questions well behind in third and fourth place (13 percent and 12 percent respectively).²⁰ Paniotto indicates that most of the population knew about Rukh on the basis of second-hand information; only 10 percent of the respondents had information about Rukh's entire platform. There are two possible reasons for this. The first is that the Communist Party of Ukraine was initially very hostile towards Rukh and heavily criticized its program (the Party press did not publish the draft program). What they did publish were letters from "concerned workers and

19 Vladimir Paniotto, "The Ukrainian Movement for Perestroika—Rukh," *Soviet Studies* 43 (1991), no. 1: 177–81.

20 Roman Solchanyk, "Introduction" in *Ukraine: From Chernobyl' to Sovereignty: A Collection of Interviews*, ed. Roman Solchanyk (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992), p. 4.

peasants" who could not possibly have read the text they were attacking. Secondly, it is likely that people were not familiar with Rukh's program because of the tradition of not reading anything concerned with "platforms" or "programs," since experience with the CPSU suggested that they were filled with false promises.

As a result, Rukh as an alternative political force in Ukraine did not succeed in mobilizing the population in the pursuit of democracy, and this weakened the subsequent development of Ukrainian civil society.

Organized opposition to the Communist party in Ukraine was not limited to Rukh. After 1989 a multitude of parties, spanning the entire political spectrum from communism to fascism, arose. This phenomenon marked the second stage in the development of civil society in Ukraine, in which independent social groups or movements sought limited goals in a widened public sphere. One of the most influential new parties, certainly in western Ukraine, was the Ukrainian Republican party (URP), which advocated complete independence for Ukraine and was uncompromising in its anti-Communism. The URP was the first political party in Ukraine to be registered officially by the Soviet authorities (November 1990). More radical in its views and political ambitions was the Ukrainian National party, which held its founding congress in Lviv on 21 October 1989; it considered the Soviet Ukrainian state "an artificial structure" and did not recognize it or its laws. The party's aim was to re-establish the pre-Soviet Ukrainian People's Republic "within its ethnic boundaries." The Ukrainian People's Democratic party (UNDP), which held its constituent congress in Kyiv on 16 and 17 June 1990, had an analogous but somewhat less strident program. Its aims were to revive "an independent, democratic, and lawful Ukrainian state."

The main representatives of the political centre are the Democratic Party of Ukraine (DemPU) and the Party of Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine (PDVU). The DemPU was established by those Rukh leaders who favoured the transformation of the organization into a political party. Its manifesto, published in *Literaturna Ukraina* on 31 May 1990, reflected a social-democratic orientation (later shelved) and called for the state independence of Ukraine. The origins of the PDVU can be traced back to the Democratic Platform, a reform movement within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that emerged in January 1990. The Green party sees itself as a left-of-centre party. It was headed by Iurii Shcherbak, a physician and well-known writer, who also headed the Zelenyi Svit (Green World) Ukrainian ecological association. The Greens held their constituent congress from 28 to 30 September 1990. Its declared aims were the rebirth and protection of the natural environment and the building of "a free and sovereign democratic state—the Republic of Ukraine." Ukrainian student organizations also played a particularly important role. It was the student hunger strike in Kyiv in October 1990 that forced the resignation of the chairman of the Ukrainian

Council of Ministers, Vitalii Masol. The strike was organized by the Ukrainian Student Union, formed in December 1989.

Although there are scores of political associations, they are not yet "real" parties. The crisis Ukraine is undergoing has its roots in the growing fragmentation of power and the weakness of democratic institutions, particularly the political parties, that have characterized national politics since independence. Like most post-Communist states, Ukraine appears to have an anarchic and ineffective party system. The existence of a large number of small, poorly organized and fractious political parties apparently promotes instability rather than stability, and hinders rather than help the task of building a stable civil society.²¹ As Wilson and Bilous have pointed out, in the interregnum between the collapse of the old regime and the formation of a new stable political order the fear must be that if such parties cannot exercise much influence on the development of society, they will help to create a political vacuum that may well be filled by some kind of revived authoritarianism.²²

There are more than twenty parties in Ukraine. Their membership figures are low, even for the best organized parties. Even among those parties claiming to have an all-Ukrainian structure, membership is regionally concentrated. According to Kuzio and Wilson, in 1993 55 percent of the members of the URP and 34 percent of the members of the DemPU—the two main parties with a national orientation—were from the radical but unrepresentative Galician region.²³ Almost a third of the Green party's members in were in one oblast—Ternopil. On the other hand, the membership of centre-left parties such as the Ukrainian Social Democratic party or the PDVU was concentrated in the urban centres of eastern and central Ukraine. Of the PDVU's 3,500 members in the spring of 1992, 320 were in Luhansk oblast, 250 were in Kharkiv oblast, and 250 were in Donetsk oblast.²⁴ Party organizations, moreover, rarely exist outside the local oblast centres, except in Galicia. Among the problems that have contributed to such a state of affairs have been limited access to the mass media and minimal resource bases. An appeal for the creation of a new, independent TV channel was therefore launched by the disgruntled opposition in July 1992; it had little immediate success.²⁵

21 Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 25–108.

22 Andrew Wilson and Arthur Bilous, "Political Parties in Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies* 45 (1993), no. 4: 693–703.

23 Taras Kuzio and Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence* (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press; London: Macmillan, 1993), chap. 7.

24 Wilson and Bilous, 393.

25 *Narodna hazeta*, 28 July 1992.

Unfortunately, links between political parties and other elements of the social and political system have been weak and ill-formed. The ability of parties to mobilize collective action among the public has declined spectacularly since the great wave of strikes and public demonstrations that culminated in the student strikes of October 1990. The predominant public mood is now hostile or indifferent to political parties. In 1992, for example, Rukh had a negative 32 percent rating (17 percent in favour, 49 percent hostile).²⁶ By contrast, Rukh had claimed 89 percent support in 1989.²⁷ According to data provided by the International Foundation for the Electoral System, in response to the question, "How many parties do you want?" 7 percent of respondents answered none, 32 percent answered one, and 46 percent, two or more.

In many cases the Ukrainian public has generally been ignorant of the activities of the political parties, given the parties' limited means of publicising themselves. One indication of declining public support for the parties was the candidates' repeated failure during the 1994 run-off elections to reach the 50 percent support rate required to elect them.²⁸ There is also abundant evidence of a lack of party discipline. During the autumn 1991 presidential election campaign the PDVU had two rival candidates, while the DemPU supported the non-partisan candidate Volodymyr Pylypchuk instead of their own member, Volodymyr Iavorivsky. Even the URP had problems, with its deputy leader, Stepan Khmara, supporting Leopold Taburiansky instead of the URP's leader, Lev Lukianenko. Finally, the conferences of many Ukrainian parties resulted in splits, including those of Rukh in February 1992, the URP in May 1992, and the Christian Democrats in April through June 1992. These splits testify to the parties' failure to create clear platforms that could command the commitment of all their members.

The weakness of the Ukrainian party system can be traced to unclear "structural cleavages" within society. The United Kingdom's traditional two-party system may be interpreted as reflecting class divisions in society; and the four main camps in Belgian politics, the crosscutting socio-economic and linguistic cleavages. In Ukraine it can be argued that the only significant social division is between a "priviligentsia" and an amorphous "society as a whole." A market economy will lead eventually to the emergence of more clearly defined social groups capable of organizing themselves to promote their own interests. Ukraine, however, is moving very slowly in this direction, and parties are still only proto-parties that do not provide linkage between social groups and the state.²⁹

26 V. Ie. Khmelko, "Komu my doviriemo?," *Ukrainskyi ohliadach*, 1992, no. 7.

27 *Literaturna Ukraina*, 11 November 1989.

28 *Tserkva i zhyttia* (Melbourne), 13 August 1994.

29 Sten Berglund and Jan Ake Dellerbrant, "The Evolution of Party Systems in Eastern Europe," *The Journal of Communist Studies* 8 (1992), no. 1: 153.

Instead, the projected social bases of parties are determined ideologically. It is unfashionable to invoke narrow working-class interests directly, and few are prepared to speak out openly for the interests of the *nomenklatura* upper stratum. Hence nearly all parties are forced either to appeal to the crowded middle ranks of society, speaking for farmers or an entrepreneurial class that has yet to come into existence, or to resort to vague and general populism.³⁰

A major problem for Ukraine is its political culture, or rather the lack of it. Post-Communist Ukraine is in effect attempting to create a political culture from scratch. Unlike the Baltic or Central and East European states with their memories of independent political parties and civil society in the interwar period, Ukraine cannot draw on a rich political tradition. The fundamentals of a civil society did develop in Galicia under Habsburg rule before 1918 and under Polish rule until 1939,³¹ but Galicia contains only 10.4 percent of Ukraine's current population. Post-Soviet political culture is not free of the birthmarks it inherited from the Soviet *ancien régime*. That regime did little to foster the principles of open dialogue, tolerance, and acceptance of mutual dependence and compromise on which the creation of broad-based political parties depends. Most Ukrainian parties have extremely low levels of internal dissent. It is hard not to agree with the prominent Ukrainian historian Ivan L. Rudnytsky, who wrote,

What is needed is a type of mentality that makes it possible to find in London monuments to both Charles I and Oliver Cromwell. Such an attitude precludes neither a critique of personalities, groups, and ideas nor the taking of a definite stand on controversial current issues. But it requires a spirit of catholicity which views all the nation's past and present spiritual and material achievements as a common inheritance, and not the exclusive property of any faction. Obversely, it also implies the willingness to accept a share of moral responsibility for one's nation's mistakes and follies, even if they were perpetrated by specific groups or individuals.³²

Open political activity has been possible in Ukraine only since 1990. It will take many years to develop the habits of collective action, accommodation, and compromise that are the cement of an effective party system.

One very important issue connected with the emergence of a civil society in Ukraine is that of national identity. National identity, as Motyl points out, may be uniquely well suited to the task of generating strong feelings of community as a collective subject, which can then serve as the basis for collective action. A society cannot operate coherently or efficiently without a recognizable, reasonably exclusive, and, most importantly, pervasive sense of the "we." And it is one

30 Wilson and Bilous, 695.

31 Subtelny, 368, 434–5.

32 Rudnytsky, "Trends in Ukrainian Political Thought," in his *Essays*, 122.

of the central functions of political discourse to construct this hegemonic "we" as the identity of the group that makes political (and, for that matter, economic) action possible. Culture-based feelings of national identity and solidarity provide the perfect ground for collective action, especially when all other possible focal points for group organization, such as social class, have been disorganized and atomized as a consequence of the long period of domination of public space by the Soviet state. National identity provides for consensus, for a shared set of values and worldviews, and this in turn encourages the emergence of social institutions and democratic rules of the game. National identity also provides social solidarity and enhances willingness to sacrifice oneself for the good of the cause. Finally, national identity helps in state-building by reducing the cost to the state of eliciting social compliance with its administrative, extractive, and coercive measures. National identity contributes most to the formation of civil society.

According to Rustow's model of the transition to democracy, one of the background conditions for such a transformation is national unity. This means that the vast majority of citizens must have no doubt or reservation as to which political community they belong to. This condition is best fulfilled when national unity is accepted unthinkingly and is silently taken for granted.³³ Unfortunately, we do not observe such unity in Ukrainian society after independence.

Ukraine is not ethnically homogeneous. It has a large Russian population, and many "passport" Ukrainians are more proficient in Russian than in Ukrainian. This linguistic dualism has a geographic dimension. The eastern regions of Ukraine have a large Russian population and a high proportion of Ukrainians there speak Russian as their first language. Some view such a situation as leading to the possible breakup of Ukraine along ethnolinguistic lines. The language question has often occupied a prominent place in Ukrainian politics, and in certain historical situations it has been the central issue. The explanation for this is not hard to find. There were times when Moscow went so far in its efforts to eliminate a distinct Ukrainian identity as to attempt to remove the Ukrainian language itself from the public sphere. When this happened and the political regime was otherwise so restrictive as to deny any other avenue for free expression, the Ukrainian cause came to be identified, in the public arena, with defence of the language.

But even when this was the case, the language was not the only or even the key issue.³⁴ In his assessment of the Ukrainian national movement of the late

33 Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Role," *Comparative Politics* 1 (1970), no. 3: 337-63.

34 Roman Szporluk, "Reflections on Ukraine after 1994: The Dilemmas of Nationhood," *The Harriman Review* 7 (1994), no. 7-9: 8.

1960s and early 1970s, Connor argued in 1972 that language was the symbol, not the real issue in the Ukrainian struggle:

The abstract essence of ethnic nationalism is often not perceived by the observer. There is an understandable propensity ... to perceive the struggle in terms of its most discernible features. Thus, Ukrainian unrest is popularly reported as an attempt to preserve the Ukrainian language against Russian inroads.... In their desire to assert their uniqueness, members of a group are apt to make rallying points of their more tangible and distinguishing institutions. Thus, the Ukrainians, as a method of asserting their non-Russian identity, wage their campaign for national survival largely in terms of their rights to employ the Ukrainian, rather than the Russian, tongue in all oral and written matters. But would not the Ukrainian nation be likely to persist even if the language were totally replaced by Russian, just as the Irish nation has persisted after the virtual disappearance of Gaelic, despite pre-1920 slogans that described Gaelic and Irish as inseparable?³⁵

Connor's analysis is apt. Ukraine became independent precisely because its leaders rose above a linguistic definition of the nation. Moreover, the implications of the language issue, as raised in Ukraine today by the Communists, go far beyond the threat of secession by some parts of the state. The enemies of Ukrainian statehood, who in Russia also include non-Communists and even anti-Communist forces, are resorting to the language issue in order to force the general body of Ukrainian citizens to define themselves primarily in ethnic terms.

The linguistic division coincides with a division on economic and political issues. In Ukraine being a Russian speaker or an ethnic Russian often goes hand in hand with a sympathetic attitude towards Soviet-style Communism. But one may well ask, like Roman Szporluk, why Russians as Russians should favour Communism in Ukraine, when so many Russians in Russia and especially so many Russians living in Russia's urban areas have voted for democrats in recent Russian elections.³⁶ The answer is that people voted for Communists in Ukraine in those areas where the Communist apparat has been especially strong and where social and economic conditions are determined by a heavy concentration of state-owned industries, which have no future under a reform economy. By contrast, Ukraine's half-million ethnic Jews, among the best educated and most urban of the republic's population, are likely to benefit most from market reform. The real problem facing Ukraine, therefore, is to establish a national consensus about the question of reform.

In addition to the consequences of Russification for national cohesion, Ukrainians are divided by religion. In the west—in Galicia and, to a lesser extent, Transcarpathia—the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church has historically

35 Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 43–4.

36 Szporluk, 2.

been dominant. Although forcibly incorporated by Stalin into the Russian Orthodox Church in 1946, it has made a powerful come-back in intensely religious Galicia and Transcarpathia since 1989. Most eastern, southern, and central Ukrainians are Orthodox Christians. The distinction is of more than theological interest. For most of the last two centuries, Uniate Catholicism has served as the main prop for national identity in western Ukraine. In contrast, the Orthodox Church has rarely played a nationally supportive function in the Ukrainian east. After the Ukrainian Orthodox had been absorbed into the Russian Orthodox Church in the eighteenth century, Orthodox Christianity served largely to blur distinctions between Ukrainians and Russians, to such an extent that Ukrainian nationalists have generally condemned it for Russifying the population. Not surprisingly, a Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was founded in the 1920s during the Soviet Ukrainian national revival; it was liquidated in 1930 for its autonomist leanings. The church was re-established in 1990. In June 1992 part of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church seceded from the Moscow patriarchate and united with its erstwhile rival, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.

Even though they share many cultural traditions and myths, eastern and western Ukrainians are clearly different, but are they so different as to constitute separate nations? Although differences complicate nation-building, the state of affairs is far from being unresolvable. Regionalism is fully compatible with nationhood, as are different religions, different ethnic origins, even different languages. Current tensions between the Ukrainian Greek Catholics and Orthodox are concerned almost exclusively with the question of the return of confiscated churches.³⁷

As well as social movements, political parties, and national churches, many other social organizations and groups have contributed to the development of a civil society in the Ukrainian state. They include the official trade unions and the Ukrainian Organization for Worker Solidarity, ethnic political and social organizations (for example, Jews for Jesus, the Russian movement of the Crimea, the Hungarian Cultural Association of Transcarpathia, and the German Rebirth Society), and independent journals, newspapers, and new publishing ventures.

Yet, despite all this progress, it would be incorrect to say that Ukraine already possesses a civil society. All the elements of autonomous social activity are not yet institutionalized. They have not yet become relatively stable, coherent, and adaptable patterns of social activity. In this sense, what Ukraine has experienced in the last six years is an increase in the level of non-state social activity, but this has not yet brought into existence a genuine civil society.

37 See David Little, *Ukraine: The Legacy of Intolerance* (US Institute of Peace, 1991).

Newly created political, social, and cultural organizations expressing the interests of broad strata of society played a leading role in the mass mobilization after the introduction of Gorbachev's reforms. The meetings and rallies led by the URP and Rukh were essential for some of the democratic forces' important victories. Glorified "live chains" in Lviv, demonstrations and "tent villages" organized by students—all these, and many other events, brought into being an entirely new political situation: governing structures could no longer neglect actions "from below" or ignore the population's growing demands and expectations. These milestones marked the third period in the development of civil society—the mobilizational stage. There is no clearly marked boundary between this stage and the previous emergent stage. But if the emergent stage can be characterized as a period of formation of oppositional forces demanding reforms within existing conditions, then the mobilizational stage is a time of radicalization of opposition groups in their struggle against Party domination. The failure of these movements to crystallize further and create a civil society was linked to the fact that they all occupied anti-Communist positions. When the Communists lost power, the opposition lost its common bond and fragmented. This eventually weakened civil society.

Another important aspect of this stage was the participation by political parties in official campaigns. This was a very serious step towards a true civil society, as the opposition had finally obtained a real chance of challenging the authorities through active involvement in the parliament and in local elections. At an early stage in this period a sort of equilibrium between the authorities and the opposition was created: the first had official power, while the latter was more effective in influencing the people.

It was a specific feature of this stage that the opposition ceased to be the opposition when, in some regions, mostly in western Ukraine, the democratic parties achieved success in local elections. This was the beginning of the final stage—the institutional. Thenceforth the official position was not the only existing point of view, and the opposition, both in parliament and outside, expressed opinions that more and more often contradicted the government's positions. The parliamentary and municipal elections in 1994 reflected an increasing differentiation within Ukrainian society as people's demands and requirements came to be expressed not merely through participation in rallies and "meetingations," but through voting for a concrete political party or organization. Entirely new "rules of the game," unknown prior to this period of global changes, emerged. During the election campaigns the political parties' ideologies, strategies, and tactics apparently crystallized, their political and economic intentions gradually became clearer, and their struggle for the electorate led to growing political understanding among those who were entitled to vote.

Institutionalization was one of the most essential consequences of these events. Beginning its activity in parliament and in local councils at all levels, the

opposition became an important dimension of the Ukrainian polity. This phenomenon appeared to be one of the crucial steps towards a civil society. No political force—neither the president nor the prime minister nor the parliament's speaker—could ignore the opposition's opinion or neglect its political views, and this created a new interrelationship between state and society.

We can say that all four stages that lead to the creation of a civil society have taken place in Ukraine. But it is too early to speak of a genuine civil society. It would be unreasonable to expect that a mature civil society would be created within a few years of the declaration of Ukrainian independence. As a newly created country, Ukraine is involved in the initial process of grasping new ideas and taking the first steps on the path towards a real civil society, which is a necessary step for the creation of a genuinely democratic state. This process is a difficult one in a situation where foreign policy is burdened with the difficult problem of the relationship with Russia, and the brittle social equilibrium is constantly at risk as contradictions between the neo-Communist parliamentary majority and democratically-oriented minority lead to permanent sabotage in legislative activity. There are also many other, complicating problems: national identity, an ineffective party system, an indifferent population because of the decreasing standard of living, crises in the economy, the republic's inability to pay eighteen billion US dollars to Russia and Turkmenistan for fuel, and the havoc created by galloping inflation, which has retarded the introduction of a new national currency (the *hryvnia*) and arrested market reforms. All these factors help to explain why Ukraine's road to a genuine civil society has been and will continue to be so difficult. Nonetheless, for a country emerging from the devastation of centuries of imperial and totalitarian rule, what has been gained is by no means insubstantial.

Leonid Kuchma's Presidency in Its First Year*

Marko Bojcun

In June 1993, in the midst of Leonid Kravchuk's term as the first president of Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a powerful strike wave engulfed the eastern industrial oblasts. Driven to strike by a collapsing industrial base, by the break-up of trade ties with Russia, upon which the coal, steel, machine-building and other sectors of the economy depend, and by the central government's failure to advance a credible strategy of economic recovery, the regional strike organizations demanded a vote of confidence in all the national institutions of power, greater economic and political autonomy for the eastern oblasts, and Ukraine's fuller integration with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The acting prime minister, Leonid Kuchma, was forced to step down in September 1993, after a fruitless year in office, his hands tied by the Supreme Rada (parliament) and President Kravchuk. The Rada negotiated an end to the strikes by agreeing to hold referendums of confidence in both state institutions in September. As the moment approached, however, the Rada changed its mind and called new parliamentary and presidential elections for March and June 1994 respectively.

The law governing presidential elections required the winning candidate to amass more than half of the votes cast by more than half of the registered electorate. There were seven candidates in the first round on 26 June 1994, and none managed to meet this requirement. The incumbent, Kravchuk, came in with 37.7 percent, followed by Kuchma with 31.2 percent, Oleksandr Moroz, the head of the Supreme Rada, with 13.1 percent, and the liberal market economist Volodymyr Lanovy with 9.4 percent. This result led to a second-round run-off between Kravchuk and Kuchma on 10 July, in which 71.6 percent of the

* Sections of this paper draw upon an analysis prepared by the author for a study entitled "Shaping Factors, Shaping Actors in Republics of the Former Soviet Union by the Year 2000 and Beyond," commissioned by the Forward Studies Unit of the European Commission.

registered electorate took part. Kuchma won with 52.1 percent against Kravchuk's 45.1 percent. Whereas Kravchuk's support came overwhelmingly from the western oblasts (87.4 percent of the vote), Kyiv city (59.7 percent), and the central Right Bank oblasts (54.1 percent), Kuchma's came from the eastern (75.6 percent), southern (72.5 percent), and central Left-Bank (65.9 percent).¹

Kuchma owed his victory mainly to a fundamental change over the previous two years in Ukrainian attitudes to independence, the economy, and relations with Russia and the CIS. Eighteen months of independence under President Kravchuk saw the country sink deeper into economic crisis: the gross domestic product approached half its pre-independence level; inflation ran at 10,000 percent annually (in 1993); debt to the Russian Federation for fuel imports mounted; and relations with Russia worsened owing to disagreements over Crimea, participation in the CIS, and other issues. Meanwhile, very little had been offered in the way of credits, loans, or investments by the Western industrial states.

Kravchuk did not make the economic crisis a priority in his election campaign, but focused instead upon a continued defence of Ukraine's statehood through a pro-European orientation in foreign affairs. Kuchma, on the other hand, campaigned on a platform of economic recovery and reform as the best guarantee of continued state independence, and restoration of ties with Russia and other CIS states as a necessary condition of economic recovery. He demanded the establishment of a strong executive authority to carry through domestic reform. He also called for granting Russian official status as a state language, which set him apart from Kravchuk. Furthermore, he called for a decisive suppression of crime and *mafia* organizations.

The incumbent's association with continued economic decline and a hostile stand-off between Ukraine and Russia hobbled him in his bid for a second term. But his challenger's relative inexperience in government and his inability to speak Ukrainian did not give him an ideal profile either. Until he became prime minister in 1992, Kuchma had built a career almost entirely in the missile industry, becoming director of the world's largest missile-production facility, in Dnipropetrovsk. Kuchma won, however, because he correctly read the electorate's rapidly changing perceptions of the way out of the country's problems. If, in December 1991, electors took Ukrainian independence to be the condition for economic recovery and prosperity, by July 1994 they understood economic recovery to be the condition of continued independence. Kuchma acknowledged that the economic crisis was related directly to the breakdown of trade ties with Russia. In the pro-Western orientation of Kravchuk and the national democrats

1 Dominique Arel and Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine under Kuchma: Back to Eurasia?" *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report* 3, no. 32 (19 August 1994).

he saw no tangible benefits, let alone a substitute for Ukraine's traditional patterns of trade with the east. Kuchma's Eurasian orientation did not mean the abandonment of Ukrainian independence: rather, Kuchma argued that Ukraine's very survival depended upon economic recovery, which could only be achieved through Ukraine's fuller participation in its traditional economic area and through normalization of relations with Russia, the major regional power.

Kuchma's victory mirrored the results of the parliamentary election in March and April 1994, when the left-wing parties (Communist, Socialist, and Peasant) emerged as the largest single bloc.² Kuchma did not share this bloc's views on economic recovery, but there was in this election campaign a certain coincidence between the left-wing parties' regional identity (eastern and southern Ukraine) and Kuchma's own—as a defender of Russian minority interests and, of course, an advocate of renewed economic ties with Russia. The outcome of the second round showed a regional division of the electorate between Kravchuk, who gained most support in the western oblasts, and Kuchma, who gained it in the east.

Yet, this east-west division has had a paradoxical effect upon Ukraine's politicians. Their understanding of it may help them take power, but, once they assume national responsibilities, they strive to overcome it. Kuchma was transformed in this way, too, after becoming president. He quickly learned to speak Ukrainian, the official language, and dropped the issue of official status for Russian. Kuchma's team in the president's administration was drawn from his long-standing supporters and collaborators in Dnipropetrovsk, where he had studied and worked for many years, from the Nova Ukraina (New Ukraine) bloc of 1993 and the Interregional Bloc for Reforms of 1994, and from the Galician Nova Khvyliia (New Wave) group of economic reformers. It was a broad coalition whose members were relatively young in comparison with the Kravchuk team, and it included easterners, westerners, and Kyivans.

International realities also proved more complicated than Kuchma's election-campaign prescriptions for them. Good relations with Russia proved more difficult to restore than many had thought, while relations with Western institutions and countries featured prominently in Kuchma's first foreign-policy initiatives, contradicting initial expectations that he would turn toward Eurasia. Within months of his election, Kuchma's standing in opinion polls was higher in Western than Eastern Ukraine (though it remained relatively high everywhere), and it remained well above that of the Supreme Rada and its chairman, Oleksandr Moroz, throughout his first year.³

2 See Marko Bojcun, "The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections in March–April 1994," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47 (1995), no. 2: 229–49.

3 *Post-Postup*, 19–25 May 1995.

The Rada had elected Moroz, the head of the Socialist party, as its chairman in May 1994. His election was the left-wing bloc of deputies' first victory in parliament. Moroz did not agree with Kuchma about macro-economic reform, privatization, or foreign investment. He opposed rapid privatization of the state economy, the privatization of land, an open-door policy for foreign investment, or any sharp reduction in the state social-security budget as a condition for Ukraine's gaining credits and technical assistance from the International Monetary Fund. He also defended the Rada's established legislative, executive, and constitutional functions against the advances of the new president. Rather, he wanted to see the president's role reduced, especially in domestic affairs. Moroz figured as a political leader whose disagreements with Kuchma were both substantial in ideological terms and indicative of the broader struggle between the president and parliament for dominance within the state.⁴

Voting patterns in the Rada throughout the latter part of 1994 showed that, by a slim majority, it was restorationist with respect to the state power structure—that is, it wanted to return to a Soviet-type state with fused legislative, executive, and constitutional powers. But, by an equally slim majority, it was reformist with regard to economic change—that is, in favour of a capitalist market, tempered by strong welfare-state provisions.⁵ Such apparently inconsistent orientations within the Rada could be explained by two important facts: first, the Rada had a large body of independent, i.e., non-party, deputies who swayed between the left and the national-democratic parties, often for quite pragmatic reasons, in their voting behaviour. Second, the ideological profiles of the parliamentary groupings or factions entered into by the parties were not at all firm. The deputies' regional loyalties often took the upper hand, with apparently left-wing deputies from the east and south voting for pro-capitalist measures because they were seen as beneficial for their regional economies.

Nevertheless, Kuchma came into direct conflict with the Rada, as well as with vested interests in the ministries and agencies of government, as he attempted to turn his election platform into state policies. The Communists, Socialists, and, to a lesser extent, the Peasant party opposed Kuchma's pro-market, pro-Western policies and his policies favouring privatization. By 1994 much of Ukrainian society had come to hold a negative view of capitalism and the market, identifying it with the looming "grey economy" that the state could not tax for its budget, and with inflation, unemployment, the steady collapse of state industry, and the appropriation of its choicest parts by the new business class. The Western capitalist countries, seen as models of development at the

4 Oleksandr Moroz's interviews and speeches provide a good overview of his political orientation. See *Holos Ukrainy*, 2 April 1992, 18 September 1993, 16 July 1994, 26 August 1994, 17 and 21 September 1994, and 31 December 1994.

5 Mykola Tomenko, "The Verkhovna Rada of Today," *Ukrainska perspektyva*, 1995, no. 1.

time of independence, came to be regarded widely as tight-fisted and bent upon penetrating Ukraine's economy and market for their own advantage.

Kuchma's anti-crime offensive encountered silent but determined resistance from state officials and elected deputies suborned by the *mafia*. There was an attempt on the life of the newly appointed minister of foreign economic relations in September 1994.⁶ This ministry issued licences to trade abroad, which allowed some state and private firms to re-export Russian fuels and dump Ukrainian minerals, metals, chemicals, railway rolling stock, ships, and other goods on world markets for considerable profit, most of it banked abroad. Kuchma's attempts to impose fiscal discipline upon the national budget, to collect taxes on company profits, to unify the exchange rate of the karbovanets (in order to eliminate arbitraging between the state and market exchanges by officials with access to state hard-currency reserves), and to halt the flight of capital abroad—estimated in 1994 to be in excess of US \$25 billion—ran up against powerful financial oligarchies straddling the state and private sectors.

To be sure, Kuchma was a pro-market, pro-capitalist reformer. On this general principle he had support within the country's new ruling circles. But there are many kinds of national capitalist economies in the world. Ukraine could be driven into the periphery of the world market, supplying raw materials and semi-finished goods, and developing a strong class of traders in these goods, while allowing its manufacturing sector to decline and thereby making the country more dependent on imports from the metropolitan states. On the other hand, Ukraine could preserve those industrial and technological sectors in which it has a distinct advantage in world trade, and develop a more self-sufficient domestic market. It could sink into the Third World, or it could balance more evenly between the Second World (the former USSR) and the West. The social consequences of these divergent paths into capitalism and the world economy would differ markedly from each other. Kuchma openly chose the latter path, seeking to foster a private economy that could be taxed, an industrial policy to save Ukraine's most promising extraction, processing, and manufacturing sectors, and a strategic trade policy to accumulate hard-currency earnings for further economic development. The capitalist class that would emerge from this process to co-exist in a regulated relationship with the state economic sector would be different from the "robber barons" who were already engaged in the primitive accumulation of capital. Perhaps Kuchma believed that a deal had to be struck between these two tendencies. However, either a deal or a forceful confrontation with the more ruinous transition to the capitalist market would require that the state's institutions, particularly its executive arm, wield greater authority. This

6 *Uriadovyi kur'ier*, 24 September 1994.

would be difficult to achieve because the Ukrainian state was weak and internally divided by ideology and conflicting material interests.

Kuchma's primary aim in the field of state reform, therefore, was to seek a new division of powers between the president, government, parliament, and judiciary. He tried to overcome the ongoing conflict between the executive and legislature, to remove executive responsibilities from the purview of the legislature, and to establish a strong presidential arm of state that could enforce its decisions from Kyiv down to the local level throughout the country.

Why is there a conflict between the executive and legislature? In the beginning there was only the Supreme Rada, an instrument of the Communist Party of Ukraine, itself an instrument of the all-Union Party leadership. As the popular movement for independence gained ground in 1989 and 1990, a growing wing of Ukraine's Communists moved to accommodate and take advantage of it. The Rada, in which they held a two-thirds majority after the March 1990 elections, claimed increasing powers from the Moscow centre, expressing this claim constitutionally for the first time in the July 1990 Declaration of State Sovereignty. Throughout this period the Rada combined legislative and executive functions and operated as a kind of constituent assembly in continuous session.⁷

The Rada then delegated some of its higher representative and executive functions to its chairman—Leonid Kravchuk from July 1990—and a year later wrote these responsibilities into the Law on the President. The president was to be the shield of the Rada against Moscow, with the responsibility of preventing application of all-Union laws if they contradicted republican legislation. As a popularly elected statesman, he would be a legitimator of Ukrainian statehood.

In 1992, after his election, President Kravchuk became not only the head of state—a role directed essentially outward, internationally—but also the chief executive, a role directing him to domestic concerns. He assumed the right to appoint the prime minister and key members of the Cabinet, though not without the Rada's approval. The president also had the right to legislative initiative from within the executive branch. The system of president's representatives, created in March 1992, provided the chief executive with a vertical line of command from the national through the oblast, raion, city, and rural governments.

The Supreme Rada, however, took measures to limit the power of the head of state and chief executive and weaken his influence. It could veto his decrees, it could override the president's veto of its own draft legislation, and most important, it confirmed and dismissed the prime minister and Cabinet. The president, on the other hand, could not dismiss the Rada if the government resigned.

7 I have relied for this summary of the historic conflict between the legislature and the executive upon Ihor Markov's excellent analysis, "The Role of the President in the Ukrainian Political System," *RL/RFE Research Report* 2, no. 48 (December 1993).

The prime minister and Cabinet emerged as an independent entity in the executive branch only with the appointment in November 1992 of Leonid Kuchma, to succeed Vitold Fokin as prime minister. The Supreme Rada gave Kuchma legislative initiative to rule by decree on economic matters, and prevented Kravchuk from overriding him through presidential decrees. After six months, when these special powers were not extended for Kuchma and Kravchuk's were restored, the Rada nevertheless turned down Kravchuk's proposal that he should reconsolidate his executive authority by heading the new Cabinet. It sought to reimpose its authority over the government, and Kravchuk had to concede.

The erosion of recently gained presidential power that began here was illustrated in the difference between the first draft of the new constitution debated in 1992, where the president was both the head of state and chief executive, and the revised draft issued in 1993, in which the president was only the head of state. The president was forced to give up the network of his lower government representatives when parliament legislated in February 1994 that their heads be popularly elected. So began a new struggle in which the Supreme Rada and the president each sought to subordinate the regional and local councils.

After the Rada's acceptance of Kuchma's resignation as prime minister in September 1993 and subsequent disastrous nine months, during which Iukhym Zviahilsky held that office (currently Zviahilsky is facing prosecution for serious economic crimes), a new prime minister, Vitalii Masol, was chosen in June 1994, on the eve of the presidential elections. Ex-Prime Minister Kuchma then defeated Kravchuk in the elections on July 10.

The election of Leonid Kuchma marked a turning point in the evolution of relations between key central state institutions. As president, Kravchuk had increasingly stood aloof from domestic politics, preferring to act as a mediator and consensus maker between competing interest groups while concentrating his efforts in foreign affairs: securing Ukraine's independence and defending territorial integrity. That became his definitive role, and it was one cause of his almost complete ineffectiveness in combating the economic crisis. Kuchma, on the other hand, was handed economic recovery and reform as his principal task, and he believed that Ukraine's continued independence depended upon success in this matter. Kuchma had no alternative but to seek greater influence over domestic policy-making than did Kravchuk, and this requirement drove him to redefine and expand his prerogatives as chief executive, to direct the Cabinet and prime minister, and to restore presidential control over lower levels of government. All these developments challenged the power, influence, and prerogatives of the Supreme Rada.

The Cabinet was overhauled in August and September 1994. Prime Minister Masol survived then, but was forced by Kuchma to resign on 1 March 1995.⁸ He was widely regarded as an opponent of Kuchma's policies who had been sneaked into the prime minister's post on the eve of the second round of presidential elections as insurance against Kuchma's victory. Well before Masol's resignation, however, Kuchma had not only filled the Cabinet with his own people, but had effectively shifted the locus of policy decision-making to his administration. After Masol resigned, Ievhen Marchuk, the minister of state security as well as the president's emissary to Crimea and Moscow in difficult negotiations, was made the acting prime minister. He was confirmed in this post and asked to form a new Cabinet in May 1995 after Kuchma reached agreement on the division of powers with the Supreme Rada.

Kuchma subordinated the Cabinet of Ministers directly to his office by a decree on 6 August 1994.⁹ The decree was motivated by the need for effective leadership of state institutions in carrying out economic reform and consolidating market relations. It requires the president's direct participation in all cabinet meetings that address matters of economic transformation and reform, his approval of all daily Cabinet agendas and the Cabinet's participation in drawing up presidential decrees on economic reform, and establishes his right to decide appointments to all state organisations subordinated to the Cabinet.

Kuchma resubordinated all regional and local governments to the president's office by another decree issued on 6 August 1994.¹⁰ He justified it by the need for an effective vertical command network that would ensure uniform and comprehensive implementation of policy. Accordingly, the heads of all oblast governments, of the Kyiv and Sevastopol city governments, and of all lower-tier (local) governments were made answerable to the president. The heads of these governments, elected for the first time on 26 June 1994, thus saw their democratic local authority limited by central executive authority. The capacity of the Supreme Rada to influence them was also diminished.

Kuchma sweetened the subordination of regional and local councils by promoting greater contact between them and the president through a new consultative body. To that end, a Council of the Regions was created by decree on 20 September. It was attached to the presidency and was to advise in matters of economic and social policy and central-regional-local government relations.¹¹ The council included the government heads of all the oblasts and the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol, as well as the deputy premier of Crimea. The president was

8 *Financial Times*, 2 March 1995.

9 *Holos Ukrainy*, 11 August 1994.

10 *Ibid.*

11 *Uriadovyi kur'ier*, 22 September 1994.

the council's head, and the prime minister was its deputy head. Kuchma's administration worked assiduously to win explicit support from these governments for his plan to consolidate the presidency as the chief domestic executive organ and to make the prime minister and the Cabinet answerable to it, thereby diminishing the ability of the Supreme Rada, with its 40 percent plus left-wing bloc, to make the Cabinet answerable to it.

Quite early in his presidency, Kuchma signalled his desire to reach a constitutional accord with the Supreme Rada that would clearly define the separation and interdependence of their functions and powers.¹² The prime issue for both sides was who would control the government. Kuchma conceived this accord as a "little constitution" prefiguring a comprehensive constitution to be adopted later. It was needed urgently, he argued, so that the executive and legislative arms of state might work effectively towards a major economic, systemic transformation. Kuchma also warned that, unless the Rada co-operated with him, he would take the issue to the country in a referendum.

The Constitution of Ukraine had been adopted last in April 1978. It was substantially amended and expanded in the period from 1990. Naturally, the evolution of the Constitution in this latest period led to a highly complex and contradictory set of legal documents because its original Soviet terms of reference did not accord with the new historical context and the new values that accompanied it. In an effort to set Ukraine's constitutional process on a more appropriate, contemporary platform, a comprehensive new draft was considered by the Supreme Rada in 1992 and was released for public discussion. Parliamentary commissions incorporated many proposals drawn from public contributions and from their own deliberations in the amended draft of early 1993. As mentioned above, the document was redrafted to reduce the powers of the president as chief executive. However, it proved impossible for the Rada to muster two thirds of its deputies to agree on a new constitution, and so it was never tabled for discussion or adoption.

In November 1994 the president and the Supreme Rada relaunched the constitutional process by agreeing upon the composition of a Constitutional Commission of the Supreme Rada.¹³ Kuchma and Moroz were made its co-heads. The Supreme Rada and the president each delegated fifteen members; the Supreme Court, the Arbitration Court, and the Procuracy-General delegated two each; and the Crimean Supreme Council and the Constitutional Court, one each. Such proportions reflected the real balance of power between the central institutions.

12 *Holos Ukrainy*, 22 and 28 July 1994.

13 *Holos Ukrainy*, 30 November and 1 December 1994; and *Uriadovyi kur'ier*, 12 November 1994.

There appeared to be at least three orientations within the commission: the Communist and Socialist deputies, who wished to build a new constitution on the basis of the 1978 document; the reformist centre from the national-democratic and liberal-democratic camps, who wanted to use the 1993 draft constitution as a basis; and President Kuchma's supporters, for whom their own "little constitution" was the kernel of the future basic law they wished to see adopted.¹⁴

In December 1994 the president submitted his draft Constitutional Law on State Power and Local Self-government¹⁵ to the Rada, which the latter passed on first reading. The draft contains the following essential provisions with respect to the central state institutions:

1. There is a division of powers between the legislature, executive, and judiciary.
2. Judicial supremacy is exercised by the Constitutional Court, which is responsible for arbitrating between the branches of state power. Its head is to be nominated jointly by the president and the Supreme Rada, and appointed by the latter.
3. The president is the head of state. Executive power is vested in the president and exercised by him and through the government he establishes. He conducts Ukraine's foreign policy subject to ratification by the Supreme Rada. The president is the head of the National Security Council and the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. He appoints and dismisses the higher command and declares war and a state of war, subject to ratification by the Supreme Rada.
4. The president independently establishes the government. He may likewise dismiss it. The Cabinet of Ministers and the prime minister are subordinate to the president.
5. Decrees of the president in matters of economic reform not yet regulated by law have the force of law until relevant legislation is adopted.
6. The president can veto Supreme Rada legislation and send it back for revision. The Rada must gain support for its amended version by a two-thirds majority in order to require the president to sign the legislation and make it public.

14 *Holos Ukrainy*, 1 and 15 December 1994.

15 Published in *Uriadovyi kur'ier*, 6 December 1994.

7. The president may dissolve the Supreme Rada, after consultation with its chairman and the Constitutional Court, if the Rada rejects his government's programme on two successive occasions or does not approve its state budget within a period of three months.
8. The president has the prerogative of nominating persons to the following key posts: the members of the Supreme Court and Higher Arbitration Court, the procurator-general, and the head of the National Bank.
9. The Supreme Rada is the supreme legislative authority.
10. The Supreme Rada can have a vote of non-confidence only on the government's programme, not its composition. Such a vote leads to the resignation of the government, but not of the president.
11. The Supreme Rada can veto the decrees of the president on the basis of their unconstitutionality, which must be established by the judiciary.
12. The Supreme Rada can initiate impeachment proceedings against the president for a serious crime, and can proceed to their completion on condition of a favourable ruling by the Constitutional Court.

How a new constitution might be adopted had already been the subject of debate. Moroz proposed that a draft be adopted by the Supreme Rada, that a referendum be held to resolve matters on which the Rada could not agree, and that the final version be debated and adopted by an All-Ukrainian Congress of Councils composed of deputies from every level of government.¹⁶ President Kuchma proposed that a constitution be adopted by the Supreme Rada, through a referendum in matters of disagreement and finally by agreement of the three central state branches in joint session.¹⁷

The draft Law on State Power was subjected to commission hearings from January to mid-April 1995 in an attempt to reach a compromise formulation that could be put to the Rada. Early on it became apparent that the Rada would give up its prerogative to appoint the government—the Cabinet of Ministers—but not its right to monitor and approve its programme. The main point of disagreement, however, was the perceived imbalance between the powers of the president and the legislature, in particular the president's right to dismiss the legislature if it would not accept the government's programme or its budget. Furthermore, the president would have control of appointments to the judiciary, which was meant to be the arbiter between the executive and legislative branches of state. He

16 *Holos Ukrainy*, 15 September 1994.

17 *Uriadovyi kur'ier*, 13 December 1994.

would also control regional and local government executives through the system of state administration, undermining their authority as elected governments and eliminating the channels of communication and influence between them and the Supreme Rada. In short, a majority of the Rada would not agree to a decisive shift in the direction of a presidential republic. On April 12, the Rada moved to the second reading of the draft law and began considering it article by article, raising fears that it would drag out the process even more and dilute the powers of the executive along the way.¹⁸

Deliberations had been proceeding for a month when President Kuchma lost patience and decided to intervene. Behind-the-scenes negotiations must have played a part in narrowing the differences between the parties. On 16 May Fedir Burchak, a presidential spokesman, proposed to the Supreme Rada that all articles referring to the its dissolution and the president's impeachment be dropped altogether in order that the law be passed quickly. Two days later it was adopted by a simple majority of 212 deputies. The Rada's national-democratic and liberal-democratic factions (Centre, Statehood, Interregional Bloc for Reforms, Unity, and Rukh) and the Peasant party's deputies voted in favour. The Independent faction, the Communists, and the Socialists were opposed.¹⁹ The Peasant party, representing the interests of the agricultural and agro-industrial sectors, had been aligned all year with the Communists and Socialists, so its defection to the centre right assured the latter a majority. How was this achieved? News began to leak out that Oleksandr Tkachenko, deputy head of the Rada and leader of the Peasant party, was being investigated for alleged profiteering from agro-business contracts with an American supplier of hybrid seed corn.²⁰ Then, on 3 June, the Rada's newspaper, *Holos Ukrainy*, carried a short item announcing that the Cabinet had instructed the National Bank to issue credits to the agricultural sector in the form of a 50 percent advance on 1995 state contracts to purchase grain and seed. The Rada suspended Tkachenko's authority as its deputy head on 6 June, pending an outcome of the investigation.²¹ These developments suggested that a split had occurred among the Peasant party deputies.

The fight was not over yet, because the left in the Supreme Rada now retreated and regrouped around the still-functioning 1978 constitution. In order to implement the Law on State Power, explicit provision had to be made to override all contradictory articles of that constitution. This would require a two-thirds majority. On this matter the parties of the left managed to hold their

18 *Holos Ukrainy*, 20, 21, and 26 April 1995; *Uriadovyi kur'ier*, 20 April 1995; and *Post-Postup*, 3–9 February and 14–20 April 1995.

19 *Holos Ukrainy*, 18 and 20 May 1995.

20 *Holos Ukrainy*, 12 May 1995.

21 *Holos Ukrainy*, 7 June 1995.

ground and to avoid the crucial constitutional amendments that would have made the Law on State Power operative. Apparently the parties of the left were able to claw back support from deputies who were moving in Kuchma's direction. According to a statement issued later by Rukh, "a group of centrist deputies who had voted for the law ... failed to take the decisive steps to implement it."²²

At this point the debate over the division of state power intensified again, revealing its underlying policy dimensions. Communist and Socialist spokesmen directed their fire towards the president's economic reform measures of the previous year, claiming they were responsible for the continuing economic ruin and the impoverishment of society at large, while fortunes were being made by the new class of traders and private appropriators of state property. They attacked Kuchma's pro-Western orientation, arguing that the International Monetary Fund's prescriptions for the state budget were appropriate for a Third World country, but not for Ukraine. Adherence to the IMF's demands would lead to a situation where transnational financial-industrial giants would control the country's economy. The chaos and corruption in central government ministries made it unlikely that greater executive power could lead to recovery and adequate social-security provisions, they argued. Rather, the president's drive for more power in these conditions only raised the spectre of authoritarian rule. The Supreme Rada was the country's guarantee of political pluralism and the medium by which social grievances could be aired and addressed.²³

On 31 May Kuchma raised the stakes and issued a decree announcing a national plebiscite for 28 June. The question to be posed—"Do you have confidence in the president or the Supreme Rada?"—and the fact that only two answers would be possible would force the electorate to choose between the two institutions. There would be no provision to indicate confidence or non-confidence in both of them. Public-opinion surveys suggested that the president would win hands down. In an appeal to the nation, Kuchma spoke of the inadmissibility of "political war" in conditions of economic ruin, of the unacceptable length of time it had taken to adopt the Law on State Power, and of its sabotage after adoption. He threatened to bring order to the country, either through agreement with the Rada "or through more complicated and drawn-out events." He emphasized, however, that "the president will not use force. The greatest political victory is not worth spilling blood over. God and the people will damn anyone who breaks the peace on Ukrainian soil."²⁴

Two small articles accompanied the appeal in the government newspaper, *Uriadovyi kur'ier*: an instruction by the Cabinet to law-enforcement agencies to

22 *Uriadovyi kur'ier*, 6 June 1995.

23 Oleksandr Holovchenko summarizes this view in a major article in *Holos Ukrainy*, 20 and 26 April 1995. See also *Holos Ukrainy*, 12, 16, 23, and 26 May and 3 June 1995.

24 *Uriadovyi kur'ier*, 3 June 1995.

strengthen the safekeeping of firearms and street-control devices such as tear-gas guns; and an announcement that the Council of the Regions unanimously supported the plebiscite, would assure its conduct, and was ready "to share responsibility with the president for the organization of the state's socio-economic and political tasks."

The Supreme Rada responded on 1 June: it vetoed the plebiscite on grounds of unconstitutionality. It forbade governments at all levels to issue funds to conduct it or any other plebiscite in 1995. It further proposed a meeting with the president to discuss reaching a compromise, and asked him to submit the names of the members of his new government to the Rada for approval. The government had resigned in March after the Rada voted non-confidence in it. Ievhen Marchuk had been appointed the acting prime minister, but Kuchma was waiting for a solution to the constitutional impasse before proposing a new government. The resolution further proposed that Kuchma and Moroz jointly submit to the Rada a new list of candidates for election to the Constitutional Court. The resolution showed that the ongoing struggle for the constitutional division of powers was simultaneously a struggle over the actual composition of the next government and of the Constitutional Court, framed by the broader struggle over the direction of Ukraine's post-Communist transition.²⁵

Having brought the Supreme Rada to the brink of dissolution, Kuchma now manoeuvred to drive his advantage home. The president had been meeting with the representatives of six factions in the Rada that supported him against the left bloc. As the conflict deepened, his support grew to eight factions by June. They proposed to sign an alternative agreement with Kuchma if the Law on State Power failed to be implemented. This agreement contained the same provisions on the division of power as the amended law, but it was framed as a temporary agreement between the president and the Rada, to remain in force until a new constitution could be adopted. That is, it was not seen as the kernel of the new constitution, and it was not expected to muster a two-thirds majority.

Kuchma met with the Rada's factions again on 4 and 5 June. On 6 June he met the Rada's Presidium, who agreed to put the agreement to a vote by the deputies. On 7 June the Rada considered the "Constitutional Agreement between the Supreme Rada and President of Ukraine on the Basic Principles of Organization and Functioning of State Power and Local Self-Government in Ukraine until the Adoption of a New Constitution." The deputies voted by name: 240 were in favour of the agreement, eighty-one were opposed, and eight abstained. Moroz and Kuchma signed the agreement at a ceremony in the Mariinskyi Palace the next day. The plebiscite was cancelled, and preparations

25 *Holos Ukrainy*, 3 June 1995.

for a new constitution were announced. Kuchma named Ievhen Marchuk as prime minister and asked him to form a new Cabinet.²⁶

The constitutional agreement broadly follows the provisions of the draft Law on State Power, with several important changes and elaborations:

1. The division of powers between the executive, legislature, and judiciary is affirmed.
2. The head of the Constitutional Court, exercising judicial supremacy, is nominated jointly by the president and the Supreme Rada, and appointed by the latter. However, these two institutions each nominate half of the court's judges. The president nominates the heads and all the judges of the Supreme Court and the Higher Arbitration Court.
3. The president is the head of state, the chief executive, and the head of the Cabinet of Ministers. The Cabinet reports directly to him. The president is also the head of the National Security Council and the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. He appoints and dismisses the high command and declares war and a state of war, subject to ratification by the Supreme Rada.
4. The president must establish his government within a month of taking office or of the previous government's resignation. Within two months the government must present to the Rada its programme, which must be within the budgetary limits set by the Rada. If this condition is not met, the government can face a non-confidence motion. The Rada can vote non-confidence in the programme, but it cannot challenge the composition of the government until one year after it has been established.
5. The president's decrees on matters of economic reform not yet regulated by law have the force of law until relevant legislation is adopted.
6. The president can veto Supreme Rada legislation and send it back for revision. The Rada must gain support for its amended version by a two-thirds majority in order to require the president to sign the legislation and make it public.
7. The president has the prerogative of nominating persons to the following key posts: members of the Supreme Court and the Higher Arbitration Court, the procurator-general, and the head of the National Bank.

²⁶ *Holos Ukrainy*, 16 May and 6, 7, 8, and 10 June 1995; and *Uriadovyi kur'ier*, 6 and 8 June 1995.

8. There is no provision for the president to dissolve the Supreme Rada. The Rada is responsible for its own dissolution and setting new elections, both of the Rada and the president.
9. The Supreme Rada exercises legislative, constitutional, and control functions, as foreseen in the existing constitution and the new agreement. It will adopt the new constitution. A broad range of subjects, including the state budget, rights and freedoms of citizens, education, currency value, and state taxes are the exclusive prerogative of the legislature. All subjects not already defined as the prerogative of other branches of the state lie within the Rada's prerogative.
11. The Supreme Rada can veto the president's decrees on the basis of their unconstitutionality, which must be established by the judiciary.
12. There are no provisions for the impeachment of the president.
13. Elected heads of the oblast, raion, and Kyiv and Sevastopol city governments are appointed as heads of their respective levels of state administration by the president. Their dismissal as state administration heads carries with it the automatic termination of their positions as elected heads of government. Higher levels of the state administration, from the president down, can overturn the decisions of lower levels. The state administration can delegate responsibilities to lower levels of government (village, town, city) and can overturn their decisions, subject to judicial review.

Conclusion

President Kuchma's first year in office was a very busy one on the domestic and international fronts. This article has investigated only one of the important developments—the effort to create a stronger presidential arm of state at the expense of the legislature, which inherited substantial executive and juridical powers from the Soviet period. By June 1995 the results were clear: Kuchma succeeded in establishing presidential control of the central government, thereby taking it out of the hands of the Central Rada. He subordinated the lower levels of government to the state administration system, undermining the elective authority and accountability of their heads. Combined with his successful courtship of elected oblast leaders by their inclusion into a Council of the Regions, Kuchma dispelled practically all hope that a Soviet system of government—with lower governments accountable to the higher ones all the way to the pinnacle of the Supreme Rada—could be created. The Rada thereby became—at least by definition—a more purely legislative arm of state.

Kuchma's hopes were not realized completely. He was denied the power to subordinate the Rada to his office by the right to dissolve it. He conceded to the

joint nomination of the chief justice and member judges of the Constitutional Court. And, not least importantly, the Rada agreed only to what Oleksandr Moroz called "a temporary juridical and political agreement," not a constitutional agreement, between the Rada and the president. The Rada will adopt the new constitution when it is ready.

The struggle over the division of state powers is by no means a struggle for the sake of power alone. The functional division between the arms of state masks a division of another kind: the complex ideological division between the Rada's left-wing bloc and the president's team and his supporters in the Rada. It is no longer a division between capitalism and socialism/communism as the long-term goal of the transition period. It is more a choice between different paths for Ukraine to a capitalist society and the world market, with still widespread disagreement about the relative benefits of ties to the east as opposed to the west, the welfare state versus neo-liberal austerity in welfare, and so on.

Behind ideology—and in some ways beyond it as well—there are real material interests that divide Ukraine's political elite. It would be too simple to say that Kuchma is the pro-capitalist reformer and the Supreme Rada contains an anti-capitalist bloc, and that here the conflict rests. Indeed, *de facto* privatization of productive assets has gone so far in Ukraine today that one can already speak about distinct concentrations of capital employed by their owners, who necessarily have distinct interests. Today these owners are all represented in politics in some way—within the Rada, the presidency, and other central and regional state institutions. On the one hand, they all have an interest in holding the state and the country together, building up the national market, and creating a national economic leadership—this is one of President Kuchma's priorities as Ukraine's foremost elected leader. However, the struggle over the division of state powers is also the struggle between these separate and sometimes contradictory interests of privately or corporately accumulating wealth. Thus, new questions must arise: who among Ukraine's new business elites will benefit materially from a strengthened presidency in the person of Leonid Kuchma, and who will suffer? And what impact, if any, will a strengthened presidency have upon the living standards of the Ukrainian population as a whole? Such questions concerning the relationship between state-political and socio-economic processes are the subject of another article.

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Poland and Ukraine: Elite Transformations and Prospects for Democracy*

Jan Pakulski

Poland and Ukraine have had similar fates. Both the historical experience of the two peoples and their current predicaments are strongly linked. This is not only a matter of territorial proximity, but also of strong geopolitical and cultural links. Both nations inhabit the “borderline” area between West and East. Both live in the shadow of the disintegrating Soviet Russian empire. Both are experiencing a difficult transition from Communism to what, it is hoped, will become a fully democratic market society. Because of their population, size and centrality in the region, they are also crucial for the stability of all of Central and Eastern Europe. These are compelling reasons for assessing the two countries’ current political developments and future prospects.

This assessment rests on the foundation of elite theory, which suggests that political developments depend primarily on elite configurations. National elites comprise persons with the most power in the national community—those who have serious and regular influence on the major decisions affecting that community. Such persons are located in the largest and resource-richest organizations—most importantly, the state. I will focus here on political elites and their changing shape in Poland and Ukraine, paying some attention also to the emergent elite configuration in Russia. The assumptions of my paper are that elite configurations are the key determinant of democratic stabilization, and that such stabilization is the key determinant of long-term Polish-Ukrainian relations and stability in the entire region.¹

* This paper is based on the assessment of elite configurations in Central and Eastern Europe found in Higley and Pakulski 1992, 1995.

1 For the classical version of elite theory, see the writings of Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, and Roberto Michels. I am using here the contemporary version of elite theory, in particular, Field and Higley 1980, Higley and Burton 1989, and Etzioni-Halevi 1993. For a review of current patterns

As far as elite configurations are concerned, there are three broad possibilities: (1) increasingly unchecked and violent power struggles between elites, with regimes oscillating between democratic and authoritarian forms, depending upon which groups have the upper hand; (2) restrained elite competitions in accordance with democratic game rules and tacit accommodations, with regimes gradually becoming stable democracies; and (3) takeovers by ultra-nationalist elites through coups or plebiscitary victories, with regimes becoming state-corporatist in form and quasi-fascist in operation. These configurations and possibilities, I argue below, are different in Poland, Ukraine, and Russia.

Elite Configurations and Political Outcomes

The key characteristics of elites are their unity and differentiation (Field and Higley 1980, Etzioni-Halevy 1993). The former involves both interaction between the key groups of power-holders and the norms guiding this interaction. The latter refers to the division of labour, institutional separation, and organizational autonomy. Unified elites interact regularly through networks and channels that provide them access to central decision-making processes. There is little exclusion; no important section of elites is marginalized or cut off from the political process. Differentiated elites become organizationally diverse and partly autonomous from inter-elite interference, mass pressures, and extra-national threats.

Differences in the extent of unity and differentiation define the main configurations of national elites: strong or weak unity accompanied by wide or narrow differentiation. These configurations are, in turn, principal determinants of political regimes: stable democracies of the "polyarchic" type (Dahl 1971) are likely to appear where there is both strong unity and wide differentiation; authoritarian regimes, where there is neither; partocratic regimes, where there is strong unity but narrow differentiation; and unstable democracies, where there is wide differentiation but weak unity.

Two types of strong elite unity must be distinguished. In the first type ("ideological" unity), all or most elites belong to a dominant party or movement and uniformly profess its ideology, religious doctrine, or other clearly defined belief system. This may result from the victory of a specific elite group in a revolutionary upheaval; both Communist and Islamic regimes approximate this type. In either case, a newly dominant elite dictates that anyone who possesses or aspires to power must conform to its doctrine and organizational base. Regimes created by this type of elite tend to be long-lasting, but there is no public contestation and therefore no democratic politics. In the second type

("consensual" unity), elites are affiliated with conflicting parties, movements, and beliefs, but still adhere to a set of procedures and tacit understandings about the operation of political institutions in which they share power through complex interaction networks. This is an essentially voluntary and procedural unity that greatly facilitates conflict resolution short of the point at which inter-elite violence begins. Elites "agree how to disagree," how to resolve their disagreements in a peaceful way. Their appeals for electoral and other support among conflicting mass categories and interests tend to be restrained. This is conducive to peaceful contestations, wide participation, and thus a stable democratic regime (Field and Higley 1980, Higley et al. 1991).

Elite differentiation follows the long-term processes of industrialization and political modernization. It may be slowed for long periods when one elite group manages, through revolution or foreign imposition, to become dominant and impose its doctrine on all other groups. This was the case with the Communist regimes. The centralized Party-state apparatus (labelled here "partocratic") concentrated power in the hands of the small political establishment, typically the Politburo. Functional autonomy was severely restricted by overall political supervision and the central management of the economy and society. In the case of dependent elites, as in the former Soviet republics, this centralization went beyond sectoral differences; national elites enjoyed only small margins of autonomy.

If the extent of elite unity and differentiation are interrelated, four broad elite configurations and the basic regime types with which they are associated emerge (see Higley and Pakulski 1995) (Figure 1).

The current elite transformations in Central and Eastern Europe started from configurations of ideological elites operating in partocratic regimes. The strength of ideological unity differed (it was higher in Ukraine and Russia than in Poland), as did the degree and scope of elite differentiation. Nevertheless, on the eve of the "velvet revolutions" all Central and Eastern European elites approximated this type. The collapse of Communism in Europe meant the collapse of ideological unity and opened the way for the process of transition from the partocratic configuration. This process started in Poland with the round-table talks

Figure 1. Configurations of National Elites (and Associated Regime Types).

		Elite Unity	
Elite Differentiation		<i>Strong</i>	<i>Weak</i>
	<i>Wide</i>	Consensual elite (stable democracy)	Fragmented elite (unstable democracy)
	<i>Narrow</i>	Ideological elite (partocratic regime)	Divided elite (authoritarian regime)

in the spring of 1989 and the June elections. The post-Communist transition in Ukraine started with the collapse of the Soviet Union accelerated by the failed coup attempt in August 1991.

The Polish and Ukrainian Elites on the Eve of the Revolution²

The ideological unity of the Communist elites had never been monolithic, however, and by the 1980s it was clearly weakening. Dissident statements and actions by intellectual, religious, scientific, and sometimes even political leaders punctuated the politics of most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe throughout the entire period of Communist rule. This erosion of ideological unity was much more intense in Poland than in Soviet-dominated Ukraine. The reforms of the Gierek era (1970–80) and the Solidarity period accelerated the process of erosion in Poland to the extent that on the eve of the round-table talks (February–April 1989) the Polish elites were already ideologically secularized and divided, with a number of intellectual, church, and trade-union leaders forming a well-articulated counter-elite (Frentzel-Zagorska 1993). This counter-elite was informally tolerated, and many of its members maintained informal contact with the party-state leaders. In Ukraine, changes in elite unity came later and mostly “from above,” in the sense that they were triggered by the reformist policies of Gorbachev. This does not deny the importance of the movement from below, Rukh. But Rukh was too weak and too fragmented to give rise to alternative political elites of a type and scope that emerged out of the Solidarity movement in Poland. The key impetus in Ukraine came from within the national-Communist elites, which grew ideologically disenchanted, divided in their political

2 The extent of changes in elite unity and the nature of political regimes warrants thinking of the 1989–91 events in Central and Eastern Europe as revolutions (e.g., Banac 1992a, Higley and Pakulski 1992, Stokes 1993). As a follower of the classical elite theorists, I consider these revolutions elite transitions.

loyalties, and threatened in their status. They seized the window of opportunity created by the collapse of the Soviet establishment and made a bid for autonomy that would strengthen their position (Motyl 1993).

The “velvet revolutions” did the demolition job: they destroyed the ideological-elite configuration and opened the way for the new elite structure. Important elite groups sought new political formulae in ethno-nationalist idioms and the principles of liberal democracy and a market economy. With the eclipse of the Communist parties and the dismantling of the partocratic regimes, power flowed rapidly from the political elites to the military, economic, state-administrative, and symbolic-cultural elites. These transformations—revolutionary in scope but peaceful in form—follow three main patterns: (1) a negotiated settlement paving the way for consensual elites (e.g., Poland and Hungary); (2) a negotiated but limited liberalization resulting in fragmented elites (e.g., Bulgaria and Slovakia); and (3) a pre-emptive takeover by sections of the Communist elites, producing divided elites (e.g., Romania, Ukraine). I shall focus on the Polish and Ukrainian cases and on the somewhat puzzling pattern of elite transformation in Russia.³

Poland: Towards a Consensual Elite

The foundations for consensual unification of elites in Poland were already laid during the Gierek era and the Solidarity period. Even during martial law the elites respected the unwritten rules of political engagement: there was no bloodshed (except in some isolated incidents), no protracted and serious persecution, no political warfare where “anything goes” (including terrorism). Reconstructing elites was much easier under such conditions of restrained contest and considerable openness. It was also easier because the counter-elites were well-articulated and relatively safe, to the extent that they could accept the offer of negotiation without risk of losing legitimacy.

Protracted, largely secret negotiations between the Communist elites and their opponents during 1988 and 1989 in Poland had the earmarks of an elite settlement. At round-table discussions held from February to April 1989, leaders of the two elite camps reached a “historic compromise”: they recognized the desirability of democracy, pluralism, constitutional reform, and free elections. The first elections were promptly scheduled for June, although the Communists were guaranteed a majority of Sejm seats and thus a decisive role in the new government. When Solidarity won all but one of the 161 Sejm seats it contested and all but one seat in the Senate, while 33 of the 35 Communist candidates who had been guaranteed seats in the Sejm failed to gain election, a comprehensive deal was secretly struck. Solidarity’s leaders agreed to let the Communists

3 For a more detailed analysis, see Higley and Pakulski 1992, 1995.

appoint persons to the seats reserved for them and acquiesced in the Sejm's election of Jaruzelski as president (by one vote). In return, Jaruzelski and the Communists signalled that the president would be no more than a figurehead and that they would assent to a host of liberalizing laws later in the year (Gross 1992, von Beyme 1993, Frentzel-Zagorska 1993).

Specific components of the round-table agreement did not last long. The decisions to let Jaruzelski remain as president and to accept Communist domination of the Sejm despite the actual 1989 election result were soon seen by most non-Communist elites as unworkable and, in the light of weakening Soviet power, unnecessary. The election of Lech Walesa as president in November 1990 and a sweeping turnover of Sejm members resulting from parliamentary elections in October 1991 eliminated both round-table provisions. But, by injecting many new faces and factions into the political elite, the elections produced considerable fragmentation, especially within the post-Solidarity bloc (Wesołowski 1991, 1992). However, the strong showing of a complete outsider in the 1990 presidential election—Stanisław Tymiński and his "Party X"—had already demonstrated to quarrelling Solidarity and other leaders how combustible politics were and how destabilizing their fragmentation could be. A five-percent threshold for individual parties and an eight-percent threshold for party blocs to achieve seats in parliament were therefore adopted for the elections in 1993. Discontent with economic conditions enabled the pro-democratic and pro-reformist successor to the Communist party, the Democratic Left Alliance, to emerge victorious in those elections (Szablowski 1993, Wesołowski and Wasilewski 1992).

Neither fragmenting tendencies nor the ex-Communists' electoral success appears to threaten the consensual unity of Polish elites. Unlike in neighbouring Ukraine, Polish debates have centred on the pace of market reforms and the shape of democratic institutions, not their desirability. The main issues have been the scope of presidential power, the extent of "welfare rights," and church-state relations, especially as regards policy towards abortion. No important elite group, including the comparatively radical Labor Union party on the left and the Christian National Union on the right, questions the democratic order. The issues of the scope of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, ethnic rights, and religious minority status—which proved to be divisive in Ukraine—did not enter the political agenda. Political fireworks resulted from the idiosyncratic, often bumbling interventions of top politicians, especially Walesa, rather than from fundamental political-ideological divisions and unrestrained power struggles.

To summarize, the transformation of the Polish elite involved elite evolution and negotiated settlement in the sense of deliberate and managed accommodations between competing elite groups. After the round-table negotiations and agreements in 1989, most top leaders of the partocratic regimes were replaced, opening the way for a broad co-optation of new leaders. But large sections of the

administrative elites retained their positions, thus providing the bridge to a new elite configuration. This combination of turnover in top political posts with substantial opening and continuity in administrative, professional, military, and other elite sectors was crucial for the transformation to a consensual elite.

Also crucial were the swift adaptations made by most surviving leaders of the old Communist parties, who quickly repudiated Marxism-Leninism and entered electoral competitions under the banner of democratic socialism. Although decisively defeated in the initial elections, the ex-Communist parties provided a vehicle for integrating many "untainted" lower-ranking politicians and administrators of the old regime into democratic politics. In the most recent Polish and Hungarian elections, the ex-Communist parties harnessed widespread economic frustrations to stage impressive comebacks.

The Ukrainian Elites: Fragmentation and Division

The current Ukrainian national elite was born deeply divided. Gorbachev's reforms and the successes of democratic movements in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia triggered a comparable movement in Ukraine, Rukh, which for a short period unified the anti-Communist opposition. Like its counterparts to the west, Rukh contained fervently nationalist and liberal-democratic factions, a dualism that was echoed by diverging nationalist and Russophile tendencies among the ruling Communist elites. Ukraine's declaration of independence immediately following the failed Soviet coup in August 1991 occurred only after stormy debates among Communist leaders about the wisdom of taking the nationalist route or remaining within the USSR as a "sovereign" republic (Cowley 1994, Motyl 1993). As the Soviet Union imploded, however, the Communist elites appropriated the independence agenda in order to retain power. This amounted to a pre-emptive coup that ensured exceptionally slow political and economic reform. Government machinery and economic enterprises have remained in the hands of *nomenklatura* officials whose rivalries involve much corrupt and criminal activity and who uphold the institutional status quo that anchors their positions. Leaders of the military-industrial state corporations, which are the main employers in the more industrialized eastern half of Ukraine, have pressed to restore economic and political ties to Russia. Nationalist factions have agitated for greater independence from Russia, but they advocate conflicting policies and are generally ambivalent about privatization and marketization. The results have been elite cleavages and political deadlock amidst drastic economic decline.⁴

4 The two-round parliamentary elections in March and April 1994 did not improve the situation. Because of the splintering of the national-democratic forces, especially Rukh, most seats were won by semi-reformed ex-Communists, thus strengthening the hold of the ex-*nomenklatura*-based elites.

The presidential elections in July 1994 highlighted these cleavages when voters split cleanly along ethnic and regional lines. Voters in the Ukrainian-speaking western half of the country supported incumbent president Leonid Kravchuk, who had masterminded the Communist elite's appropriation of the independence agenda in 1991. Voters in the predominantly Russian-speaking eastern and southern areas opted for Leonid Kuchma. After a narrow victory, Kuchma appealed for national unity, and in the next month he signed a pact with several key leaders (Oleksandr Moroz and Vitalii Masol) that promised mutual consultation and co-operation thereafter. Although the pact did not last long, it helped to limit elite conflict in the crucial post-election period, thus helping Kuchma to consolidate the "party of power"—a loose coalition of interests attached to the state apparatus—and to speed up economic reforms. He managed to patch up differences with Russia (about the Black Sea Fleet, Russian minority rights in Ukraine, and the energy trade) as well as with the West (nuclear weapons, foreign investment). But the unbanning of the Communist party in October 1994 and the attempts at institutionalizing the division of powers (which would increase the president's autonomy) in the spring of 1995 provoked further divisions within the elite. Thus, the Ukrainian elites did not follow the negotiated settlement path leading to the opening up, accommodational differentiation and consensual consolidation of elites. There are fewer signs of a democratic-reformist elite consensus, and calls to replace democratic institutions with a "strong and decisive" nationalist regime are frequent.

In sum, elite transformations in Ukraine have been limited. They have mainly involved takeovers by more reformist Communist-elite factions, who have engineered them to avoid wider changes. The ideological-elite configuration has clearly dissipated; the Marxist-Leninist political formulas and semiformal elite hierarchies running through the Communist parties have disappeared. But there is neither strong elite unity nor wide functional differentiation. With the exception of the August 1994 "pact," evidence of a negotiated elite settlement has been absent, and the electoral campaigns have revealed strong plebiscitary tendencies. The presidential "party of power" has limited the extent to which different elites can participate in central decision-making. The separatist movement in Crimea has been held in check by the concerted disapproval of both Ukrainian and Russian leaders, but it continues to threaten elite unity. Ukrainian elites look deeply fragmented, bordering on divided. There are deep splits over the fundamental issues of the form of democracy, presidential power, economic reform, and national unity.

The Russian Elite Puzzle

The Soviet Union's implosion and the emergence of a post-Communist Russia have involved an extraordinarily complex elite transformation and regime transition. These processes began with Gorbachev's reforms (see Lane and Ross 1994), went through a sudden democratic acceleration after the failed coup in August 1991, and have since entailed much political conflict and economic upheaval. Three sets of elites can be distinguished: the central Russian elite, the less reformed regional elites, and the largely autonomous elites in the breakaway republics (Helf 1994). I focus here on the central Russian elite.

There are few signs and little prospect of democratic stabilization and consensual-elite unification in Russia (Dunlop 1993, Rutland 1994). Which of the other elite configurations—a divided or a fragmented national elite—is most clearly emerging? A case for each of these possibilities can be made. Transformation to the divided configuration is suggested by the extent to which the ex-Communist elites have clung to power in many institutional sectors, by the power struggles between the ultra-nationalist and liberal-democratic elite groups, by the conflicts between the presidential and parliamentary elites, and by an internally divided military elite, some of whose leaders flout orders with which they disagree. It follows that the Russian regime is basically unstable, with a takeover by ultra-nationalist or military elites or both a distinct possibility.

Transformation to the fragmented configuration is suggested by weak unity and extensive elite differentiation, which has resulted in an increasingly personalized presidential elite, a congeries of political parties and movements inside and outside parliament, and an array of military, state-administrative, business, intellectual, media, trade union, and other elites. In this interpretation, the acceptance of free and participatory electoral competitions and referendums is nevertheless sufficiently wide among elites for a precariously democratic regime to be likely to persist.

Fundamental divisions in Russia seem to be prevented by the legacies and lessons of the Soviet experience. The most important legacies are an acute awareness of the need for elite unity (peppered by fears of the "unruly mob"), a strong aversion to inter-elite violence dating back to the Stalinist period, and many informal elite networks of familiarity and friendship built during the stable Brezhnev years. Among the important lessons of the Soviet experience are the unworkability of a centrally planned economy, the need for broader political incorporation, and the costs of military undertakings such as the Afghanistan and Chechnia quagmires. From this perspective, Russian elite relations, although certainly rough-and-tumble, exhibit at least some signs of restraint and accommodation.

The dramatic showdown between Yeltsin's government and a rump of the Russian parliament in September and October 1993 can certainly be interpreted as indicating a divided elite. But it can also plausibly be regarded as a clearing

of political debris from the Soviet implosion and as a highly sobering lesson about the costs of elite disunity. The rump that hunkered down in the Russian White House was quite small and, owing to its status as a holdover from the Soviet-designed electoral system, dubiously legitimate.

Perhaps more important, the 1993 showdown produced no clear winners. It was almost unanimously condemned by the public, undermined Yeltsin's prestige and legitimacy, and destroyed the political careers of the parliamentary rebels. Subsequent developments suggested a sobering effect on all sides. The parliamentary elections and constitutional referendum two months later were freely contested and eminently peaceful. In April 1994 leaders of most of the parties represented in the State Duma, together with representatives of twenty of Russia's twenty-one semi-autonomous regions, signed a "Treaty of Social Accord" in which they pledged to avoid political violence, to hold early elections, and to introduce major constitutional changes before the presidential election scheduled in 1996. Because leaders of the Communist and Agrarian parties, who together controlled roughly a quarter of the Duma's 450 seats, refused to sign, and because it was not the product of extensive negotiations, the treaty cannot be regarded as a Russian round table equivalent to the round tables elsewhere in the region. But neither was this attempt at unity the sort of undertaking one expects where national elites are fundamentally divided, and elite initiatives during the year that followed did not violate the treaty in any major way.

In sum, the Soviet-Russian elite transformation is unique in its complexity. In terms of procedure, it has clearly not involved a negotiated settlement. Had Gorbachev's reforms continued, they might well have led to such a settlement. But because of the Soviet Union's imperial history and multinational make-up, his liberalization unleashed powerful centrifugal forces that provoked an elite backlash culminating in the August 1991 coup attempt. This enabled Yeltsin and the main Russian elites, in what resembled a pre-emptive coup, to destroy remaining Soviet power and consolidate their own power in Russia. But the Russian elites immediately displayed considerable fragmentation and division along institutional, policy, and national-regional lines, aggravated by economic disarray. Crises such as the showdown with parliament in 1993 and the costly attempt to enforce control over Chechnia have been seen by many as indicating a divided national elite from which an authoritarian regime may well result.

However, as in Ukraine, there have been some attempts to unify the elite through the series of late and limited "emergency pacts." They have been late, in the sense of coming after the formal transition to electoral democracy. They also have been limited in scope: the major oppositional factions—both ideological and ethnic—have been largely excluded from the deals, and they seldom have involved regional leaders struggling for broader autonomy.

Conclusions

Stable democracy requires strong elite unity of a consensual kind accompanied by wide elite differentiation into specialized, relatively autonomous, and competing sectors and groups. Transformations to the configuration are quite advanced in Poland. They have involved negotiated settlements and have been followed by a thorough turnover of holders of top political positions. Continuing disagreements about policies, especially the pace of economic restructuring, and about how power should be apportioned between parliamentary and executive branches of government, are likely to produce further political tensions and changes of government. However, all significant elite groups in Poland, including the military, appear disposed to practice restraint in crisis situations. This creates a climate conducive to the consolidation of stable and polyarchic regimes.

Stable democracy is less likely where elite unity is weak and elite differentiation and autonomy are narrow. In Ukraine, a pre-emptive coup by Communist party factions greatly retarded the dismantling of partocratic institutions and the accommodation of emergent elites. Barely reformed ex-Communists continue to control parliament, elites are aligned in opposing camps, there are few signs of a democratic-reformist consensus, and ethnic-regional cleavages provide fertile ground for separatist and ultra-nationalist factions. The political domination of the ex-Communist ruling coalition (the "party of power") was achieved by a closed elite network entrenched in the executive, security and other state institutions. The members of this narrow network "remain united in ensuring that any systemic change in the transition period will not threaten their predominance in the state nor their capacity to use state office to accumulate personal material wealth" (Bojcun 1995: 241). The electoral contest was delayed until 1994 and, when it happened, it highlighted the deep ethnic-territorial divisions. Instead of a round table, the emerging regime of Leonid Kuchma entered a temporary post-election pact with two major parliamentary opponents.

This form of "management of change" through restricting accommodation of opponents and emergency pacts proves less successful in building consensus and consolidating the democratic order. The persistent elite divisions make risks high and security low. The regimes emerging in Ukraine under such conditions will continue to be more vulnerable to populist flare-ups and authoritarian bids than the more secure regimes in neighbouring Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

Russia is the most complex and puzzling case of "unconsolidated democracy." The fragmentation of its elites is at least two-dimensional: there are rifts between the groups and factions making up the central elite, and between the central elite and assorted regional elites. The latter cleavage reflects Russia's vast size and the way in which Yeltsin and his associates have bolstered the autonomy of regional elites when confronting the Soviet regime. While deep ethnic cleavages have been largely confined to the southern regions of Caucasia and Tatarstan, there are significant regional fissures that will work against elite

accommodation and compromise. Although Russian politics remain an elite game, the elites lack the insulation from public pressures that a developed party system would provide, and they are therefore vulnerable to demagogic and plebiscitary challenges. The loss of empire and of a sense of national greatness, as well as the predicaments of 25 million Russians in the "near abroad," only heighten elite vulnerability.

The future of Polish-Ukrainian relations should be seen in this broad socio-political context. Both countries are vulnerable—although to a differing degree—to an internal threat that may come from elite divisions as well as from de-stabilization and/or authoritarian imposition in Russia. Paradoxically, the same domino effect that prompted the wave of democratization in the years 1989–91 may reverse the democratic wave in a way suggested by Huntington (1991). If this happens, Poland and Ukraine will likely continue to share the same fate. Therefore, geopolitical logic should prompt the leaders of both countries towards an alliance, a pact stabilizing the entire region. Historical memories, however, seem to prevent the formation of such an alliance and to keep both nations in what, to an outsider, must look like a puzzling indifference to each other. Perhaps only courageous and far-sighted political elites on both sides can overcome this indifference. Whether such elites will emerge or not is the question that only prophets, and not social scientists, can answer.

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Polish-Ukrainian Relations Today and in the Future: Round Table*

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JERZY ZUBRZYCKI

In looking at Ukrainian-Polish relations today and in the future one has to begin, I suggest, with four givens, four points of departure, which may serve as an analytical framework for our discussion. The first, and the most obvious, is the enormous and tragic baggage of history that, for many centuries, and particularly in this century, has weighed heavily upon Polish-Ukrainian relations. For Poles raised on the legend that we were always the victims of whatever misfortune befell our country, it is worth recalling that in the Ukrainian consciousness, as I understand it, Polish hands were second only to Moscow's when it came to inflicting suffering. We need to appreciate the weight of the terrible baggage of history and to be aware of the responsibility that each side must bear for its part of it.

Secondly, we must bear in mind the face of Russia today—the Russia of the 1990s with its new imperialist political stance. The prominent Polish commentator, Jan Novak, in Washington recently called it the new Duchy of Moscow, and we see the justification for this in Russia's ambitions to restore the Russian Empire of the tsars and the Soviets and to regain its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. We see it in Moscow's veto against NATO membership for former satellite countries of the Soviet Union; we see it in Russia's repeated

* The round table, an initiative of Prof. Emeritus Andrzej Ehrenkreutz (University of Michigan), was co-sponsored by the Australian Institute of Polish Affairs and the Ukrainian Studies Association of Australia. It was co-chaired by the presidents of these bodies, Prof. Emeritus Jerzy Zubrzycki and Dr. Marko Pavlyshyn, respectively.

warnings to Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania about attempts to form any kind of alliance among themselves.

The third given is the nature of nationalism in Eastern Europe today. In Western Europe nationalism is in decline. Members of the European Community, by and large, disregard problems of national sovereignty, of nationalism, in the interests of the larger issue, the larger community. That, regrettably, is not the case in Central or Eastern Europe. On both sides of the boundary separating Poland and Ukraine, prominent nationalist voices are raised against the idea of a commonwealth—not a political commonwealth, but a commonwealth as a community of ideas and of cultural, economic, and political ties that would take our nations into a natural partnership for the sake of the integrity of Europe as a whole.

Our fourth point of departure is the reality of multicultural Australia. Multicultural policies in Australia promote two ideas. One is the idea of cultural maintenance, which enables us—Ukrainians, Poles, and members of other communities—to maintain our cultural identity beyond the first generation, for the good of Australia. The other is the idea of dialogue, of mutual tolerance.

Now I come to a point of substance. As I see it, anti-Polish sentiment in Ukraine seems to be relatively weakest in western Ukraine for reasons obvious to most of us. This is not because Ukrainian memories of Poland and the Poles have grown any fonder, but because, happily, persistent and hard-working groups of people on both sides of the frontier have done a great deal to promote the idea of a community of fate uniting our two nations in a sensible partnership of sovereign states—an idea that, I suggest, must outweigh any of the past errors to which I referred in my opening comments. This argument, in my opinion, has received a good hearing in Ukraine, for, whatever state Poland is in today, given its web of political intrigue, its inadequate welfare safety net, and other problems, it nevertheless presents the unexpected phenomenon of considerable economic development, increase in national wealth, and rapid growth of gross national product.

In 1992 the then president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, and Lech Wałęsa signed a declaration of understanding and pledged themselves to promote, as a matter of priority, friendly relations between our two countries. This initiative, regrettably, has remained, by and large, on paper. What, I think, is required now is that all people of good will promote this idea at the grass roots, so that the politicians may have a foundation on which to build. For without this no minister of foreign affairs, even with the best will in the world, can possibly promote good relations. To leave such matters to democracy would, I think, be a mistake. We must involve public initiatives. Universities, research institutes, think tanks, the arts community, sporting teams, the churches, spontaneous activities of various kinds—all of these can give the diplomatic game the necessary depth, the

necessary underpinning of ideas. They can, above all, promote genuine friendship, reciprocity, and give-and-take.

Today questions are being asked in Warsaw: Is it in Poland's interest to cultivate Russia at the expense of the peoples of the neighbouring countries? Or should the Poles realize that their relations with Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Lithuanians are of far greater significance than perceived hitherto? In my judgment, promoting relations with peoples of the neighbouring countries, and not giving priority to relations with Russia, makes sense, and I hope this will be generally accepted by members of this forum. I think we ought to remember Piłsudski's federalist vision and his *modus vivendi* with Petliura. It may be well, today, to revive something of this as a basis for the partnership of two nations that have so much in common.

Another point that I want to make concerns the problem of leadership. I have referred already to the Kravchuk-Wałęsa declaration of 1992 and to the fact that it did not result in much action. Apathy and narrow nationalism on both sides of the frontier bear much of the blame for that, as does the lack of politicians with vision and will—politicians of the stature of Piłsudski and Petliura. Regrettably, some Ukrainian politicians who are very supportive of those ideas—Mykhailo Horyn and Dmytro Pavlychko, for example—are no longer in parliament. But I would draw attention to a true friend of the ideal of partnership between the two countries—Hennadii Udovenko, once the ambassador in Warsaw and now the foreign minister of Ukraine. These are the kinds of people whose activity in future may do a great deal to promote the ideal of a true and solid partnership.

One final point. In 1988 I happened to be visiting Poland. At Jasna Góra in Częstochowa, Poland's great shrine of Our Lady, I witnessed the celebration of the millennium of the Christianization of Rus' by Ukrainians of the Greek Catholic faith. They came to Częstochowa because they could not go to a shrine in their own country. In front of the Black Madonna, the miraculous icon from Belz in Ukraine that, centuries ago, fell into Polish hands as a piece of wartime plunder, they pledged their commitment to Christianity. I was very pleased and honoured to be able to meet Cardinal Liubachivsky and other prominent hierarchs of the Uniate Church who came there and, on Polish soil, pledged their commitment not only to the continuation of their faith, but also to improved, more meaningful relations between Poland and Ukraine. That celebration of 1988, three years or so before Ukrainian independence became a reality, was, in my judgment, a good omen for the future.

IAROSLAV ISAEVYCH

Poland was the first state to recognize the independence of Ukraine *de jure*. Official recognition of Ukraine by the Polish government was announced on the very first day after the referendum of 1 December 1991, which supported the

Ukrainian parliament's declaration of Ukrainian independence. During the following years, Polish and Ukrainian governments declared repeatedly the importance of close co-operation between the two countries. It is often said, both officially and unofficially, that an independent Poland and an independent Ukraine need each other, and that the loss or curbing of the independence of either country will be dangerous for the independence of the other.

It is a pity that concrete actions aimed at Polish-Ukrainian consolidation have not followed as quickly as was at first envisaged. There are many objective difficulties caused by differences in the political and social situations of the two countries. One major negative factor is the lack of mutual confidence caused by persistent mutual negative stereotypes. Most of these stereotypes have as their background different interpretations of history. Those forces that are against Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement use mostly historical arguments. On the other hand, the first Ukrainian diplomatic representative in Poland, Mr. Teodosii Starak, has declared that the different understanding of history is the *only* serious obstacle to the establishment of ideal relations. Although this is, perhaps, an overstatement, it is true that the historical memories of both nations continue to influence political relations. During World War II Polish and Ukrainian politicians underestimated the importance of good relations between the two neighbouring nations. There was virtually no serious attempt at meaningful political dialogue. It is well known that in Volhynia and Galicia bloody conflicts between Polish and Ukrainian underground armed forces resulted in the cruel murder of many civilians and the destruction of numerous villages. Some Polish authors assume that the Ukrainian Insurgent Army murdered as many as 500,000 Poles, mostly women, old people, and children (I am quoting here a figure published in a bulletin of the Polish Press Agency).¹

In a more recent Polish publication the estimated number of Polish victims has been reduced to 50,000, and the number of Ukrainian victims is estimated at nearly 20,000. All Polish authors are sure that Ukrainians were initiators of the bloodshed and, thus, that Polish actions were only a retaliation. On the other hand, according to Ukrainian historians, the origin of the conflict is to be traced back to the interwar period, when the Polish state incorporated and tried to assimilate territories with a Ukrainian majority. Contemporary Ukrainians believe that the conflict was provoked also by Polish plans during the war to restore Polish rule over western Ukraine, although the majority of the population categorically rejected the perspective of Polish domination. The Polish professor Ryszard Torzecki, in his monograph on Poles and Ukrainians in World War II,²

1 *Nowiny*, 10 July 1990.

2 *Polacy i Ukraińcy: Sprawa ukraińska w czasie II wojny światowej na terenie II Rzeczypospolitej* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1993).

quotes a report by a Polish government-in-exile representative in Volhynia that states that the first Ukrainian terrorist actions were aimed against those Poles who served, voluntarily or involuntarily, in the German administration. Most importantly, he also proves that both the German and Soviet authorities, as well as their agents, contributed largely to provoking the bloody Ukrainian-Polish feuds. I consider morally important an exchange of mutual declarations of repentance, similar to the famous exchange of letters between the Polish and German episcopates. Perhaps at this stage our societies are not ready for such a step, though there is widespread understanding that history should not be an obstacle to improvement in mutual relations.

Returning to history, I should note that it was only after the Soviet occupation of western Ukraine and Poland that some members of the Polish Home Army and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army tried to co-ordinate their activity against the Communist authorities. But such cases were a rare exception. In general, Communist propaganda succeeded in entrenching mutual negative stereotypes of Poles and Ukrainians. In Ukraine the Soviet propaganda machine insisted that the Russians and Soviets had liberated Ukrainians from the Polish yoke. The authorities of so-called People's Poland tried to demonstrate Polish patriotism by pretending that the communists were defending the Poles from Ukrainian atrocities. In 1947 almost all Ukrainians who lived in Poland's regions bordering on Ukraine were deported to the former German territories that had been incorporated into Poland according to the Yalta decisions. Another large group of Ukrainians was transferred to Soviet Ukraine, while the majority of Poles in western Ukraine were resettled in Poland. This was called repatriation, but, even in those cases where it was voluntary, it was a tragedy for the people involved, who were deprived of their fundamental right to live where they wanted. Meanwhile, Poles living in the eastern and central regions of Ukraine were denied their right to emigrate to Poland.

As a result of various political developments, attitudes to Poland in western Ukraine differ from those in eastern Ukraine. I do not agree that they are better in western Ukraine. In western Ukraine—Galicia and western Volhynia—some people still hold an irrational fear of Poland. They are afraid that Poland has not abandoned plans to establish Polish rule over western Ukraine. Such views are not typical of eastern Ukraine, although anti-Polish and anti-Catholic stereotypes promoted by the Soviets and by Russian Orthodoxy have influenced a part of the public there. In postwar Poland many, or even most, Poles treated the Polish Communist authorities as agents of Moscow, and the idea of a Polish-Russian alliance could not be popular among Poles. Nevertheless, Polish authorities exploited anti-German feelings and anti-Ukrainian stereotypes as arguments for the inevitability of Polish dependence on Moscow. Most Poles, in defiance of communist repression, revered Marshal Piłsudski as a national hero and sympathized with his anti-Russian and anti-communist policies. Nevertheless,

even Poles who were hostile to the Soviet Union could not accept Piłsudski's idea of alliance with Ukraine. To a large extent, this nonacceptance was the result of a propaganda campaign by the Polish Communist authorities, who exaggerated the extent of the co-operation of some Ukrainians with the Germans and played down the Ukrainians' contribution to the armed struggle against the German Reich. In the Soviet Union the idea of Russian supremacy was disseminated under the guise of internationalist rhetoric. Thus cultural contacts between the Soviet republics and the East European satellites were theoretically welcome. In reality they remained extremely limited and were discredited by the misuse of so-called cultural exchanges to promote Communist propaganda. Still, some writers and scholars did their best to promote an authentic cultural exchange. The achievements in this field of the Ukrainian poet and translator Maksym Rylsky and of Marian Jakubiec, Ryszard Łużny, and other Polish philologists were tremendous.

But real political dialogue between Poles and Ukrainians was possible only in the diaspora. Most important in this regard was the initiative of the Polish monthly *Kultura*, published in Maisons-Laffitte near Paris. In 1977 a Ukrainian émigré and Canadian professor, Peter J. Potichnyj, organized the first scholarly conference on Polish-Ukrainian relations, at McMaster University in Hamilton, Canada.³ Other similar conferences were organized, but in Ukraine information on them was available only from Radio Liberty or the Voice of America.

As I said earlier, many of those Poles who were hostile to communist propaganda as such still accepted the thesis of communist authors about Ukrainians as eternal enemies of Poland. But anti-Ukrainian attitudes were most readily adopted by poorly-educated people. On the other hand, among leading Polish intellectuals, especially among the Catholic intellectual elite, the idea of reconciliation was much more popular. A new stage of Polish-Ukrainian dialogue was opened by the dissident movement. Especially important was the appearance in 1983 of Bohdan Skaradziński's *Belarusians, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians: Our Enemies or Our Friends?* in the Polish underground press.⁴ The founders of the Ukrainian national movement, Rukh, tried to take as their models Polish Solidarity and Lithuanian Sajudis. Although the Ukrainian Rukh remained far behind the Polish and Lithuanian movements, their development was very much alike. First there was the stage of the mass movement, marked by general euphoria and hopes for a near and total success. But rather soon came disillusionment, political conflict, growing social inertia, and, last but not least, the

3 The proceedings were published as *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980).

4 Kazimierz Podlaski (pseud.), *Białorusini—Litwini—Ukraińcy: Nasi wrogowie—czy bracia?* (1983; rev. ed.: Przedświt, 1984); Ukrainian trans.: *Bilorusy—lytovtsi—ukraints: Nashi vorohy—chy braty?*, ed. with an intro. by Jarosław Pelenski (Munich: Vidnova, 1986).

corruption and opportunism of many democratic functionaries. Still, in their early stages, when Solidarity and Rukh were on the upsurge, they managed to organize important friendly meetings between Polish opposition and Ukrainian patriotic leaders, and I believe that this contact of opposition leaders paved the way for later contacts between governments and presidents and for those mutual agreements that were signed and, we hope, will be fulfilled.

Some Ukrainian and Polish leaders have tried to promote the idea of the co-operation of nations between the Baltic and Black Seas. For various reasons, politicians of both countries are now less enthusiastic about this plan than they were initially. For the Polish government, it now seems, the most important objective of national policy is joining the NATO alliance. Some Ukrainians are afraid that if Poland joins NATO, the West will support Polish independence while abandoning Ukraine within the Russian sphere of influence.

I have to add that the Polish and Ukrainian governments have agreed to give more assistance to the cultural development of the Polish minority in Ukraine and the Ukrainian minority in Poland. Not everything is proceeding smoothly in this area. In Poland there are several revanchist associations, among them the so-called Society for the Investigation of Crimes of Ukrainian Nationalists and many societies promoting nostalgia for the so-called lost Polish territories. Our Polish colleagues explain that these societies have been organized by the generation that will soon disappear. Even if this is so, these societies have propagated anti-Ukrainian attitudes among certain younger Poles. This is a bad omen for the future. I have to admit that there are anti-Polish activists in Ukraine as well, but they have had less influence than their Polish counterparts.

It is a pity that the majority of Ukrainians, as well as the majority of Poles, still do not understand that, for geopolitical and other reasons, Poland and Ukraine are the most natural of allies. There are attempts to improve the situation. For example, some Ukrainian and Polish historians have established a joint commission for the discussion of difficult historical problems, and there exists a Polish-Ukrainian commission for the mutual revision of geography and history textbooks.

Cultural exchanges between Ukraine and Poland are still negligible. There was a time when Poland was for Ukrainians a kind of window to the West. The Polish press and Polish books were a unique source of alternative information for us under the Communist regime. Now we cannot subscribe in Ukraine to the Polish press because it is too expensive. Books from the United States, Britain, or Austria reach Ukraine because there are charitable foundations in those countries that donate them to Ukrainian libraries. Nobody, however, does this from Poland.

In the economic sphere, relations between Poland and Ukraine remain inadequate. It is encouraging, however, that both private companies and government officials are trying to improve the situation. It was decided recently

to open new border crossings and to continue the narrow-gauge railway of the West European type from the Polish-Ukrainian border to Lviv and further on. There are many other small signs of improvement in everyday co-operation.

Returning to the geopolitical situation, I would like to reiterate Zbigniew Brzeziński's dictum: "Russia can be an empire or a democracy, but not both, and in this issue Ukraine is central." Let me end with still another quotation, which is from a recent article by the American political scientist Paul Goble: "Ukrainians now know that the United States and the Western Europeans will not solve their security problems, and they also know that Russia will continue to be a security threat. They must look around, and in the first instance to their other neighbours." The most important of these neighbours is Poland. Under present conditions formal regional blocs would not be functional. What is needed is an understanding by government and society in both Poland and Ukraine that they have to proceed slowly but steadily towards better co-operation, which is in the best interests of both nations. That Poland was the first country to recognize Ukrainian independence is symbolic. I believe deeply that this gesture will be remembered by the next generation of Ukrainians and that it marks the beginning of a new era in Ukrainian-Polish relations.

MARKO BOJCUN

I shall address the issue of the security dilemma that Ukraine and Poland have faced after the cold war. Most of my remarks follow on from what Professor Isaievych has said, though I diverge from him in some of my views.

At the end of the cold war the essentially bipolar architecture of security in Europe was shattered. The countries of East Central Europe and, indeed, Eastern Europe, including Russia, very quickly developed a wholesale pro-Western, pro-Europe orientation. On this basis, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization initially began to consider how it might move eastward and take on new members. In consequence, the North Atlantic Co-operation Council extended its membership to include representatives of East European countries, and then the Partnership for Peace was formed. Both Poland and Ukraine were included in these initiatives quite early.

From the end of 1992 we see a serious change. Russia recoiled from its initial pro-Western enthusiasm and developed what is now being called its Eurasian orientation. Russia now saw its place as lying between Europe and Asia and began trying to build a sphere of influence that would incorporate the countries that it had lost upon the break-up of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet bloc. This meant that Poland found itself still on track for eventual membership in NATO and the security system of the Western alliance. It simultaneously became the prime candidate among the East Central European countries for membership in the European Union. Although the union does not have a security

arm, not having an army or foreign policy, membership would nevertheless bring Poland much closer to the Western system.

The change that came about in Russia in 1992 left Ukraine in a security vacuum. Ukraine could not be a member of the Western alliance, because the United States and other members of the Western alliance are afraid of including Ukraine for fear of alienating Russia. On the other hand, Ukraine fears domination by Russia and therefore does not want to be part of an Eastern security alliance in which Russia would, obviously, be the central member.

Once this development occurred, the countries of East Central Europe, notably Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and, to a lesser extent, Slovakia, which also continue to fear the reassertion of Russia's influence on its western flank, began to see Ukraine as a buffer between themselves and Russia. But this view of Ukraine as a buffer, while silently recognized, is publicly unacknowledged. This means that Ukraine still does not have a place, or the prospect of a place, in either camp—in either of the security systems.

So what are, I ask, the prospects for Polish-Ukrainian relations in the area of security in the face of this dilemma? Ukraine and Poland are neighbours, and the biggest and most powerful countries between Germany and Russia, which historically have established the tension that made for the division of Europe. And while it is clear that Poland and Ukraine should have close relations and some security arrangements, the form that these should take is quite a complicated problem.

As was mentioned earlier, there have been declarations of solidarity and of intent concerning mutual co-operation between representatives of Poland and Ukraine. In February 1992 Poland signed an agreement to develop trade and other forms of co-operation with Ukraine. This was done at the same time as Hungary and Czechoslovakia signed similar agreements with Ukraine. At the beginning of 1992, at the invitation of the Polish minister of defence, the Ukrainian minister of defence visited Poland; thus began a long discussion on military and security issues. In January 1993 a military agreement was signed between Poland and Ukraine. I do not know the substance of that agreement.

It is clear that Ukraine is in a difficult situation: it has no way out of the security vacuum that has existed in Europe since the end of the cold war and is only being filled, from the West as well as from the East, in such a way as to tear Poland and Ukraine apart. There was an attempt in 1993 to begin a discussion among numerous countries between the Baltic and Black seas. The KPN (Confederation for an Independent Poland) was one of the big promoters of this idea in Poland. In Ukraine it was the Ukrainian Republican party. The idea was that a security alliance could be built that would include the Baltic states, Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, and Turkey and would fill the vacuum between the big powers in the East and West. But this idea was very quickly dropped; it

was made public, but not for long, and President Kravchuk had to deny that there ever was such an idea.

This is the dilemma: Poland is seeking rapid admission into the Western alliance, and this, naturally, means membership, as soon as possible, in NATO. This is a major foreign-policy objective for that country. Ukraine is looking for a new security architecture in Europe in which it can be included. But it seems quite clear that the idea of a Baltic-Black Sea alliance does not find support in East Central Europe. Both Poland and Ukraine are looking for a solution to their insecurity in the face of a threat perceived as coming from Russia. That is the only thing that they have in common on the security front—a perception of where the threat is coming from. Obviously, both countries have a need for close relations: this makes good geopolitical sense on many levels, including the military. But I suggest that the only kind of security architecture in which Poland and Ukraine can both be included successfully is a pan-European security architecture. Such a system would have to include all the countries from the Atlantic Ocean up to and including Russia. I cannot see any way in which Ukraine could join a security system without provoking Russia, unless it is a security system that includes Russia to Ukraine's east, as well as countries to its west. This system, I think, could furnish a place for both Poland and Ukraine, but it would require substantial redefinition and reappraisal by both Poland and Ukraine of their perceptions of Russia, not just of each other.

JAN PAKULSKI

Prof. Pakulski's contribution appears here as a separate paper.

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й—i	я—ia
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л—l	ий—y in endings of personal
м—m	names only.

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